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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence systems are edging into policing.1 Massive
troves of sensor data, unstructured video surveillance feeds, and
many other digital clues allow artificial intelligence to make sense of

1. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109,
113 (2017). See generally Sarah Brayne, The Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Implications of Big Data, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 293, 294 (2018); Elizabeth E. Joh, The New
Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 15, 15–16 (2016).
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otherwise overwhelming amounts of information.2 The ability to harness artificial intelligence for police surveillance and investigation
portends an era-defining shift of power and capabilities.
Leading the charge of game-changing new surveillance technologies is facial recognition—namely the ability to identify faces among
crowds, in videos, in photo datasets, and almost everywhere else.3
From scanning Super Bowl crowds and public streets, to searching
stored arrestee mugshots, police are beginning to experiment with facial recognition technology.4 This development is also causing great
public concern, because the scope and scale of these new surveillance
systems threatens to upend the existing power relationship between
police and the people.5
This Article explores the constitutional design problem at the
heart of facial recognition surveillance systems. One might hope that
the Fourth Amendment6—designed to restrain police power and enacted to limit governmental overreach—would have something to say
about this powerful and overreaching generalized surveillance
2. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017).
3. CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO M. BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN L. CTR. ON
PRIV. & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA
1 (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/The%20
Perpetual%20Line-Up%20-%20Center%20on%20Privacy%20and%20Technology%
20at%20Georgetown%20Law%20-%20121616.pdf [https://perma.cc/S48P-PL53].
4. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Call It Super Bowl Face Scan I, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2001),
https://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/02/41571 [https://perma.cc/
BS67-UJVA]; Dakin Andone, Police Used Facial Recognition To Identify the Capital Gazette Shooter. Here’s How It Works, CNN (June 29, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn
.com/2018/06/29/us/facial-recognition-technology-law-enforcement/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7GHK-UDZH]; Benjamin Powers, Eyes over Baltimore: How Police
Use Military Technology To Secretly Track You, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 6, 2017), https://
www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/eyes-over-baltimore-how-police
-use-military-technology-to-secretly-track-you-126885 [https://perma.cc/F3RK
-CDCK].
5. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 134 (1997) (“Any highintegrity identifier [such as biometric scanning] represents a threat to civil liberties,
because it represents the basis for a ubiquitous identification scheme, and such a
scheme provides enormous power over the populace. All human behavior would become transparent to the state, and the scope for non-conformism and dissent would
be muted to the point envisaged by the anti-Utopian novelists.” (quoting Roger Clarke,
Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy
Issues, 7 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 6, 34 (1994))); see also Malkia Devich-Cyril, Defund Facial
Recognition, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2020/07/defund-facial-recognition/613771 [https://perma.cc/9P29-JD63].
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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technology. But current doctrine and constitutional theory offer little
privacy protection and less practical security than one might expect.
Even worse, by studying the Fourth Amendment through the lens of
facial recognition technology, other doctrinal limitations come into focus.7 Issues of error, bias, unfairness, and opacity in policing more
generally become magnified when trying to design a new surveillance
system for law enforcement.8
Understanding the limitations of the Fourth Amendment in the
face of new law enforcement technology is important for three independent reasons. First, analysis shows that the Fourth Amendment
will not save us from the privacy threat created by facial recognition
surveillance.9 The Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only goes so far, leaving significant privacy gaps to fill.10 Second, the planned designs for facial recognition systems raise core police legitimacy issues around error rates, racial bias, fairness, and
transparency, and the current Fourth Amendment largely ignores
these issues.11 The danger of building an algorithmic model to match
a flawed Fourth Amendment doctrine invites deeper inquiry into the
weaknesses of both the technology and the doctrine itself. Finally, the
revealed weaknesses help shape a more privacy protective and legitimate legislative framework to regulate any future growth of facial
recognition technology.12
Part I of this Article describes how facial recognition technology
will be used by police. This Part looks at the surveillance capabilities
of the technology as well as how police might use different versions to
conduct face surveillance, tracking, identification, and other non-law
enforcement tasks like face verification at the international border.
Part II examines how the Fourth Amendment (as the traditional
constitutional protection against police power) might respond to the
privacy concerns raised by facial recognition technology. The answer
is unfortunately unsatisfying as the Supreme Court’s recent guidance
on digital surveillance searches remains inadequate, leading to a frustrating sense of uncertainty.13 The discussion reveals the gaps in

7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373 (2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part II.A.
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Fourth Amendment doctrine, which will require a legislative response.
Part III examines how the Fourth Amendment fails to address issues of error, racial bias, fairness, and transparency in policing generally, and facial recognition more specifically. This Part reveals how
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine largely sidesteps problems
that are central to police legitimacy. Arguably, the current design of
the Fourth Amendment would allow for the design of facial recognition systems rife with error, bias, unfairness, and opacity, further undermining police legitimacy.
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative framework to regulate facial recognition in a manner consistent with existing Fourth Amendment law. This Part examines the core principles that any legislative
response to facial recognition should include—principles that prohibit law enforcement access to some face surveillance and tracking
technology, tighten the legal protections for access to face identification technology, and address the recurring concerns of bias, accuracy,
transparency, fairness, and privacy in all types of facial recognition
technology.
By studying the Fourth Amendment through the lens of facial
recognition technology, new insights surface about the doctrine’s limitations as a check on constitutional policing. Equally revealing, however, is the new legislative framework that emerges to regulate systems of digital surveillance like facial recognition.
I. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
If there is one technological innovation that has gotten the attention of the privacy and civil rights community it is facial recognition.14
The simple idea behind facial recognition is to have a computer program automatically match a digital image of a face with a similar digital image of a face in a stored database.15 To work, a computer
14. See, e.g., Matt Cagle & Nicole A. Ozer, Amazon Teams Up with Law Enforcement
To Deploy Dangerous New Face Recognition Technology, ACLU N. CAL. (May 22, 2018),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/amazon-teams-law-enforcement-deploy-dangerous
-new-face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/WYF4-7XDT]; Fran Spielman,
ACLU Sounds the Alarm About Bill Allowing Use of Drones To Monitor Protesters, CHI.
SUN-TIMES (May 1, 2018, 5:17 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/aclu
-sounds-the-alarm-about-bill-allowing-use-of-drones-to-monitor-protesters [https://
perma.cc/T64R-SS94]; GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3.
15. Kirill Levashov, The Rise of a New Type of Surveillance for Which the Law
Wasn’t Ready, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 164, 167–68 (2013) (“Facial recognition . . .
software is able to detect and isolate human faces captured by the camera and analyze
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program is run on existing digital photographs or video surveillance
cameras turning images into a digital network of identifiable objects
and faces.16 As will be discussed in this Part, there are different types
of facial recognition technologies with corresponding applications for
police use.
A. THE TECHNOLOGY
Facial recognition is a digital matching technology.17 In practice,
digital images of faces are broken down into identifiable component
parts.18 Traditionally, facial recognition technology has been “featurebased,” which utilizes identifying measures like one’s eyes, nose, and
mouth and the distances between these features,19 or “appearance-

them using an algorithm that extracts identifying features. The algorithm identifies
and measures ‘nodal points’ on the face, which are defined by the peaks and valleys
that make up human facial features. Using these measurements, the algorithm determines an individual’s identifying characteristics, such as distance between the eyes,
width of the nose, shape of cheekbones, and the length of the jawline.”); Clare Garvie &
Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/
the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognition-systems/476991 [https://perma.cc/4L5J
-AXR4].
16. JOY BUOLAMWINI, VICENTE ORDÓÑEZ, JAMIE MORGENSTERN & ERIK LEARNED-MILLER, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES: A PRIMER 8–13 (2020), https://global-uploads
.webflow.com/5e027ca188c99e3515b404b7/5ed1002058516c11edc66a14_FRTs
PrimerMay2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8CH-JAV3].
17. For purposes of this Article, “facial recognition” will be used as a generic term
covering all of the different types of face matching technology. “Facial recognition” is
the global term whereas face surveillance, face identification, face tracking, and face
verification are more specific types of facial recognition technology.
18. See Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy
Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1871 n.14 (2007).
19. Jagdish Chandra Joshi & K.K. Gupta, Face Recognition Technology: A Review, 8
IUP J. TELECOMMS. 53, 54 (2016) (“[F]eature-based methods . . . are based on local facial
characteristics (such as eyes, nose and mouth) and use parameters such as angles and
distances between ducial points on the face as descriptors for face recognition.”); Relly
Victoria Virgil Petrescu, Face Recognition as a Biometric Application, 3 J. MECHATRONICS
& ROBOTICS 237, 240 (2019) (“Certain face recognition algorithms identify facial features by extracting markers or features from a face-to-face image. For example, an algorithm can analyze the position, size and/or relative shape of the eyes, nose, cheekbones and jaw. These features are then used to look for other matching features.”);
Mary Grace Galterio, Simi Angelic Shavit & Thaier Hayajneh, A Review of Facial Biometrics Security for Smart Devices, 7 MDPI COMPUTS. 37, at 3 (2018) (“Face metric uses the
normal face picture, or the canonical image, to inspect special features of the face.
These features include the distance between the eyes, distances of eyes to nose, mouth
to nose, and many others. These metrics are used and stored as a template to be compared to for future recognition.”).
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based,” which attempts to match the whole face image.20 In recent
years, other forms of identification have emerged that look at skin textures,21 shadows,22 three-dimensional models,23 or some combination
of all of these types.24
In simple form, the digital “faceprint” is like a digital fingerprint,
a map written in code that measures the distance between features,
lines, and facial elements or some other digital code.25 When one digital representation of a face is compared to another digital representation of a face, and the code lines up the same, the computer will
deem the process a “match.”26 These digitized images are stored in
large datasets so that a computer model can train itself on what constitutes a match.27 In many systems, returned matches involve more
than one image and may involve as many as twenty to fifty similar
faceprints.28 These face images are provided in order of the closeness
of an overlap of the fixed digital features. So, for example, a police

20. Joshi & Gupta, supra note 19, at 53–54 (“Appearance-based methods consider
the global properties of the face and use the whole face image (or some specific image
regions) to extract facial features.”); Petrescu, supra note 19, at 240 (“Other algorithms
normalize a gallery of images and compress the face data, saving only image data that
is useful for face recognition. A probe image is then compared to face data.”).
21. Petrescu, supra note 19, at 241 (“Another emerging trend uses the visual details of the skin as captured in standard or scanned digital images. This technique,
called Skin Texture Analysis, transforms lines, patterns and unique stains into a person’s skin in a mathematical space.”).
22. Galterio et al., supra note 19, at 3 (“The eigenface technology works differently, as it changes the presented face’s lighting by using different scales of light and
dark in a specific pattern. The different light and dark areas computed on the face cause
the picture displayed to not actually look like a face anymore. The pattern created from
the shaded areas is very important, however, as it is a way to portray and calculate
how the different features of the face are singled out and to evaluate the symmetry of
the face. The pattern is calculated to a degree of eigenfaces, or eigenvectors, that is
determined by including facial hair or the size of facial features. Using different numbers of eigenvectors to calculate a face can allow for easy reconstruction.”).
23. Petrescu, supra note 19, at 240–41 (“Three-dimensional face recognition
technology uses 3D sensors to capture information about the shape of a face. This information is then used to identify distinctive features on the surface of a face, such as
the outline of the eye, nose and chin sockets.”).
24. Petrescu, supra note 19, at 241.
25. See generally Levashov, supra note 15.
26. See BUOLAMWINI ET AL., supra note 16, at 10–14.
27. See GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 9 (describing how face recognition algorithms train themselves to identify matches).
28. See BUOLAMWINI ET AL., supra note 16, at 12 (describing how faceprints with a
similarity score higher than a set threshold are considered matches).
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officer who seeks a match for a probe photograph of a suspect may
receive twenty to fifty faceprints back as possible matches.29
To work, systems must acquire faces, classify them, train the data,
and test the training sets, so the systems can identify the overlapping
nodal points of any face in the system.30 After the system returns a list
of matching faceprints, an analyst will review the images to select a
final suspect for investigation (if any).31
Facial recognition technology comes in different forms and can
be used for different purposes.32 As will be discussed in more detail
below, one use is face surveillance which involves the generalized
mass identification of individuals using face matching technology.33
Face surveillance has been used in China as a means to identify people
on busy streets or in train stations.34 Another use is face identification
which involves the matching of a particular face (a suspect) to a database of existing photographs (a mugshot database or DMV records).35
Face identification is being piloted by police as a revolutionary
29. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 9 (“Most police face recognition systems will
output either the top few most similar photos or all photos above a certain similarity
threshold.”).
30. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-621, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: COMMERCIAL USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 3–4 (2015), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/680/671764.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9GG-J7NS].
31. Teresa Wiltz, Facial Recognition Software Prompts Privacy, Racism Concerns in
Cities and States, PEW STATELINE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/08/09/facial-recognition-software
-prompts-privacy-racism-concerns-in-cities-and-states [https://perma.cc/4RJU
-CV88] (“[A]fter the software identifies a possible match, two analysts trained in biometrics by the FBI study the photograph.”).
32. See Galterio et al., supra note 19, at 3–4 (describing the different forms of facial recognition technology and the purposes for which it can be used).
33. “Face surveillance” is defined here in as the mass collection of faceprints for
pure monitoring and surveillance purposes. This will be distinguished from “face identification” which involves the matching of face images only after police have some individualized suspicion of an individual with static photo datasets.
34. Simon Denyer, China’s Watchful Eye: Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big
Drive for Total Surveillance, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp
-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance [https://perma.cc/YT62-RXTC]; Josh Chin, Chinese Police Add Facial-Recognition Glasses to Surveillance Arsenal, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7,
2018, 6:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-police-go-robocop-with
-facial-recognition-glasses-1518004353 [https://perma.cc/9J3S-VKFG].
35. Joy Buolamwini, Response: Racial and Gender Bias in Amazon Rekognition—
Commercial AI System for Analyzing Faces, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2019), https://medium
.com/@Joy.Buolamwini/response-racial-and-gender-bias-in-amazon-rekognition
-commercial-ai-system-for-analyzing-faces-a289222eeced [https://perma.cc/U2F3
-LT4T] (“Facial identification . . . involves trying to match a face to a person of interest
in an existing database of faces.”).
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investigative tool akin to DNA matching36 and is also being piloted in
some commercial venues to enhance private security.37 Third, there is
face tracking, which is a hybrid of face surveillance and face identification.38 Face tracking involves police use of stored or real time video
to track a targeted suspect.39 For example, after a bank robbery, police
could search city video feeds to find the path of the fleeing suspect.40
The main difference between face tracking and face identification is
that face tracking provides locational information about the suspect.
Finally, there is face verification, which involves confirming that a particular human face present before the camera matches a preset digital
image of that face.41 Face verification is already being piloted at international borders to confirm identity with stored passport photographs42 and in airports to replace airplane boarding passes.43

36. See, e.g., Asha Barbaschow, How One Sheriff’s Office Is Using Machine Learning
to Uncover Persons of Interest, ZDNET (Nov. 30, 2017, 11:31 PM), https://www.zdnet
.com/article/how-one-sheriffs-office-is-using-machine-learning-to-uncover-persons
-of-interest [https://perma.cc/L9RY-NE3F].
37. See, e.g., Lisa Respers France, Taylor Swift Reportedly Used Facial Recognition
to Try to ID Stalkers, CNN (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/13/
entertainment/taylor-swift-facial-recognition/index.html [https://perma.cc/F9PW
-NMQ3].
38. I am using the term “face tracking” in the context of facial recognition to distinguish it from generalized surveillance and identification. Tracking allows locational
data to be uncovered as a result of a facial recognition match.
39. See GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (describing how facial recognition programs can compare faceprints to live video feeds).
40. See id.
41. Buolamwini, supra note 35 (“Some facial recognition is used to perform tasks
like unlocking a phone or getting access to a bank account. This is known as facial verification.”).
42. Mallory Locklear, DHS Will Use Facial Recognition To Scan Travelers at the Border, ENGADGET (June 5, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/05/dhs-facial
-recognition-scan-travelers-at-border [https://perma.cc/V4E8-7N7M]; Petrescu, supra note 19, at 238 (“Face recognition has become a normal activity in many airports
around the world. Many people today have a so-called biometric passport that allows
them to go faster to the gate without having to be controlled.”); id. at 242 (“The Australian Border Service and New Zealand have created an automated border processing
system called SmartGate, which uses face recognition, which compares the passenger’s
face with the e-passport microchip data.”).
43. Lori Aratani, Your Face Is Your Boarding Pass at This Airport, WASH. POST (Dec.
4, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/12/04/your-face
-is-your-boarding-pass-this-airport [https://perma.cc/9WW3-ZEG4] (“An increasing
number of airports are using biometrics to process passengers as they move through
the system. Dulles International Airport recently unveiled a system that uses iPads to
scan passengers’ faces before they board flights. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
has been using biometrics to track passengers entering the U.S.”).
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Of the four types of facial recognition, face verification tends to be
the most accurate because the match is a binary, confirmatory yes/no
choice built around a high quality photo like a passport or government
identification card.44 Either the face image from your passport
matches the digital photo just taken of you standing in the airport line
or not (there is no searching of a larger dataset to compare the images
against).45 On the other hand, face identification requires searching
through thousands (or millions) of images for the appropriate match
and finding the “best” match.46 Still portraits like those in passport or
drivers’ license identifications are easier to match than photographs
taken of people while moving or with hats or glasses, which require
understanding angles, perspectives, and lighting.47 Face surveillance
and face tracking are the most complicated to use because the matches
are being done in real time or across vast streams of digital images
with many more possibilities for error or misidentification.48 Issues of
age, race, clothing, facial hair, hair style, hats and other accessories all
can impact the accuracy of the identification done at scale.49

44. Eisa Anis Ishrat Ullah & M. Akheela Khanum, A Comparative Study of Facial
Recognition Systems, 9 INT’L J. ADVANCED RSCH. COMPUT. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2) 114,
114 (2018) (“A facial recognition algorithm has its focus on two main tasks i.e. recognition and verification with verification being much more easier as compared to recognition, as verification does a kind of binary mapping by verifying the input image which
is already present in the database.”).
45. Marcy Mason, Biometric Breakthrough: How CBP Is Meeting Its Mandate and
Keeping America Safe, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/
cbp-biometric-testing [https://perma.cc/GZM6-KJ2Y] (stating that when a passenger
has their picture taken, it is compared to “his or her gallery of photos”).
46. See Drew Harwell, Oregon Became a Testing Ground for Amazon’s FacialRecognition Policing. But What if Rekognition Gets It Wrong?, WASH. POST (Apr. 30,
2019, 4:19 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/30/
amazons-facial-recognition-technology-is-supercharging-local-police [https://
perma.cc/LA3C-JD8K] (describing how police departments use facial-recognition algorithms to search through hundreds of thousands of images to find a match).
47. See Levashov, supra note 15, at 169 (stating that “[e]ven slight changes, like
adding makeup,” can make finding a match difficult).
48. Ullah & Akheela Khanum, supra note 44 (“The major concern for building
these systems has remained the accuracy of these systems which varies significantly
when put in an unconstrained environment. These systems have to particularly deal
with issues such as illumination, lightning, brightness effect, variable poses, hairstyles,
facial expressions, noise in the input image.”).
49. BUOLAMWINI ET AL., supra note 16, at 12 (“Variations in many factors, such as
hairstyle, camera angle, image resolution, lighting, and make-up, can all have significant impacts on faceprints, resulting in the faceprints of a single individual having significant variability.”).
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To work as intended, facial recognition needs at least two sets of
images:50 a photograph or collection of known faces digitized to their
faceprint and a second digital dataset to match those faceprints
against.51 The set of faceprints can come from still images (e.g.,
driver’s license photos, mugshot photos, Facebook photos), and once
digitized can be matched to other still photos or live or stored video
stream (e.g., surveillance cameras, police-worn body cameras, private
surveillance cameras).52 The tremendous scale of digital photographs,
video feeds, and growing sophistication of video analytics makes the
ability to match faces possible in a wide variety of settings.53
B. POLICE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Facial recognition surveillance technology is a tool that has many
possible uses for law enforcement.54 Faces can be matched for generalized surveillance purposes, targeted tracking purposes, or just as a
means of confirming identity for law enforcement and non-law enforcement purposes.55 Each potential use raises different Fourth
Amendment questions. This Section provides a brief overview of the
types of facial recognition technology that will be of most interest to
law enforcement.56
50.
51.
52.
53.

See BUOLAMWINI ET AL., supra note 16.
See id.
GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 10–12.
Police Unlock AI’s Potential To Monitor, Surveil and Solve Crimes, WALL ST. J.
VIDEO (May 30, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/video/police-unlock-ai
-potential-to-monitor-surveil-and-solve-crimes/819D5F78-22BC-4A41-9517AE31BE
3C5E7E.html [https://perma.cc/HX8A-ZJ5J] (showing how police departments employ face-recognition technology).
54. Galterio et al., supra note 19 (“Using facial recognition software for surveillance purposes would assist government authorities in locating certain criminals, extremists, and missing children.”); Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License
Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 2:54
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state
-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches [https://perma
.cc/KDM2-6YJQ].
55. Nila Bala & Caleb Watney, What Are the Proper Limits on Police Use of Facial
Recognition?, BROOKINGS INST. (June 20, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2019/06/20/what-are-the-proper-limits-on-police-use-of-facial
-recognition [https://perma.cc/2HGB-BFRY]; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where It Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020) https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html [https://
perma.cc/3UXM-3E5W].
56. Some portions of this Article were originally written as testimony to the
House Oversight Committee on how best to regulate facial recognition technologies.
See Facial Recognition Technology (Part 1): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties:
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1. Face Surveillance
Face surveillance involves the generalized monitoring of public
places or third-party image sets using facial surveillance technologies
to match faces with a prepopulated list of face images held by the government.57 Police could use “face surveillance” in three ways: (1) scanning stored video footage to identify all faces in the stored data; (2)
real-time scanning of video surveillance to identify all faces passing by
the cameras; and (3) datamining stored images from third-party platforms to identify individuals via their photographs. Each of these different uses will be discussed in turn.
a. Face Surveillance: Searching Stored Video Footage
One potential form of face surveillance is the ability to search
stored video footage from networked surveillance cameras.58 Imagine
the ability to sort through stored digital video surveillance to identify
particular people as they travel through public streets or on public
transportation.59 These cameras can be government-owned, private,
or from mobile devices such as police-worn body cameras.60 As digital
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 115th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/
GO00/20190522/109521/HHRG-116-GO00-Wstate-FergusonA-20190522.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8YX-Q4UM].
57. See generally Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still
Do: Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 88, 94 (2017) (“Generally the facial recognition systems are designed today to seek
out patterns in captured images that compare favorably to facial model. Systems are
typically programmed such that when a pattern is found to resemble a facial model,
the software generates the assumption that there is a face presented in the photo.”).
58. See Clare Garvie & Laura Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the
United States, GEO. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH.: AM. UNDER WATCH (May 16, 2019), https://
www.americaunderwatch.com [https://perma.cc/P6RF-56EB] (describing how various police departments use a network of surveillance cameras to conduct face surveillance).
59. See Allie Gross, Experts: Duggan’s Denial of Facial Recognition Software Hinges
on 3 Words, DET. FREE PRESS (July 16, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/detroit/2019/07/16/duggan-war-of-words-surveillance
-tech/1701604001 [https://perma.cc/9N2H-U7HW] (describing how the Detroit Police Department’s facial recognition technology takes still images from videos to find a
match).
60. See Chris Burt, Motorola Could Offer Facial Recognition with Police Body Cameras with WatchGuard Acquisition, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (July 23, 2019), https://www
.biometricupdate.com/201907/motorola-could-offer-facial-recognition-with-police
-body-cameras-with-watchguard-acquisition [https://perma.cc/6RQG-EHGP]. But see
Madeline Purdue, Axon Body-Camera Supplier Will Not Use Facial Recognition in Its
Products – For Now, USA TODAY (July 1, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
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storage becomes cheaper and more available, and as video analytics
technology becomes more sophisticated, the vast hours of daily video
footage can be datamined for identifiable faces.61 Face surveillance
can match any face in a government dataset to any matching face captured in surveillance data. To be clear, the search in stored footage is
not based on any individualized suspicion of a crime or to support a
particular criminal investigation but merely for generalized monitoring of people as they come into contact with the cameras.62 The resulting scans could locate individuals at any point they are identified by a
camera, creating a virtual retrospective map of movements and activities over time.63
b. Face Surveillance: Real-Time Monitoring
Another potential form of face surveillance technology is realtime public monitoring. The technology already exists (and is being
used in countries like China) to watch the streets and identify people
in public spaces using pattern-matching technology.64 Imagine a TV
monitor of a city street with every human figure digitally framed by a
box around his/her/their face. As they pass by cameras, personal information displays because the surveillance system has matched a
prepopulated faceprint to their real-time presence.65 Again, in this
type of monitoring there is no individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. Generally, the justification for use is a form of public
safety or social control, for example, to identify all of the people

story/tech/2019/07/01/axon-rejects-facial-recognition-software-body-cameras
-now/1601789001 [https://perma.cc/324C-AALN].
61. Police Unlock AI’s Potential To Monitor, Surveil and Solve Crimes, supra note
53.
62. Garvie & Moy, supra note 58 (“With such a system, all people caught on camera . . . are scanned, their faces compared against the face recognition database on
file.”).
63. Id. (“If deployed pervasively, real-time video surveillance threatens to create
a world where, once you set foot outside, the government can track your every move.”).
64. See Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. To
Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/
14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9QR-PG6F]; Chinese Man Caught by Facial Recognition at Pop Concert, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-4375
1276 [https://perma.cc/9DFT-5H3C].
65. Paul Mozur, Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams, A.I. Shame and Lots of Cameras,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china
-surveillance-technology.html [https://perma.cc/8J37-2NEK] (“China has an estimated 200 million surveillance cameras.”).
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jaywalking,66 or frequenting a sporting event, or entering a gun
show.67 Cameras can be fixed, mobile, on drones, or privately owned.
c.

Face Surveillance: Datamining Third-Party Stored Images

The same type of generalized face surveillance can be done by
scanning private photo datasets or private digital images. Billions of
images and videos exist in third-party systems like Facebook, Google,
Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and other platforms.68 Acquiring those
images and matching them would allow law enforcement to build dossiers of individuals in a community.69 Again, this type of face surveillance match would not be done for a particularized law enforcement
purpose but rather to gather intelligence about individuals in the community.70 The resulting identifications could involve locational details
(both in metadata of the photos and from the context or content of the
photos themselves), personal connections, likes, interests, and

66. Christina Zhao, Jaywalking in China: Facial Recognition Surveillance Will Soon
Fine Citizens via Text Message, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:34 AM), https://www
.newsweek.com/jaywalking-china-facial-recognition-surveillance-will-soon-fine
-citizens-text-861401 [https://perma.cc/H99T-NZAZ].
67. See generally Chris Burt, NEC Facial Biometrics to Be Deployed for Rugby World
Cup and Busiest International Airport in Japan, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201811/nec-facial-biometric-to-be-deployed
-for-rugby-world-cup-and-busiest-international-airport-in-japan [https://perma.cc/
VAJ9-Z236]; Dave Gershgorn, Carnival Cruises, Delta, and 70 Countries Use a Facial
Recognition Company You’ve Never Heard of, MEDIUM: ONEZERO (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
onezero.medium.com/nec-is-the-most-important-facial-recognition-company-you’ve
-never-heard-of-12381d530510 [https://perma.cc/6BDD-E8WJ].
68. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We
Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/
technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/G895
-W3LJ] (describing a facial recognition app reportedly supported by three billion images from Facebook, YouTube, and other websites); Petrescu, supra note 19, at 242
(describing a “deep learning facial recognition system created by a Facebook research
group” trained on four million Facebook photos that is said to be “97% correct”).
69. Heather Kelly & Rachel Lerman, America Is Awash in Cameras, a Double-Edged
Sword for Protesters and Police, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/03/cameras-surveillance-police
-protesters [https://perma.cc/F4GX-XDBJ]; Aaron Boyd, ICE Outlines How Investigators Rely on Third-Party Facial Recognition Services, NEXTGOV (June 2, 2020), https://
www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/06/ice-outlines-how-investigators-relythird-party-facial-recognition-services/165846 [https://perma.cc/SL4J-DHUK].
70. Cf. Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 10, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/map
-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties [https://perma.cc/
TC22-49A3] (describing how law enforcement has used social media monitoring software to monitor protests).
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activities.71 For example, the latest fabulous photo of your family
beach vacation not only shows your family, associations, and activities, but also the day, time, and location of the photo.72 One of the realities of digital photographs is that, by design, they encode information about location, time, date, camera type, and thus details about
where, when, and how the photo was taken.73 A composite of locational metadata can thus reveal interests, activities, and travel patterns through still digital photographs.
2. Face Identification74
Investigative face identification technology differs from generalized face surveillance because police have suspicion about a particular
person. Police may have an image from a crime scene (e.g., surveillance tape, witness’s iPhone video) or they might have a suspect’s photograph and wish to match it with different photo datasets.75
In what has been a common practice in some jurisdictions, police
may wish to match a target’s face image with a database of other face
images in their possession.76 These databases could be drivers’ license
71. See Richard Matthews, How Law Enforcement Decodes Your Photos, CONVERSA(June 22, 2017, 4:04 PM), http://theconversation.com/explainer-how-law
-enforcement-decodes-your-photos-78828 [https://perma.cc/7RQ8-MX5C]; Thomas
Germain, How a Photo’s Hidden ‘Exif’ Data Exposes Your Personal Information, CONSUMER REPS. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/what-can-you
-tell-from-photo-exif-data [https://perma.cc/YPG7-54AS].
72. See Matthews, supra note 71; Germain, supra note 71.
73. Germain, supra note 71.
74. Note that in past discussions of the subject, I have used the term “face recognition” to cover the categories of “face identification” and “face tracking.” See, e.g., Facial Recognition Technology (Part 1): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, supra note 56. In this Article, I use the
terms “face identification” and “face tracking” instead of “face recognition” for greater
clarity and precision.
75. See Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in
America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019, 3:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us
-news/how-facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251
[https://perma.cc/P3A4-KYJR]; Harwell, supra note 46.
76. See James O’Neill, Opinion, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial
-recognition-police-new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/HDY6-FJ35] (“When detectives obtain useful video in an investigation, they can provide it to the Facial Identification Section, of the Detective Bureau. An algorithm makes a template of the face,
measuring the shapes of features and their relative distances from each other. A database consisting solely of arrest photos is then searched as the sole source of potential
candidates . . . .”); see also Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial
TION
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photos (state DMV records), mugshot arrest photos (police-generated
photos), or other more informal suspect identification systems (e.g.,
gang databases, jail photographs, prosecution data management systems).77 In this scenario, police have an identified suspect and want to
confirm the identity of the suspect through existing photo datasets.78
This type of facial identification process is used by the FBI
through local state partners, and in certain states. For example, in a
year-and-a-half span between 2017 and 2019, the FBI conducted
152,500 searches for law enforcement investigations.79 In New York
City, NYPD conducted 7,024 searches in 2018.80 The Washington Post
reported that one small Oregon police department used commercial
software created by Amazon to conduct investigatory searches in a
variety of cases.81 Police in Detroit, Michigan, have also admitted to
using this type of facial recognition matching to track down violent
suspects.82
-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/458E-SR99]; Ella Torres, Black Man
Wrongfully Arrested Because of Incorrect Facial Recognition, ABC NEWS (June 25, 2020,
1:01 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/black-man-wrongfully-arrested-incorrect
-facial-recognition/story?id=71425751 [https://perma.cc/JF9M-3C8E].
77. Amy Harmon, As Cameras Track Detroit’s Residents, a Debate Ensues over
Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/
detroit-facial-recognition-cameras.html [https://perma.cc/B5L2-9MS7] (describing a
Detroit program that compares faces on video to “50 million driver’s license
photographs and mug shots contained in a Michigan police database”); see also Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Prosecution and Brady, 67 UCLA L. REV. 180, 185–215
(2020) (describing various prosecution databases filled with photos of suspects).
78. See Schuppe, supra note 75 (describing how police use facial recognition to
identify suspects from surveillance videos).
79. Facial Recognition Technology (Part II): Ensuring Transparency in Government
Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 21 (2019) (statement of Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information
Services, FBI).
80. O’Neill, supra note 76 (“[I]n 1,851 cases possible matches were returned,
leading to 998 arrests.”).
81. Harwell, supra note 46.
82. Harmon, supra note 77 (“Facial recognition, the Detroit police stress, has
indeed helped lead to arrests. In late May, for instance, officers ran a video image
through facial recognition after survivors of a shooting directed police officers to a gas
station equipped with Green Light cameras where they had met with a man now
charged with three counts of first-degree murder and two counts of assault. The lead
generated by the software matched the description provided by the witnesses.”). But
see Robert Williams, Opinion, I Was Wrongfully Arrested Because of Facial Recognition.
Why Are Police Allowed to Use It?, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/24/i-was-wrongfully-arrested
-because-facial-recognition-why-are-police-allowed-use-this-technology [https://
perma.cc/XRD7-JFVR] (describing an innocent man’s experience of being arrested for
a non-violent crime based on Detroit police’s use of facial recognition technology).

2021]

FACIAL RECOGNITION

1121

Face identification, as defined here, is limited to static photographs (not streaming video) and is used only after a crime has been
committed to identify people. In the near future, however, this type of
database matching could even be used during an ongoing investigation or during a police traffic stop.83 Private companies are already
selling the capabilities to do the search on a mobile phone.84 Especially
in a situation involving a suspect unwilling or unable to provide identification, the ability to quickly identify someone by their photo would
be useful.85
One private company, Clearview AI, was revealed to have scraped
billions of face images off public facing Internet and social media sites
and created its own database for law enforcement.86 Clearview AI had
developed partnerships with hundreds of law enforcement and local
police departments and conducted facial recognition searches to identify suspects.87 Because Clearview scraped the images for its database
from sites like Twitter—in violation of their policies—the company’s
practices were of dubious legality, but using its database was as

83. See Marco della Cava, California Could Become First to Limit Facial Recognition
Technology; Police Aren’t Happy, USA TODAY (June 17, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/16/california-could-limit-how-police
-use-facial-recognition-technology/1456448001 [https://perma.cc/9AZS-8P5F]
(“State law enforcement officials here do not now employ the technology [facial recognition in body cameras] . . . . But some police officials oppose the bill on the grounds
that a valuable tool could be lost.”).
84. See, e.g., FACEFIRST, http://web.archive.org/web/20200620203318/https://
www.facefirst.com/industry/law-enforcement-face-recognition.
85. See Harwell, supra note 46 (“[T]he sheriff’s office sets its own rules for facialrecognition use and allows deputies to use the tool to identify dead bodies, unconscious suspects and people who refused to give their name.”).
86. Hill, supra note 68; Ina Fried, Clearview Brings Privacy Concerns from Facial
Recognition into Focus, AXIOS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.axios.com/clearview
-facial-recognition-law-enforcement-ac069290-b83e-4934-a9f0-0b782af82588.html
[https://perma.cc/X4S6-QJFG] (chronicling the fallout from an exposé in The New York
Times).
87. Hill, supra note 68; Fried, supra note 86; see also Corinne Reichert, Clearview
AI Is Looking to Expand Globally, Report Says, CNET (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www
.cnet.com/news/clearview-ai-reportedly-looking-to-expand-globally [https://perma
.cc/4UXM-6SRH] (reporting that the company wants to sell its technology to law enforcement in Australia, Dubai, Sweden, Nigeria, and other countries).
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simple as running a Google search.88 Clearview AI is not alone, however, in selling facial recognition to law enforcement.89
3. Face Tracking
“Face tracking” is a term I will be using to describe a hybrid between face surveillance and face identification because it involves the
same generalized video facial recognition surveillance technologies
but with particularized suspicion of a specific target. Police are not
just passively monitoring for generalized surveillance purposes but
actively investigating a particular crime with an identifiable suspect
using facial recognition matching software. As a general matter, police
might use what I am terming “face tracking” in three different ways:
(1) scanning stored video footage to identify a targeted face in the
crowd; (2) scanning real-time video feeds to identify a targeted face;
and (3) scanning image databases from private third-party platforms
to identify a targeted face.
a. Face Tracking: Searching Stored Video Footage
After a crime, police may wish to run a face image they possess
against stored video surveillance from a network of city cameras.90
The same matching technology can be used to search months of stored
surveillance footage, networks of video feeds, or growing image databases for images to compare with the target’s face.91 For example,
searching stored video footage from a network of cameras could reveal the location of the “target” over time, including time, date, place,

88. Louise Matsakis, Scraping the Web Is a Powerful Tool. Clearview AI Abused It,
WIRED (Jan. 25, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-ai-scraping
-web [https://perma.cc/7VTF-KS66]; Gisela Perez & Hilary Cook, Google, YouTube,
Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist Letters to Facial Recognition App that Helps
Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:15 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-and-desist-letter-to-facial
-recognition-app [https://perma.cc/UE64-UZBA]; Jon Porter, Facebook and LinkedIn
Are Latest to Demand Clearview Stop Scraping Images for Facial Recognition Tech,
VERGE (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/6/21126063/facebook
-clearview-ai-image-scraping-facial-recognition-database-terms-of-service-twitter
-youtube [https://perma.cc/AX4H-A9BJ].
89. Nicolás Rivero, The Little-Known AI Firms Whose Facial Recognition Tech Led
to a False Arrest, QUARTZ (June 26, 2020), https://qz.com/1873731/the-unknown
-firms-whose-facial-recognition-led-to-a-false-arrest [https://perma.cc/8MMN
-H9V6] (describing the companies that developed and sold the facial recognition technology that Detroit police used when they arrested an innocent man).
90. Garvie & Moy, supra note 58.
91. Id.
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and patterns of movement.92 In addition, because other identifying
data about the locations exist, the facial recognition matches could reveal the target’s interests, employment, religious preferences, health
issues, or legal troubles.93 Over time, a mosaic of a person’s activities
would be revealed by the location of the face identified by face tracking.
It is important to recognize that the difference between face surveillance and face tracking, when it comes to stored footage, is less the
technology than the purpose of why the scan is being conducted. The
facial recognition technology is undertaking the same matching process in both but with a particularized justification for face tracking
(i.e., looking for one particular face, not identifying all faces). But, as
may be evident, the danger of widespread mass surveillance exists
with both types, as the line between generalized surveillance and particularized tracking is not always so clear.
b. Face Tracking: Real-Time Scans
Networked video systems also create the potential to track suspects in real-time.94 A networked system of real-time face tracking
would be able to provide the specific location of a “wanted” suspect.95
The “hit” or “match” would alert police to the location of a particular
person at a particular time in the city.96 In January 2020, the London
Metropolitan Police rolled out a facial recognition surveillance tool
that seeks to match faces with a stored “watch list.”97 Of course, in order to be able to track that one target, surveillance cameras with the
ability to match other faces would be required to be in effect. This
same type of matching would also work with single (non-networked)
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see Harmon, supra note 77 (“Although the [Detroit Police D]epartment has
the ability to implement real-time screening of anyone who passes by a camera—as
detailed in a recent report by the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology—there is no plan to use it, he said, except in extraordinary circumstances.”).
96. See Police Unlock AI’s Potential To Monitor, Surveil and Solve Crimes, supra note
53 (demonstrating how police can use artificial intelligence to track a suspect).
97. Natasha Lomas, London’s Met Police Switches on Live Facial Recognition, Flying
in the Face of Human Rights Concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2020, 7:07 AM), https://
techcrunch.com/2020/01/24/londons-met-police-switches-on-live-facial
-recognition-flying-in-face-of-human-rights-concerns [https://perma.cc/Y9QR
-L7E6]; Jason Douglas & Parmy Olson, London Police to Start Using Facial Recognition
Cameras, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/london
-police-to-start-using-facial-recognition-cameras-11579895367 [https://perma.cc/
A3AZ-DARA].
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cameras. A single camera or drone with camera could spot a particular
person at a particular place based on a face recognition match from a
pre-populated dataset.
c.

Face Tracking: Private Third-Party Image Scans
Private third-party providers hold massive numbers of face images, all potentially searchable with similar pattern matching technology.98 Police access to this dataset (via informal request, subpoena,
warrant, or purchase) can help identify suspects, groups, and associates.99 Third-party datasets of photos not only provide images and
identification but also locational data from metadata that can reveal
where and when the photos were taken.100 While unstructured, this
long-term, aggregated locational information could be revealed from
the collected metadata and inferences from the photographs. Police
are already monitoring social media for gang violence and threats, so
this would just be a slight change in practice.101
4. Non-Law Enforcement Purposes
Police may wish to use face matching for non-law enforcement
purposes. Face verification technologies at airports or borders or even
to enhance the security of public events may be utilized not for investigatory policing but for public safety purposes.102 While the lines
98. Facebook users alone upload 350 million photos per day. Salman Aslam, Facebook by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics [https://perma.cc/936W
-4Z9G].
99. O’Neill, supra note 76 (describing how police could “find social media images
of a person at a birthday party wearing the same clothing as the suspect in a robbery”
using facial recognition technology, leading to a break in a case).
100. Matthews, supra note 71 (explaining metadata and noting that Facebook “typically removes metadata from uploaded images”); Germain, supra note 71 (“If you upload pictures to Craigslist, Facebook, Imgur, Instagram, Twitter, or WhatsApp, the Exif
data won’t be available to the people who see them. That doesn’t mean social media
companies don’t find any use for it, however.”).
101. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Seeking Clues to Gangs and
Crime, Detectives Monitor Internet Rap Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www
.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/seeking-clues-to-gangs-and-crime-detectives
-monitor-internet-rap-videos.html [https://perma.cc/E2FC-XYN9] (describing how
police and prosecutors listen to local rap videos to understand recent crimes); Ben
Austen, Public Enemies: Social Media Is Fueling Gang Wars in Chicago, WIRED (Sept. 17,
2013, 6:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/09/gangs-of-social-media [https://
perma.cc/MD29-DC4N] (explaining how police monitor social media to anticipate and
respond to crimes).
102. See Joshi & Gupta, supra note 19, at 58 (articulating a variety of uses for facial
recognition technology).
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between security, policing, and public safety are blurry, some non-law
enforcement uses include monitoring high security areas103 or government-controlled areas such as public or rent-controlled housing.104
In other cases, facial recognition can be used to identify victims
of crime or lost children, where police focus on their emergency response, not their investigation.105 The limitations here involve the
non-law enforcement purpose for which the face surveillance or face
recognition technology is used.
These non-law enforcement uses seemingly avoid some of the
problems of general face surveillance or investigatory face tracking,
but, in fact, raise equally complicated questions. Regardless of how
systems collect images, how their algorithms match faces, or why users conduct a search, these systems allow massive scans of large portions of the population. As a simple point, to find the lost child in the
city, the surveillance system needs to be able to identify humans, children, boys, girls, races, face types, and then match the target face to all
the other identified faces. This mass surveillance capability also exists
if the dataset consists of Facebook images. Once we build the architecture of surveillance that supports non-law enforcement matching, we
have by necessity also created the capabilities for police use.

103. See Jon Schuppe, Secret Service Tests Facial Recognition Surveillance System
Outside White House, NBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/secret-service-tests-facial-recognition-surveillance-system-outside
-white-house-n943536 [https://perma.cc/965K-DA4B] (describing the Secret Service’s efforts to identify persons of interest outside the White House compound quickly
using facial recognition).
104. Mutale Nkonde, Automated Anti-Blackness: Facial Recognition in Brooklyn,
New York, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. J. AFR. AM. POL’Y, 2019–2020, at 30, 31, 34 (critiquing the
proposal to install facial recognition technology in Atlantic Towers, a rent-controlled
apartment complex); Yasmin Gagne, How We Fought Our Landlord’s Secretive Plan for
Facial Recognition—and Won, FAST CO. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.fastcompany
.com/90431686/our-landlord-wants-to-install-facial-recognition-in-our-homes-but
-were-fighting-back [https://perma.cc/ZV48-864C] (interviewing residents of Atlantic Towers); Lola Fadulu, Facial Recognition Technology in Public Housing Prompts
Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/
politics/facial-recognition-technology-housing.html [https://perma.cc/ET3D-E4Y2]
(reporting on the installation of video surveillance around a Detroit public housing
complex that enables police to capture footage and use facial recognition technology).
105. Aarti Shahani, ICE Turned to DMV Driver’s License Databases for Help with Facial Recognition, NPR (July 8, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/
739643786/ice-turned-to-dmv-drivers-license-databases-for-help-with-facial
-recognition [https://perma.cc/CWY5-P4PH] (“[I]t is important to point out facial
recognition has done plenty of good in this world. It’s helped find missing children and
reunite with [sic] them with their families.”).
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The next Part addresses the privacy-invading powers of facial
recognition surveillance technology and how the Fourth Amendment
might act as a constitutional check on growing police surveillance
power. Later, Part III will tackle the equally fundamental questions
arising from issues of police legitimacy like fairness, bias, accuracy,
and opacity.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVACY PROBLEM OF
FACIAL RECOGNITION
How does the Fourth Amendment fit into the puzzle of facial
recognition technology? There is not an easy answer because the
Fourth Amendment has largely ignored surveillance techniques that
police use early in an investigation106 and failed to regulate information seemingly exposed to the public.107 But a new understanding
of policing as more programmatic and systemic has shifted recent
thinking about this traditional view,108 and powerful new surveillance
capabilities may force the Supreme Court to rethink its traditional
Fourth Amendment approach.
This Part begins with a brief background on the Supreme Court’s
approach to the Fourth Amendment before the digital age and then
explores how this approach has had to adapt to new digital surveillance threats. The argument set forth is that certain “future proofing”
principles can be divined from recent Supreme Court decisions that
open up a new theory about how technologies like facial recognition
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. To be clear, this is
my attempt to make sense of a muddled doctrinal landscape with a
new interpretive theory.
As will be detailed, however, any global Fourth Amendment conclusion remains largely unsettled and likely dependent on which use
of the technology we focus on (e.g., surveillance, identification, tracking, or non-law enforcement purposes) and whether the Supreme
106. See Joh, supra note 1, at 33 (summarizing how the Fourth Amendment permits activities like following a suspect on the street).
107. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
574–76 (2009).
108. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (2016) (“While our Fourth Amendment framework is
transactional, then, surveillance is increasingly programmatic. . . . [T]he system of
searches is designed en masse.”); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93–97 (2016) (“[T]he concrete rules governing panvasive techniques
should be viewed through the entirely different prism of administrative law.”); Tracey
L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk
as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162–63 (2015).
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Court’s recent privacy-conscious decisions about digital surveillance
will be extended to cover facial recognition technology. These gaps
will guide the legislative response proposed in Part IV.
A. PRE-DIGITAL FACE SEARCHES
Under a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, a court would
ask whether the surveillance technology at issue violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy.109 This constitutional standard comes from the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v.
United States.110 If the technology violates a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the government action would be a “search,” and without a
warrant or exception to the warrant requirement, the search would
be deemed unconstitutional.111 While strange to think about today,
the facts of Katz also involved new technology, although in 1967 that
new technology was a wiretap of a public, free-standing telephone
booth.112 The Supreme Court held that the electronic interception of
Mr. Katz’s conversation violated a reasonable expectation of privacy
and thus the Fourth Amendment.113
Under a pre-digital, traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, human observation of a face or manual photo matching likely would not
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 1973, the Supreme
Court stated:
Like a man’s facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that

109. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
112. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 359. Notably, this development spurred Congress to pass the Wiretap
Act to regulate government use of new surveillance technology involving communications. This connection has not been missed by Supreme Court Justices who have relied
on this parallel to encourage congressional action on other new surveillance innovations. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427–28 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“On
the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions. This is what ultimately happened with
respect to wiretapping. After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to develop a
body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006
ed. and Supp. IV), and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed
primarily by statute and not by case law.” (footnote omitted)).
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others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.114

This understanding has largely prevailed in the context of human observation of human faces.115 As a result, one traditional way of looking
at the Fourth Amendment doctrine is to assert that it offers little protection to faces in public, no protection from digital collection of face
images, and no protection from subsequent searches of those face images.
Even more fundamentally, as a practical matter the Fourth
Amendment would have little application without a person harmed.
Most Fourth Amendment cases arise in the criminal context through a
suppression hearing, so general challenges to generalized police powers are non-justiciable due to a lack of standing.116 Large scale surveillance systems have already created a difficult puzzle for standing determinations.117 While facial challenges to statutes are permissible,118
and systems of Fourth Amendment violations have been litigated under civil rights law,119 establishing concrete harm and getting those
privacy claims before a court is not as easy.
Such a pre-digital understanding of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in public, however, has undergone some rethinking in recent
years, as the Supreme Court has begun addressing the threat of new
digital technologies to public activity. After the Court’s unanimous

114. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (emphasis added).
115. See, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Alaska 1994) (“Generally, one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his physical characteristics, including one’s likeness.”).
116. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–14 (2013) (denying
standing for a lawsuit challenging mass surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act); see also Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 530 (2015) (describing justiciability requirements). But see Leaders
of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. RDB-20-0929, 2020 WL 1975380, at
*1–2, *6 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1495 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2020)
(finding standing for community activists to challenge Persistent Surveillance System
planes flying over Baltimore, Maryland, and videotaping movements on the ground).
117. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
INFO. SOC’Y 551, 552 (2014), https://kb.osu.edu/handle/1811/73361 [https://perma
.cc/N8XA-DUPM] (describing standing difficulties in Clapper and considering congressional remedies).
118. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015) (“We first clarify that
facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored.”).
119. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (examining New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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ruling in Riley v. California,120 legal commentators have recognized
that when it comes to new digital surveillance technologies, “digital is
different” for Fourth Amendment purposes.121 In addition, if interpreted broadly, the Supreme Court’s analysis about particular cases
may have application to generalized surveillance systems.122 Such an
interpretation provides the analytical foundation to develop a futureproofing theory for future Fourth Amendment cases. This theory is the
subject of the next Section.
B. FUTURE-PROOFING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A THEORY123
To understand how the Supreme Court might resolve the puzzle
of facial recognition surveillance, it is useful to study three recent Supreme Court decisions on new digital technologies.124 These privacyprotective cases help frame the analysis because they recognize the
privacy and liberty threat from technology-enhanced police surveillance as distinct from traditional police surveillance. Importantly,
these cases also appear to be addressing more than just the particular
defendant’s case at issue, raising concerns with how new technologies
impact everyone’s privacy interests.

120. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of
what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
121. See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They
Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 951 (2016) (“So, while
Riley perhaps left things unanswered that it could have addressed, it made very clear
that when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, digital is different.”); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive
Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 10 (2015) (“[C]omputer technologies can call for computer-specific rules.”); see also Jennifer Stisa Granick, SCOTUS & Cell Phone Searches:
Digital Is Different, JUST SEC. (June 25, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12219/
scotus-cell-phone-searches-digital [http://perma.cc/94RH-42EV].
122. Granick, supra note 121 (“The Court’s reasoning [in Riley] also will influence
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and surveillance cases going forward.”).
123. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Future-Proofing the Fourth Amendment, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (June 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/future-proofing-the
-fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/MD79-G69G]; see Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’”).
124. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 216 (2018) (“Carpenter is the latest in a trilogy
of decisions in which the Supreme Court has finally begun to confront modern surveillance tools used by law enforcement.”); Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and
an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 132 (2018) (noting that “Jones,
Riley, and other recent Fourth Amendment cases illuminate the limitations of the Katz
privacy test in the face of developing big data law enforcement capabilities”).
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First, in United States v. Jones, the majority of the Supreme Court
held that placing a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car was a search
for Fourth Amendment purposes because the physical act of attaching
the tracking device with the intent to gain information was a “trespass” that violated the constitutional rights of the driver.125 More importantly for our analytical purposes, five Justices concurred in the
outcome, reasoning that long-term GPS location tracking violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy in most cases.126 These concurring
Justices were concerned with the private details revealed by longterm tracking in terms of habits, interests, associations, and the freedom to move without government monitoring.127 In two overlapping
concurring opinions, the Supreme Court drew a line at the government’s ability to monitor individuals in public for weeks at a time. This
understanding about locational privacy in public was reaffirmed in
Carpenter v. United States.128
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that police typically need a
probable cause warrant to acquire digital cell-site location information (CSLI) held by third-party cell phone service providers.129
Timothy Carpenter was suspected of robbing a series of electronics
stores, and police sought access to his cell phone location data to link
him to the crimes.130 Using a court order authorized under the Stored
Communications Act, police obtained seven days of his CSLI.131 This
information provided police with a virtual map of Carpenter’s whereabouts that corresponded with his presence during the robberies.132
Carpenter filed a motion to suppress the third-party cell-site records,
arguing that their acquisition was a search under the Fourth Amendment and unconstitutional without a probable cause search
125. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–08 (2012).
126. See id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that,
at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). In Carpenter,
Chief Justice Roberts confirmed this consensus by positively citing the Jones concurrences and declaring, “A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215, 2217.
127. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
128. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
129. Id. at 2221 (“Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI was a
search, we also conclude that the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.”).
130. Stephen E. Henderson, Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment:
The Best Way Forward, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 495, 497 (2017).
131. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
132. See id. at 2212–13.
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warrant.133 The Supreme Court agreed with Carpenter, holding that
the acquisition of the data without a probable cause search warrant
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.134 Chief Justice Roberts
summarized the holding stating, “[i]n light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”135 The focus on “depth,”
“breadth,” scope, and scale makes it clear that the Court is concerned
with systems of digital surveillance.136 The reasoning again turned on
the voluminous and personal nature of the locational data being
sought by police without a warrant.137
Finally, in Riley v. California, the Court held that police must obtain a warrant before searching a suspect’s smartphone incident to arrest.138 The Court reasoned that sensitive data139 in modern
smartphones revealed too many of the “privacies of life” not to require
a probable cause warrant before acquiring the information.140 In Riley,
the Court emphasized the quantitative and qualitative realities of digital evidence as different enough to warrant a different Fourth Amendment approach from past rules for non-digital physical evidence.141
The quantitative difference involves the “immense storage capacity”
that can, in a very small space, collect and maintain an almost infinite
amount of personal data.142 In addition, the nature and scope of digital
133. See id. at 2212.
134. Id. at 2217–19.
135. Id. at 2223.
136. See Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357,
399 (2019) (explaining the Court’s decision in Carpenter reveals its concern with the
modern proliferation of digital surveillance).
137. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
138. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
139. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2015)
(describing sensitive information as “information that can be used to enable privacy
or security harm when placed in the wrong hands”).
140. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
141. Id. at 393 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense
from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term ‘cell phone’ is
itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also
happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries,
albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”).
142. Id. at 393–94 (“One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell
phones is their immense storage capacity. . . . Most people cannot lug around every
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information reveals much more qualitative information than citizens
normally share with anyone else.143
These three cases signify the emergence of a digitally-aware
Fourth Amendment and a Supreme Court cognizant of the limitations
of applying analog precedent to a digital reality.144 One can also intuit
a new awareness of systems of mass surveillance as a distinct concern
not traditionally acknowledged in Fourth Amendment cases.145 The
Court is not just talking about a particular defendant’s rights vis a vis
surveillance technologies, but everyone’s rights.146 Such a digitallyaware Fourth Amendment would, of course, apply to the mass deployment of facial recognition.147
The next six Subsections identify what I am calling the “futureproofing” principles, which are helpful to analyze new surveillance
technologies.148 Some of these principles are decidedly new, and some
can trace their roots back to first principles, but combined, these principles help structure an otherwise disordered Fourth Amendment
doctrine.149 The final Subsection will then apply this future-proofing
theory to the problem of facial recognition technology.150 The goal is
to draw out common principles that underlie the Court’s recent decisions to build an analytical framework to analyze future surveillance
technologies.
1. Anti-Equivalence Principle
The Supreme Court’s recent cases involving police surveillance
have caused a reexamination of existing precedent crafted in a pretechnological age.151 In its recent technologically-enhanced
piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have
taken, or every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to
attempt to do so.”).
143. Id. at 395–97.
144. See Ohm, supra note 136, at 399–401.
145. See id. at 401–03.
146. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
148. See infra Parts II.B.1–6.
149. See infra Parts II.B.1–6.
150. See infra Parts II.B.7, II.C.
151. But see United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (illustrating such an
awareness of technological dangers is not necessarily new, as the Supreme Court has
recognized mass surveillance concerns in older beeper tracking cases); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court must be aware of “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
[which] have become available to the government” to ensure that the “progress of science” does not erode Fourth Amendment protections).
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surveillance cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that digital police capabilities are simply not the equivalent of traditional analog policing methods.152
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that a “mechanical interpretation” of the third-party doctrine failed to account for the
type of information now being collected by police through third parties.153 He said the same thing in Riley when comparing smartphone
data recovered incident to arrest and traditional physical objects recovered incident to arrest.154 Justice Sotomayor also recognized this
truth in Jones when discussing the ease with which police could track
automobiles in ways that would simply be impossibly difficult with
human power.155 In this way, the Court has been conscious of futureproofing its holdings.156 In both Kyllo157 and Carpenter,158 the Court
explicitly acknowledged that its decisions were not limited to the technology of the particular case but also meant to foresee the technology
of the future. In tackling these surveillance cases, the Court has tried
to maintain a balance between growing government power and
shrinking personal liberty,159 recognizing that Fourth Amendment
principles are threatened by new surveillance technologies in ways
they were not similarly threatened by existing analog counterparts.160
152. See Ohm, supra note 136, at 399–403.
153. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210–14 (2018) (“[T]here is a
world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in
Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers.”).
154. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (“A search of the information on
a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in
[prior precedent].”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (“[W]e rejected in Kyllo a
‘mechanical interpretation’ of the Fourth Amendment and held that use of a thermal
imager to detect heat radiating from the side of the defendant’s home was a search.”).
155. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
156. Ferguson, supra note 123.
157. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“While the technology used in
the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
158. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’” (quoting
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36)).
159. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479–81 (2011).
160. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (“We have kept this attention to Founding-era
understandings in mind when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach
upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to ‘assure[]
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This “digital is different” theme is an important framing change
for facial recognition analysis because it recognizes that merely applying analog precedents to digital challenges does not maintain the status quo but significantly enhances police power at the expense of personal liberty.161 It is no longer an answer to say, “Well, police could
have just done it without technology,” so the surveillance technique is
constitutional.162 Now, the Court has signaled that new technology requires new and arguably more protective constitutional analysis, especially where the amount of information available is quantifiably and
qualitatively different.163
But to say “digital is different” does not provide the contours of
how the Supreme Court might evaluate digital surveillance technologies like facial recognition. The next few Subsections examine the
principles underlying the Court’s recent decisions looking at the concerns with data aggregation, data permanence, long-term tracking, arbitrary monitoring, and the permeation of surveillance technologies.164
2. Anti-Aggregation Principle
Underlying Jones and Carpenter is a particular privacy harm that
occurs when police can aggregate personal data. Whereas one fact revealed about a person might not infringe on a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the long-term aggregated collection of many of those same
facts will be seen as a cognizable Fourth Amendment harm.165 Both
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito in Jones separately articulated the
consequences of large-scale public data collection on individual liberty.166 The principle was reaffirmed in Carpenter when the Court
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34)).
161. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“The Government thus is not asking for a
straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.”); see also Granick, supra note 121.
162. See Granick, supra note 121.
163. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014); see also Granick, supra note
121.
164. See infra Parts II.B.2–6.
165. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139–40 (2002) (describing the increased privacy concerns with compiling individual public records into comprehensive reports). See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311
(2012) (explaining the Fourth Amendment “mosaic theory” under which searches are
analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps).
166. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 429–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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drew a clear line from Jones to the privacy-invading nature of aggregated cell-site tracking.167 The same theme can even be observed in
Riley with private smartphone data, when Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged how the sum of data collection can reveal more than
the individual parts.168 In a remarkable admission of the changing
world, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the aggregated information
in a smartphone is probably more revealing and more privacy invading than the contents of our homes—traditionally the most constitutionally protected space.169 In each of these cases, the Court found the
mosaic of aggregated personal data collection a Fourth Amendment
concern.170
A city-wide web of digital cameras using face surveillance creates
aggregation problems. If networked or searchable, the locational privacy of an individual in a city will be at risk. As will be discussed later,
this type of surveillance system may be just as revealing as GPS tracking or cell-site tracking.171
3. Anti-Permanence Principle
The anti-permanence principle involves not just the collection of
data but the long-term storage and retrievability of that information.
The Court in both Jones and Carpenter expressed concern about the
government’s ability to revisit that information for any reason and for

167. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2225 (2018).
168. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394 (“The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—
that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be
said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data on a
phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person might carry
in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would
routinely be kept on a phone.”).
169. Id. at 396–97 (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless
the phone is.”).
170. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 165.
171. See infra Parts II–III.
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all time.172 This “time-machine-like” capability to access permanently
stored data produced a fear about the creation of overbroad and unlimited data systems that allow for retrospective searching.173 As the
Court stated in Carpenter:
Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a
category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the
frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel
back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention
polices of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to
five years.174

This retrospective power of collected data points offers guidance
about the creation of any digital system that collects personal information to be used by police for investigative purposes. Just as Riley
warned against collecting a trove of data about our intellectual or informational interests, and cell-site locations expose a similarly revealing dataset about the paths of all cell phone users, so would the ability
to mine networked surveillance footage using facial recognition techniques.175
4. Anti-Tracking Principle
The Supreme Court in Jones and Carpenter was explicitly concerned about the locational tracking capabilities of new surveillance
technologies. Jones was literally a case about GPS tracking176 and Carpenter a case about a network of tracking capabilities.177 The Jones
Court expressed concern about the associational freedoms impacted
and the revealing nature of the tracking technology:
Awareness that the government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the government’s unrestrained power to assemble
data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net
result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost
such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom
the government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”178

172. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“The government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information
years into the future.”); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
173. Henderson, supra note 121, at 939.
174. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
175. Id.
176. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403–04.
177. Carpenter, 128 S. Ct. at 2216.
178. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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The five concurring Justices’ determination that long-term aggregated
tracking was a Fourth Amendment search arose directly from the concrete harm of revealing locational data and the personal inferences
derived from that information.179 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts in
Carpenter recognized how the tracking capabilities of cellphones
dwarf the capabilities of GPS tracking,180 allowing an “all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts”181 and creating a much graver
threat to personal privacy.182 The Court has been adamant that locational data should receive some Fourth Amendment protection when
threatened by tracking technologies.183 Similarly, the intellectual
tracking of ideas—as made manifest by the informational choices in
our smartphone—also deserves protection under Riley.184 As facial
recognition can track and identify location and generate inferences
from private locational details, the same privacy concerns arise.185
5. Anti-Arbitrariness Principle
A related theme in the cases involves the desire to prevent arbitrary police actions. In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts stated quite
179. Id. (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”); id.
at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
period. In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement
that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was
surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”).
180. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (“The question we confront today is how to apply
the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past
movements through the record of his cell phone signals. Such tracking partakes of
many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring we considered in Jones. Much like GPS
tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”).
181. Id. at 2217 (“As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but
through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”).
182. Id. at 2217–18 (“In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered in Jones.”).
183. Id.; see also David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98
MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); David Gray, A Collective Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable
Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 189 (2015) [hereinafter Gray, A Collective Right]; Rachel
Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 (2017).
184. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
185. See infra Parts II–III.
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simply: “[t]he ‘basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment,’ our cases
have recognized, ‘is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’”186
This is, of course, the central principle animating much of constitutional criminal procedure involving checks to government power.187
The Fourth Amendment’s textual emphasis on warrants, probable
cause, particularity, oaths, and other formalities speaks to a concern
about unconstrained, arbitrary government authority.188 But specific
emphasis on arbitrariness echoed Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Jones where she stated equally plainly, “the Fourth Amendment’s goal
[is] to curb arbitrary exercises of police power.”189
In both the context of cell-site locational tracking and GPS tracking, the Court began with a focus on the arbitrariness of government
agents gaining access to private information without a warrant. Again,
from Carpenter:
Although no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy
are entitled to protection, the analysis is informed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the
Fourth Amendment] was adopted.” On this score, our cases have recognized
some basic guideposts. First, that the Amendment seeks to secure “the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power.”190

This fear of arbitrary government power arose directly from a historical experience which amply demonstrated how unconstrained governmental police power could negatively impact liberty.191 In the prerevolutionary war colonies, arbitrary invasions directly interfered

186. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added).
187. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment is really about “power not privacy”); see, e.g., Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 462 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”); I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
contact between the police and citizens, but is designed ‘to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security
of individuals.’”).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
189. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
190. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (emphasis added).
191. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309 (1998) (“The Fourth Amendment
was a creature of the eighteenth century’s strong concern for the protection of real and
personal property rights against arbitrary and general searches and seizures.”).
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with private behavior, manifesting both as physical home invasions
and indirect government surveillance.192
In our modern times, facial recognition technology gives police
the power to conduct arbitrary digital searches of its citizens.193 Governments can run pattern matching searches for any face.194 They can
target surveillance in particular places or to find particular people.195
The power is arguably far broader than a general warrant.196 Instead
of having a constable empowered to find out revealing information,
you have an entire city designed to expose the people in it.197
6. Anti-Permeating Surveillance Principle
Finally, in both Carpenter and Jones, the Court addressed the
Fourth Amendment’s foundational role in restricting invasive police
surveillance.198 In Carpenter the Court stated, “a central aim of the
Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.’”199 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor made an even more direct reference to overbroad police power, recognizing “the Fourth
Amendment’s goal to . . . prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.”200
Admittedly, the “too permeating” language is both vague and
oddly unhelpful in a world of growing omnipresent surveillance.201
192. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (“[T]he central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 242 (1973) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects the ‘security of one’s privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police.’”).
193. See supra Part II.C.
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See supra Part II.C.
196. See infra Parts II.D, III.
197. See infra Parts II–III.
198. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1994) (“The warrant preference rule is a twentieth-century construction of the Fourth Amendment that is designed to restrain the discretion
of police power—a relevant concern today as it was in 1791.”).
199. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
200. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595).
201. See Daniel de Zayas, Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging
Expectation of Privacy in Data Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 AM.
U. L. REV. 2209, 2246 & n.216 (2019) (comparing Justice Sotomayor’s invocation of the
Framers’ goals for the Fourth Amendment with colonial conceptions of privacy as
“safeguard[ing] personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited
and protected communication”).
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But the term may well have been chosen to respond to the growing
sense that new digital technologies threaten to expose and undermine
privacy in a whole host of areas. Both Carpenter and Jones have been
interpreted to be less about deciding their particular cases involving
particular technologies202 and more about signaling that all new privacy-invading surveillance technologies will require greater scrutiny.203 In addition, the term reflects a long-standing constitutional
concern with growing surveillance capacities, which links back to a
colonial history of invasive government practices that undermined
personal liberty and security.204
Interestingly, while the Court did not define “too permeating,” the
concept shifts the focus to a systems analysis. The idea evokes concerns about scope and scale, and the larger Carpenter emphasis on
depth, breadth, and comprehensive monitoring. It is a concept that
only makes sense when talking about systems of tracking technologies
and the privacy threat that emerges from overreaching monitoring capabilities.
7. Systems of Surveillance
These six principles suggest a way to analyze some developing
systems of digital surveillance, although they leave others unprotected. The working theory is that the more a system of surveillance
202. See, e.g., Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter Case, Justice Sotomayor Tries To
Picture the Smartphone Future, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www
.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/carpenter-justice-sotomayor-tries-to-picture
-smartphone-future [https://perma.cc/2Q8P-3LT4] (“If Smith can apply to long-term
location data today, what might a decision for the government in Carpenter be used to
justify forty years from now?”); Kade Crockford & Nathan Freed Wessler, The Supreme
Court’s Big Privacy Ruling Sent a Message. Will Judges Hear It?, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Sept.
5, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/
supreme-courts-big-privacy-ruling-sent-message-will-judges [https://perma.cc/
D74K-XS68] (“While [Carpenter] concerned historical location data stored by cellphone companies, it provides a roadmap for the protection of all manner of location
data.”).
203. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter
Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 415 (“Carpenter means that a
majority of the Justices are searching to find ways to better protect privacy in the modern age. And by retooling long-standing precedent to be more adaptive to privacy concerns . . . .”); Shaun B. Spencer, Predictive Surveillance and the Threat to Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 109, 131 (2017) (“The Carpenter
decision could significantly impact how future courts approach predictive surveillance.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16402) (“JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That’s today . . . we need to look at [the privacy of cellphone information] with respect to how the technology is developing.”).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 191–92.
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violates these principles, the more likely it will be seen as violating a
reasonable expectation of privacy and be struck down by the Supreme
Court on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Equally important, the Court seems to be concerned with the collective harm of surveillance, not just the collection of data about a particular suspect.205 The language chosen in Carpenter is about how a
system of surveillance could impact everyone, not just the instant defendant.206 The underlying argument is that if police cannot conduct
surveillance with individualized suspicion against a particular person
without a warrant, then police certainly cannot conduct generalized
surveillance without individualized suspicion on almost everyone.207
Thus, to study the problem of facial recognition, this Article looks
at issues of aggregation, permanence, locational tracking, arbitrariness, and pervasive surveillance through a “digital is different”208 lens.
The next Section attempts to apply these future-proofing principles to
the various ways police might use facial recognition technology.
C. ANALYSIS: HOW THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FITS FACIAL RECOGNITION
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This Section examines the main types of facial recognition surveillance technology available to police. As will be observed, the
Fourth Amendment question depends on how the future-proofing
principles of (1) anti-equivalence, (2) anti-aggregation, (3) anti-permanence, (4) anti-tracking, (5) anti-arbitrariness, and (6) anti-permeating surveillance are balanced. The Fourth Amendment may provide
different levels of protection from different types of facial recognition
technology. Even more importantly, this analysis reveals the constitutional gaps in protective coverage requiring legislative action, which
will be discussed in Part IV.

205. See Gray, A Collective Right, supra note 183, at 199–200 (connecting the
Fourth Amendment’s origin in protecting the colonial public against general warrants
with the Court’s ruling in Jones).
206. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Critically, because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those
belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound
tracking capacity runs against everyone.”).
207. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 202, at 48–49 (“JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . . do you really believe that people expect that the government will be
able to [see and locate them anywhere they are at any point in time] without probable
cause and a warrant?”).
208. Henderson, supra note 121, at 951.
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1. Face Surveillance
How does the Fourth Amendment apply to generalized face surveillance? Again, face surveillance is the scenario involving suspicionless, mass surveillance of all people in a public area or using a thirdparty records image set.209 As an example: imagine police wish to
identify everyone walking on a public street or appearing in an image
on a third-party social network, like Facebook, for the purposes of
gathering information (not criminal investigation). Applying the future-proofing principles articulated in Part II.B to the problem of face
surveillance, all of the principles point to this type of generalized surveillance (identifying everyone, everywhere, for all time) being
deemed a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The first question to ask is whether digital, networked surveillance cameras with facial recognition should be considered the equivalent of ordinary security cameras. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court
made clear that the opinion did not cover “conventional surveillance
techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”210
The anti-equivalence principle suggests, however, that facial
recognition technology is not a conventional surveillance tool because
of the qualitative and quantitative differences between traditional security cameras and networked systems of identification utilizing facial
recognition software.211 The combination of facial recognition software with the scope and scale of digital networks create a new scheme
just too different to equate to older systems.212 In terms of scope, generalized surveillance is troubling because everyone observed

209. See supra Part I.B.1.
210. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
211. See supra Part II.B.1.
212. The addition of such software to existing networks could result in a rapid and
dramatic increase in our government’s surveillance capacity.
The United States is, by various estimates, home to tens of millions of surveillance cameras. . . . [I]t has been widely understood that it would be unfeasible, if not impossible, for each device to be constantly monitored and its footage carefully categorized and documented . . . . But improvements to
technology . . . are poised to change that, ensuring that every second of footage can be analyzed.
Niraj Chokshi, How Surveillance Cameras Could Be Weaponized with A.I., N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/us/aclu-surveillance
-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/EL49-3YAD]; see also Complaint at 4–5,
ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 1:19-CV-12242 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2019) (“[Biometric
identification and tracking] technologies have the potential to enable undetectable,
persistent, and suspicionless surveillance on an unprecedented scale.”).
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becomes a target.213 In order to identify every person on a given
street, police would need to match those people against some identified list which, for surveillance purposes, could encompass nearly everyone in the country.214 The scale of the search can also be a problem,
depending on which datasets the targets are matched against. Public
spaces or the extensive repositories of images in third-party databases provide a vast search field for potential matches.215 Months’
worth of stored video footage from surveillance cameras, or a database of years’ worth of images uploaded to third-party social networks, would expand the scale of potential matches to cover millions
(or even billions) of people.216 This type of overbroad matching seems

213. See Randy E. Barnett, The NSA’s Surveillance Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J.
(July 11, 2013, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323823
004578593591276402574 [https://perma.cc/6G8S-3X5A] (“[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has apparently secretly approved the blanket seizure of data
on every American . . . . Such indiscriminate data seizures are the epitome of ‘unreasonable,’ akin to the ‘general warrants’ issued by the Crown to authorize searches of
Colonial Americans.”).
214. Compare S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3101(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2013) (“The Secretary [of
Homeland Security] shall develop and maintain a photo tool that enables employers to
match the photo on a covered identity document . . . to a photo maintained by a U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services database.”), and David Kravets, Biometric Database of All Adult Americans Hidden in Immigration Reform, WIRED (May 10, 2013, 6:30
AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/immigration-reform-dossiers [https://
perma.cc/XJ6V-JEG3] (suggesting that the database would contain “photographs of
everyone in the country with a driver’s license or other state-issued photo ID”), with
VANESSA M. PEREZ, PROJECT VOTE, AMERICANS WITH PHOTO ID: A BREAKDOWN OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 3 tbl.1 (2015), https://www.projectvote.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/AMERICANS-WITH-PHOTO-ID-Research-Memo-February-2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL4F-VZ99] (reporting the results of a survey finding that 93%
of Americans possess a current government-recognized photo ID).
215. See, e.g., Google Photos: One Year, 200 Million Users, and a Whole Lot of Selfies,
GOOGLE: KEYWORD (May 27, 2016), https://blog.google/products/photos/google
-photos-one-year-200-million [https://perma.cc/5N7S-UNCU] (disclosing that users
of one phone application captured 24 billion self-taken photos of themselves in one
year).
216. See FACEBOOK INV. RELS., FACEBOOK Q2 2020 RESULTS 3 (2020), https://
s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc.financials/2020/q2/02-2020-FB-Earnings
-Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8N9-KYZ4] (disclosing that Facebook has 2.7
billion monthly active users worldwide and 256 million such users in the United States
and Canada); FACEBOOK, ERICSSON & QUALCOMM, A FOCUS ON EFFICIENCY 6 (2013)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130919062717/https://fbcdn-dragon-a.akamaihd
.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/851575_520797877991079_393255490_n.pdf] (reporting figures which equate to the average user uploading approximately nine photos per
month). Even this rough synthesis of uploads to Facebook would provide law enforcement 24.3 billion new photos each month.
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to cut against the Fourth Amendment’s preference for particularized,
individualized suspicion.217
Escaping the equivalence trap allows us to distinguish face surveillance from the analog tradition of officers taking photos on the
street or watching fixed camera feeds. The difference is the scope,
scale, detail, personal data, locational data, and retrieval capabilities
at play. Further, the other principles concerning aggregation, tracking,
and permanence suggest that this type of constant, ongoing monitoring system would constitute a Fourth Amendment search, although
the analysis for stored footage and real-time images differs slightly.
a. Face Surveillance: Stored Footage
The power of face surveillance is that it allows police to scan
through stored footage and identify individuals by their face, aggregate their movements, interests, and patterns, and store and study
these pathways for long periods of time (all without individualized
suspicion).218 The future-proofing principles of anti-aggregation, antipermanence, and anti-tracking all apply.219 This suggests face surveillance would be considered a surveillance system of Fourth Amendment concern.
After all, this surveillance would be directed against everyone in
public,220 creating a pervasive sense of police power that could be arbitrarily used or abused.221 If the Supreme Court was concerned with
tracking a single car (Jones)222 or a single cellphone (Carpenter),223 the
idea of tracking everyone without a warrant should also raise constitutional concerns. Certainly, a system that routinely scanned faces and
identified everyone in public or allowed the searching of stored image
data to identify someone would raise constitutional red flags.

217. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV 483, 533 & n.206 (1995) (“Individualized suspicion of illegal activity is normally required as one element of that justification [for the interference of liberty that results from a seizure].”).
218. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
219. See supra Parts II.B.2–4.
220. See Mozur, supra note 65 (discussing a Chinese face surveillance system that
scans all crossers at an intersection to identify jaywalkers).
221. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS 75 (1973) (“The risk of abuse of intelligence records is too great to permit
their use without some safeguards to protect the personal privacy and due process interests of individuals.”).
222. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
223. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
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Perhaps even more fundamentally, the operative limiting terms
of “probable cause” and “warrants” in the Fourth Amendment make
little sense in a world of generalized surveillance.224 With generalized
surveillance there is no cause at all. There can certainly be no probable
cause warrant predicate for generalized surveillance of everyone, everywhere, at all times. The lack of a limiting principle and the overbroad nature of suspicionless surveillance highlight the unreasonable
nature of this type of surveillance.
While there exist real issues of standing to challenge face surveillance under traditional Fourth Amendment law,225 one can imagine
that a surveillance system that identified and tracked everyone in a
city environment would be challenged under § 1983 civil rights law as
a facial matter226 or could be litigated if a criminal defendant was
stopped based on the technology.227 Such a threat to public privacy
would find objection under the principles suggested in Jones and Carpenter and would likely be the target of litigation.228
224. See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”:
The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 299 (2016) (“The inability to
make sense of the Fourth Amendment in today’s world has the practical result of causing vastly more police intrusion, widespread violations of constitutional rights, and racial profiling. Making matters worse, there is good evidence that these intrusions are
simply inefficacious . . . .”). See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING
WITHOUT PERMISSION 143–84 (2017) (discussing the evolution of jurisprudence on the
issue of cause in warrantless searches).
225. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010))). The Court held
that there was no standing to challenge an electronic surveillance program on grounds
that an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of the respondents’ information being
searched was “inconsistent with [the] requirement that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.’” Id. at 410 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
226. For example, a federal district court found that community activists in Baltimore, Maryland, had both First and Fourth Amendment standing to challenge aerial
surveillance planes filming the entire city as part of a violent crime suppression effort.
Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. RDB-20-0929, 2020 WL
1975380, at *1–2 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2020).
227. Cf. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 423 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] plaintiff has that standing . . . if the action or omission that the plaintiff challenges has caused . . . an injury that
is ‘concrete and particularized,’ ‘actual or imminent,’ and ‘redress[able] by a favorable
decision.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992))).
228. See Complaint, supra note 212, at 1–2 (“[S]urveillance [utilizing biometric
identification and tracking technologies] would permit the government to pervasively
track people’s movements and associations in ways that threaten core constitutional
values.”).
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b. Face Surveillance: Real-Time
In the context of generalized face surveillance, real-time scans to
identify individuals face a similar Fourth Amendment infirmity. A citywide system could flag each time an identifiable face appears on the
screen.229 This would result in an equivalent tracking system marking
where people are located, what they are doing, and when they are doing it. While a real-time system would only provide a snapshot of localized presence, the data could be stored and rendered searchable230
(raising the stored footage issue).231 Equally importantly, the system
itself “runs against everyone” and creates a similar warrantless dragnet.232 The future-proofing principles point to a Fourth Amendment
search problem, as the system can aggregate personal location data,
track individuals, and is permanent, pervasive, and arbitrary.233
Simultaneously, the real-time nature of the collection might mitigate some of the Fourth Amendment harms. Real-time scans involve
broad mass collection of information but not necessarily deep or aggregated data collection.234 If the system did not save the collected
data, the retrospective harm principle might not apply. Similarly, if the
system merely identified a particular person at a particular point in
time but did not track them, the tracking and aggregation principles
might be less important.235 Under a Carpenter analysis, one might
229. See Mozur, supra note 65 (discussing the goals of police and artificial intelligence companies to create facial recognition scans capable of identifying individuals
in real-time).
230. See Mozur, supra note 64 (discussing a Chinese facial-information database
searchable by data tags identifying gender and ethnic minority status).
231. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
232. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018); cf. Press Release,
ACLU Va., ACLU-VA Puts Law Enforcement on Notice That Warrantless Dragnet Surveillance Is Illegal (July 15, 2019), https://acluva.org/en/press-releases/aclu-va-puts
-law-enforcement-notice-warrantless-dragnet-surveillance-illegal [https://perma
.cc/JBG9-2EXE] (reporting the noticing of Virginia law enforcement agencies that
“‘passive’ use of automated license plate readers” used to “collect data on people’s
whereabouts without it being related to a specific criminal investigation” is illegal).
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. See JAKE LAPERRUQUE, CONST. PROJECT, FACING THE FUTURE OF SURVEILLANCE
(2019), https://www.pogo.org/report/2019/03/facing-the-future-of-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/S3DP-72C6] (“Real-time surveillance . . . involves scanning all faces
during a video feed and running them against a watchlist that will identify certain individuals. The contents of such a list could . . . be as broad as all individuals with a prior
arrest for a minor crime.”). But cf. Mozur, supra note 65 (“The system remains more of
a digital patchwork than an all-seeing technological network. . . . Systems that police
hope will someday be powered by A.I. are currently run by teams of people sorting
through photos and data the old-fashioned way.”).
235. See supra Parts II.B.2, 4.
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imagine the Supreme Court allowing real-time scans in certain locations, under certain circumstances (e.g., special events, targeted locations).236 However, generalized use for suspicionless surveillance
would run afoul of Fourth Amendment search principles.237
This distinction is important in order to show the gaps in Fourth
Amendment coverage. The Court in Carpenter emphasized the “depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach”238 of CSLI data, leaving open the
question of what happens when surveillance is broad but not deep or
comprehensive. This gap may need to be addressed by legislation as
the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases provide little guidance.
c.

Face Surveillance: Third-Party Records

Generalized use of datamining techniques to scan face images acquired from third-party datasets presents a related but different problem. These are situations where the scans are conducted without suspicion simply for monitoring purposes.239 First, the fact that the
images are held by third parties does not change the Fourth Amendment analysis.240 The Supreme Court in Carpenter held that the Fourth
Amendment applied to government acquisition of certain private
third-party records that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy over.241 While there may be an open question about whether images that individuals post publicly deserve any Fourth Amendment
protection, the scans here would go beyond individual public posting.
They would include billions of available photos242 as well as the accompanying metadata (revealing location, time, etc.),243 which is not
generally thought to be publicly shared information.244 All of the
236. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222–23 (“Even though the Government will generally
need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions may support a warrantless
search of an individual’s cell-site records under certain circumstances.”).
237. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
238. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
239. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
240. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
241. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
242. See supra note 215.
243. See Matthews, supra note 71 (discussing the content of metadata embedded
in digital photos, including the GPS coordinates of the location it was taken); see also
Hanni Fakhoury, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words, Including Your Location, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/picture
-worth-thousand-words-including-your-location [https://perma.cc/8MH6-6LYG]
(discussing an FBI arrest made using metadata from photos posted to social media).
244. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (holding that telephone customers have no legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers they
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future-proofing principles apply to generalized suspicionless face surveillance of third-party images. Such images will reveal a great deal of
information about individuals’ associational connections and locations, available for search in a permanent capacity.245 It would largely
be an arbitrary use of government power to monitor all (or almost all)
individuals with images in these datasets.246 The quantity and quality
of data shared is simply beyond what could ever have been found before, raising similar fears to the Riley case.247
Two issues complicate the third-party records surveillance problem: the first is standing to challenge surveillance technologies, and
the second is current practice. As discussed earlier, bringing a Fourth
Amendment claim to challenge mass surveillance has proved difficult
because the harm alleged is not easily justiciable.248 If the FBI decided
dial, as they were exposed to the telephone company’s equipment in the ordinary
course of business, thus falling outside of Fourth Amendment protections), with Jennifer Stisa Granick, Debate: Metadata and the Fourth Amendment, JUST SEC. (Sept. 23,
2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/927/metadata-fourth-amendment [https://
perma.cc/3VGV-JEPT] (“While it may be obvious that phone companies have the numbers I dialed, the average consumer has no idea what a trunk identifier, IMEI or IMSI is
[various types of telephone metadata], or that the phone company keeps time and duration records for toll free calls.”).
245. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Daniel Victor & Mike Isaac, Police Use Surveillance
Tool to Scan Social Media, A.C.L.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/technology/aclu-facebook-twitter-instagram-geofeedia
.html [https://perma.cc/9Q39-KDSP] (discussing a program that allowed law enforcement to access and retain user images and location data from social media platforms);
Aimee Picchi, OK, You’ve Deleted Facebook, but Is Your Data Still Out There?, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (Mar. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ok-you’ve
-deleted-facebook-but-is-your-data-still-out-there [https://perma.cc/8P7F-CQ8B]
(discussing certain data retained by Facebook even after users delete their accounts);
Hill, supra note 68 (“But if your [social media] profile has already been scraped, it is
too late. The [facial recognition] company keeps all the images it has scraped even if
they are later deleted or taken down.”).
246. See supra Part II.B.5.
247. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (“[M]any of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. . . . Allowing the
police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing
them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.” (citing Ontario v. Quon,
560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010))).
248. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 156
(2018) (discussing how the requirement under Clapper that plaintiffs show “clear evidence they are being surveilled—a fact that, because of the secret nature of the surveillance” makes standing in mass surveillance cases “difficult to establish”). But see
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 738 (2013) (finding standing to challenge a mass
surveillance program because the plaintiff’s telephone metadata was in fact collected);
cf. Rozenshtein, supra, at 132 (discussing the potential for technology companies to
challenge mass surveillance programs based on their corporate standing).
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to search all Facebook accounts for a particular gang sign and then
used facial recognition to identify all of the people posing with that
gang sign (building a dossier of gang members), it is not clear how one
could bring a Fourth Amendment claim against this form of surveillance.249 In a criminal prosecution, the use of facial recognition software could be litigated if police acquired private records from a third
party without a warrant250 but, in the general surveillance situation, it
is not clear how the case would arise. That said, unlike the standing
problem in Clapper,251 there at least would be a digital trail linking the
government action to a particular person (or group of persons),252 so
proving the Fourth Amendment harm would be easier. A plaintiff
could argue that the search was conducted, even if defining the individual Fourth Amendment harm remains difficult.
The second issue is that this practice of looking through social
media images (albeit without using facial recognition) is already conducted regularly by law enforcement.253 Because no Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment ruling has addressed the practice of viewing non249. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
250. Warrantless collection of a defendant’s face data would meet the Court’s requirement that harm “must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’” Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). The problem remains, however, of proving that it
was in fact the facial recognition system which identified the defendant. See Rozenshtein, supra note 249, at 156 (highlighting the difficulty targets of surveillance
might have in proving they were actually surveilled).
251. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409–11.
252. See Aaron Mak, Facing Facts, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://slate
.com/technology/2019/01/facial-recognition-arrest-transparency-willie-allen-lynch
.html [https://perma.cc/74NW-X3PQ] (reporting that discovery uncovered digital evidence that a criminal defendant had been identified by use of facial recognition software). Defendant Willie Allen Lynch’s pro se requests and motions also found that the
sheriff’s office failed to disclose their use of “biometric software.” Benjamin Conarck,
How an Accused Drug Dealer Revealed JSO’s Facial Recognition Network, FLA. TIMES UNION: JACKSONVILLE.COM (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:11 PM), https://www.jacksonville.com/public
-safety/2016-11-11/how-accused-drug-dealer-revealed-jso-s-facial-recognition
-network [https://perma.cc/7KXM-N62B]. Lynch appealed on Brady violation
grounds, but his conviction was upheld because he could not prove he was misidentified as a result of the lower court denying him access to the other photos in the database. Mak, supra.
253. See, e.g., Megan Behrman, When Gangs Go Viral: Using Social Media and Surveillance Cameras to Enhance Gang Databases, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 315, 324 (2015)
(“[P]olice in Cincinnati . . . created a gang database filled with information gleaned from
monitoring suspects’ social media accounts. Thanks to this database, the police possessed evidence that not only highlighted a given member’s participation in certain
crimes but also enabled them to link suspects together.” (footnote omitted)).
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private images254 and because there are no clear laws on the subject,255 this type of monitoring (at least through posted images) is a
routine practice.256 The open question is whether overlaying a facial
recognition search program on top of this regular practice changes the
Fourth Amendment calculus.
2. Face Identification
On the other end of the Fourth Amendment spectrum is face identification, involving the matching of digital faceprints.257 Two types of
facial recognition scans should be distinguished based on the type of
dataset to be matched.258 One type of image database consists of police-generated images (e.g., arrest photos, jail photos, suspect photos
taken during investigations).259 Another consists of larger
254. See Cases – Search and Seizure, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/issues/227
[https://perma.cc/CAS7-WSES]. See generally United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp.
2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When a social media user disseminates his postings and
information to the public, they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. . . . However, postings using more secure privacy settings reflect the user’s intent to preserve
information as private and may be constitutionally protected.” (citation omitted));
United States v. Gatson, Crim. No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22 (D.N.J. Dec. 16,
2014) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, gathered by police accessing
his Instagram account through use of an undercover account with a false identity, on
grounds that “[n]o search warrant is required for the consensual sharing of this type
of information”).
255. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Ángel Díaz, How to Reform Police Monitoring
of Social Media, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHSTREAM (July 9, 2020), https://www.brookings
.edu/techstream/how-to-reform-police-monitoring-of-social-media [https://perma
.cc/R3ZN-RJPU] (“[T]here are few laws that specifically constrain law enforcement’s
ability to engage in social media monitoring. In the absence of legislation, the strongest
controls over this surveillance tactic are often police departments’ individual social
media policies and platform restrictions . . . .”); see also State Social Media Privacy Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications
-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-access-to-social-media
-usernames-and-passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/YP6X-4QAZ] (reporting no state
laws shielding social media information from law enforcement).
256. See KIDEUK KIM, ASHLIN OGLESBY-NEAL & EDWARD MOHR, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS POLICE & URB. INST., 2016 LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA SURVEY 3 fig.2 (2016),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law
-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L7A-5NGA] (reporting that 70% of responding police agencies used social media for “[i]ntelligence
gathering for investigations”).
257. See supra Part I.B.2.
258. See Garvie & Moy, supra note 58 (distinguishing between the Detroit Police
Department’s agency-generated photo database and “Michigan’s Statewide Network
of Agency Photos” compiled from civil sources).
259. Schuppe, supra note 75 (“[F]acial recognition allows officers to submit images
of people’s faces, taken in the field or lifted from photos or video, and instantaneously
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government image databases, like driver’s license photos or passport
photos, that include a large majority of the population.260 While the
two datasets raise different privacy concerns because of their respective sources and scales,261 they share a similar Fourth Amendment
analysis.
As a general matter, there does not appear to be a strong claim
that photographs taken by police or the government infringe on an expectation of privacy.262 Second, in terms of the future-proofing principles, the Supreme Court’s concerns are not directly implicated,263 thus
leading to the conclusion that these are likely not Fourth Amendment
searches. A facial recognition photo image match against a database of
stored images would reveal an individual’s identity,264 but not necessarily their location, tracking history, or aggregated private details as
it would if run against real-time surveillance or stored footage databases.265 In addition, assuming there is some predicate level of suspicion (or internal police policy), the scan will not be arbitrary.266 Combined with some control over their use, the scan will not be a form of
pervasive surveillance. This is especially true when using alreadycompiled police-generated photographs (as opposed to DMV photos);
there is less of a privacy harm because the photos already exist in
compare them to photos in government databases—mugshots, jail booking records,
driver’s licenses.”).
260. See PEREZ, supra note 214, at 3 tbl.1 (finding that 93% of Americans possess a
current government-recognized photo ID).
261. Compare What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Priv. Tech. & the L. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) (statement of Jerome M. Pender, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, FBI) (testifying that the FBI’s
“national repository of photos consisting of criminal mug shots . . . contains approximately 12.8 million searchable frontal photos”), with PEREZ, supra note 214 (reporting
survey results finding that 93% of Americans have a photo ID), and U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock [https://perma
.cc/TLA5-7F3K] (estimating the U.S. population at 330.4 million). This rough estimate
suggests that over 307 million Americans have their photos in civil government databases, twenty-four times as many as have their photos in the FBI’s mugshot database.
262. See, e.g., Jamali v. Maricopa Cnty., No. CV-13-00613, 2013 WL 5705422, at *2
(D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2013) (holding that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s “seizure and publication of Plaintiff’s [mugshot] and personal information did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights”).
263. See supra Parts II.B.1–6.
264. See, e.g., Mak, supra note 252.
265. See supra Parts II.B.1–6; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (warning of the deeply personal details that can be compiled
by locational tracking information).
266. See supra Part II.B.5.
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police custody.267 Thus, under existing jurisprudence, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would find Fourth Amendment harm in a face
identification scenario.
As face identification is the most common use of facial recognition technology,268 the lack of Fourth Amendment protection raises
concerns. Under current doctrine, there is no constitutional check on
the use of the technology, allowing police to use it at-will without legal
process.269 There is also no current legislation on police use of facial
recognition technology,270 raising the question, addressed in Part IV,
of whether the gap should be filled with some form of legislation.
3. Face Tracking
Face tracking technology presents a more difficult Fourth
Amendment analysis, but it is perhaps one of the most important. The
potential capability to scan image databases or vast stores of stored
video footage to find wanted suspects is quite attractive for law enforcement.271
Because stored video is generated by fixed city cameras, mobile
body cameras, and private security cameras, the ability to search
through a city’s worth of images to identify the human needle in the
digital haystack is seen as a game-changing power.272 In addition, the
ability to match target face images with the accumulated face images

267. See Jamali, 2013 WL 5705422, at *3 (“Plaintiff does not have a property interest in his likeness and personal information that would prevent the County from taking
his picture and obtaining personal information incident to his arrest. Use of information seized incident to arrest should ‘not be unduly restricted upon any fanciful theory of constitutional privilege.’” (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 457 (2013))).
268. See GARVIE ET AL., supra note 3 (finding that “law enforcement face recognition
affects over 117 million American adults” and “[a]t least one out of four state or local
police departments has the option to run face recognition searches”); Jenni Bergal,
States Use Facial Recognition Technology To Address License Fraud, GOVERNING (July 15,
2015), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/states-crack-down
-on-drivers-license-fraud2.html [https://perma.cc/7ZEH-4ZMD] (reporting that “[a]t
least 39 states now use [facial recognition] software in some fashion”).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 261–67.
270. See supra note 254.
271. See supra Part I.B.3.
272. See Garvie & Moy, supra note 58 (“Thanks to face recognition technology, authorities are able to conduct biometric surveillance—pick you out from a crowd, identify you, trace your movements across a city with the network of cameras capturing
your face—all completely in secret.”).
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contained in third-party social networks means that many more people can be identified for criminal prosecution.273
Again, targeted tracking is distinguishable from generalized surveillance because police are seeking to find a particular person’s location, not that of all people.274 Further, the predicate of alleged criminal
activity justifies the law enforcement tracking action.275 For example:
imagine that a police department wishes to use an automated, ongoing
facial recognition system to locate a “wanted” face in stored surveillance footage of a major city. The facial recognition system could be
programmed to only identify the person with an open felony warrant
while ignoring everyone else. To make that match, the system is potentially identifying all of the times the wanted face shows up in front
of a camera on the streets of a city. So, the suspect’s face might be observed dozens of times in a day as they are recorded by dozens of cameras in a city. This information could allow police to make an informed
decision about when and how to apprehend the suspect, weighing factors such as imminence of further harm to the public, risk of escape,
or further intelligence that could be gained by tracking the suspect.
To answer the open question about whether targeted face tracking is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, one must apply the
future-proofing principles discussed above.276 As an initial matter, it
should be noted that the police’s ability to manually compare photos
of targets to collected photobooks or other datasets does not end the
analysis.277 Again, “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, digital is
different.”278 As Justice Alito recognized in Jones, the fact that police
could have manually followed Mr. Jones around the streets does not
change the fact that monitoring him with digital technology requires
a different analysis.279 A manual search of all media uploaded to

273. Cf. Hill, supra note 68 (reporting that facial recognition technology was able
to scan social media information to identify a suspect who did not have a driver’s license and did not appear in law enforcement databases).
274. See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part II.B.5.
276. See supra Parts II.B.1–6.
277. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94 (2014) (“[T]he fact that a search
in the predigital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not
justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery.”).
278. Henderson, supra note 121, at 951.
279. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the
precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor
statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”).
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Facebook would take multiple lifetimes,280 while a digital search can
take mere seconds.281 Riley’s “quantitative” and “qualitative” differences of digital technology is made even more obvious in the facial
recognition context.282 While a police officer could recognize a face
from a “most wanted” poster while walking a city, that officer could
never be able to manually examine the entire city’s worth of faces over
months or years.
The next three Subsections examine how the Fourth Amendment
would apply to targeted investigations using three different types of
face tracking. As will be clear, the analyses turn on the type of dataset
being used to match faces with identities, taking in turn (1) stored
footage of public areas, (2) real-time footage, and (3) third-party image datasets.
a. Face Tracking: Stored Footage
Face tracking scans using a network of stored video footage
might constitute a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter. Like a
cell signal, such a scan would reveal where a person was over time.283
A retrospective scan of stored video footage for a particular individual
would involve police tracking a person’s location over time, making
inferences from the aggregated data, and keeping it for other uses,284
thus creating the same type of Fourth Amendment harms as in Carpenter.285 A mosaic of geolocational clues could be mapped to reveal a
pattern of activity, tracking personal details, and exposing the privacies of one’s life. Where one prays, loves, learns, and lives would all be
trackable because of the identifying nature of their face. The datapoints could be aggregated and made permanently and continually

280. See FACEBOOK ET AL., supra note 216, at 6 (“More than 250 billion photos have
been uploaded to Facebook, and more than 350 million photos are uploaded every day
on average.”).
281. Hill, supra note 68 (reporting that a facial recognition program scanning
against social media data “was ‘able to identify a suspect in a matter of seconds’”).
282. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94 (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a
wallet.”).
283. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
284. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
285. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[T]ime-stamped
data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring))).
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searchable.286 The requisite camera system would exert a pervasive
surveillance power and, while targeted at individual suspects, would
also capture information on innocent bystanders (even if they were
not identified).
Again, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has focused on the creation of systems of continuous, automatic surveillance that reveal location and personal details.287 A stored-footage face-tracking system
seems to raise the same issues. In both Jones and Carpenter, the Court
was concerned with the potential tracking capabilities of the instant
technologies as much as the actual details revealed about the particular defendants.288 A face tracking system provides an even more powerful potential retrospective search system than GPS tracking or cellsite signals.289
Of course, open questions remain regarding the scale of the surveillance system, the length of time in which the data is held, and
whether the revealing nature of face tracking is (under the facts) really more or less revealing than a cell-site signal. Unlike cell-site towers, the continuous collection of face images would depend on the density of surveillance cameras and networks.290 In some cities, there
286. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The government can
store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.”
(citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting) (mem.))).
287. In addition to Justice Sotomayor’s elucidation on the personal information
tracking technology can reveal, id. at 417–18, both concurrences in Jones expressed
concerns with the length of the surveillance period, id. at 415; id. at 429–30 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Contra id. at 412 (majority opinion) (“[I]t remains unexplained why a 4week investigation is ‘surely’ too long . . . .” (quoting id. at 431 (Alito, J., concurring))).
Justice Alito specifically connected the ability to surveil a suspect in this manner with
advancements in tracking technology. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
288. 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’” (quoting Kyllo v.
United States, 544 U.S. 27, 36 (2001))). At oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor even
mused about the possibility that “someday a [cellphone service] provider could turn
on my cell phone and listen to my conversations.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 203, at 14.
289. Compare Garvie & Moy, supra note 58 (“Thanks to face recognition technology, authorities are able to . . . pick you out from a crowd, identify you, trace your movements across a city . . . completely in secret. [The technology] may now identify who is
where, doing what, at any point in time.”), with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Unlike
the . . . car in Jones, a cell phone . . . tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.”
(emphasis added)).
290. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court was willing to imagine a future with more
advanced surveillance capabilities beyond the stated limitations of CSLI technology the
year Timothy Carpenter was arrested:
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might be more locational details revealed than others.291 The Fourth
Amendment question might thus depend on the sophistication and
scale of the technology, which offers an unsatisfying and rather happenstance constitutional answer.
b. Face Tracking: Real-Time
Real-time scans can identify whether a target is present as they
pass by a facial recognition enabled camera,292 representing a different Fourth Amendment analysis. Police could load a suspect’s face image into a system and, in real-time, find their current location in a
city.293 Or the situation could involve a fixed camera outside a shooting range (preventing a wanted felon from entering and possessing a
gun)294 or a police-worn body camera automatically alerting the officer to a person with an open arrest warrant.295
While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at the start of the
decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. As
the number of cell sites has proliferated, the geographic area covered by each
cell sector has shrunk, particularly in urban areas. In addition, with new technology measuring the time and angle of signals hitting their towers, wireless
carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50
meters.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 12, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402)).
291. See Paul Bischoff, Surveillance Camera Statistics: Which Cities Have the Most
CCTV Cameras?, COMPARITECH (July 22, 2020), https://www.comparitech.com/vpn
-privacy/the-worlds-most-surveilled-cities [https://perma.cc/3NCD-42BQ] (comparing CCTV-camera-to-population ratios by city). The data upon which Comparitech researchers relied shows, for example, that Los Angeles has 49% more CCTV cameras
per person than New York City. CCTV Cameras by City and Country (June 2020),
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1I-WpH2KOiguKy9JTQ9zC2JxBBhH2scdb
SRI8lJVjzdo/edit#gid=979494433 [https://perma.cc/6DT5-WCUY].
292. See supra Part I.B.3.
293. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Mozur, supra note 65 (discussing a “building complex where [a] facial-recognition gate system has been installed” to keep criminals out).
295. See Ava Kofman, Real-Time Face Recognition Threatens to Turn Cops’ Body
Cameras into Surveillance Machines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://
theintercept.com/2017/03/22/real-time-face-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops
-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines [https://perma.cc/NFL8-HBEG] (quoting
“[t]he captain of the Las Vegas Police Department” as “envision[ing] his officers someday patrolling the Strip with ‘real-time analysis’ on their body cameras and an earpiece
to tell them, ‘Hey, that guy you just passed 20 feet ago has an outstanding warrant’”);
Patrick Tucker, Facial Recognition Coming to Police Body Cameras, DEF. ONE (July 17,
2017), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/07/facial-recognition
-coming-police-body-cameras/139472 [http://perma.cc/QF35-ALKU] (reporting
Motorola’s partnership with a startup “to build ‘real-time learning for a person of interest search’”).

2021]

FACIAL RECOGNITION

1157

From one perspective, the animating concerns of the futureproofing principles are somewhat mitigated. The suspect is tracked,
but only to a particular location,296 and their location need not necessarily be aggregated. The scan is not arbitrary to the target, even if it
is arbitrary when directed to those innocents captured by the camera
system.297 Under this reading, the scope of privacy invasion would be
real but limited, and it may not constitute a Carpenter-like Fourth
Amendment violation.298
From another perspective, however, the privacy harms look less
benign. In order to find one targeted suspect, a system of facial recognition tracking must be in place to cull out the non-matched.299 Everyone is being surveilled, just not flagged. If police body cameras have
the potential to scan every face,300 vast numbers of innocent people
would thus arbitrarily be included in the collection, as was the concern in Carpenter.301 In addition, while the search is in real time, the
images may still be stored and thus permanently accessible, undermining the limitation of the anti-aggregation principle.302 Finally,
other people accompanying a suspect will have their information collected incidental to a criminal investigation irrespective of any criminality on their part.303 The net of associational and inferential connections will grow as never before,304 reshaping the power the
government has over individuals.305 For this reason, real-time tracking technology is less constrained than one might think and may thus

296. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part II.B.5.
298. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“[W]hen the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it
had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”).
299. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
300. See Kofman, supra note 295.
301. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“The Government’s position fails to contend
with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only
[defendant’s] location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and
years.”).
302. See supra Part II.B.2.
303. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
305. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”); Mozur, supra note 65
(“China is reversing the commonly held vision of technology as a great democratizer,
bringing people more freedom and connecting them to the world. In China, [facial
recognition technology] has brought control.”).
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raise significant constitutional questions.306 But, as may be clear, the
Fourth Amendment principles do not resolve the question, and standing problems may forestall any actual Fourth Amendment litigation.307 The issue remains open for debate and discussion until resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress.
c.

Face Tracking: Third-Party-Controlled Image Searches

The scope and scale of third-party image datasets (e.g., Facebook,
Google, YouTube, Instagram) are vast and growing, and now include
billions and billions of images and videos.308 Police acquisition of
306. As a parallel, this type of investigative surveillance parallels police use of
“Stingray” cell-site simulators. Cell-site simulator technology allows police to find a
particular cell phone among the world of cell phone signals. See generally Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: ST.-LEVEL SURVEILLANCE (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/pages/cell-site-simulatorsimsi-catchers [https://perma.cc/
8US5-GKGR]. Using a Stingray device, police could find a particular phone in a particular apartment. See, e.g., Courtney Mabeus, Battlefield Technology Gets Spotlight in Maryland Courts: Secrecy and Defense Concerns Surround Cell Phone Trackers, CAP. NEWS
SERV. (May 3, 2016), https://cnsmaryland.org/interactives/spring-2016/maryland
-police-cell-phone-trackers/index.html [https://perma.cc/H6JA-THZA] (describing a
case where the location of a particular phone was tracked to a specific city bus). Baltimore police, for example, “have used the technology 4,300 times since 2007.” Justin
Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in Thousands of
Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015, 6:42 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/
baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html [https://web.achive
.org/web/20201001173300/https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore
-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html]. However, the use of Stingrays in
Baltimore only came to light in 2015, as police departments had been subject to “nondisclosure agreement[s] with federal authorities” that “explicitly instruct[ed] prosecutors to drop cases if pressed on the technology.” Id. Previously, police did not seek warrants for the use of Stingrays, instead “obtain[ing] court orders under the state’s ‘pen
register’ statute . . . requir[ing] a lower standard of proof than a search warrant.” Id.
Subsequently, the Department of Justice issued guidance requiring a probable cause
warrant before using these devices. See DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICE
GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (2015), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/file/767321/download [https://perma.cc/WU3V-XR73] (“[P]rosecutors
should . . . either (1) obtain a warrant that contains all information required to be included in a pen register order . . . or (2) seek a warrant and a pen register order concurrently.”). The rationale is much the same as it might be for a facial recognition
search: in order to find the suspect’s phone, the Stingray device searches all of the
other signals in the area, increasing the attendant privacy harms. See supra notes 300–
02 and accompanying text. To minimize the harms of collection, a higher probable
cause standard was adopted. See DEP’T OF JUST., supra.
307. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text.
308. See FACEBOOK ET AL., supra note 216, at 6 (“More than 250 billion photos have
been uploaded to Facebook, and more than 350 million photos are uploaded every day
on average.”); Anmar Frangoul, With Over 1 Billion Users, Here’s How YouTube Is Keeping Pace with Change, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2018, 4:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
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some subset of these images against which to run face tracking
matches for identified suspects offers a new investigatory power. If
police wished to investigate a suspect by acquiring third-party images
of a suspect, they would be able to locate and identify more people in
a fraction of the time.309
Applying the future-proofing principles to the problem of police
acquisition of third-party images for face tracking purposes is unsatisfying. On the one hand, the request for images (or the ability to
search images) will reveal much more personal data than mere identity. All of the times a face is on the platform will be shown, which will
include information about when the photo was taken, where, and with
whom.310 Unlike cell-site signatures, photos reveal a host of associational information because of the contextual nature of the photos (e.g.,
what the subject matter of the photo reveals about the photographer).311 The aggregation and permanence problems both exist since
the collection of images can be searched in perpetuity.312 In fact, the
situation is more like Riley than Jones, because the harm comes from
the revealing nature of stored digital content and inferences about interests drawn therefrom, rather than from pure locational tracking.313
03/14/with-over-1-billion-users-heres-how-youtube-is-keeping-pace-with-change
.html [https://perma.cc/7D86-GK6Q] (reporting a YouTube regional director’s claim
that the site “ha[s] over 500 hours of new content uploaded onto the platform every
minute”); Olivia B. Waxman, Here Are the 5 Most Popular Instagram Photos of All Time,
TIME (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/4060078/instagram-5th-birthday
-most-liked-photos [https://perma.cc/AY8N-N3K3] (reporting that over 40 billion
photos were uploaded to Instagram in its first five years of existence).
309. See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 243 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (mem.) (“[GPS
trackers] create a permanent electronic record that can be compared, contrasted and
coordinated to deduce all manner of private information about individuals.”), cert.
granted, vacated, remanded for consideration in light of United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
1189 (2012), aff’d on remand, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012).
313. In Riley, the Court was concerned less with the tracking data emitted by a
smartphone than with the personal information and interests contained within its
memory.
Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital
record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. . . . There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party
news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing
prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning
your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for
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On the other hand, all that is being revealed are photographs or
videos that confirm an individual’s identity. Social media images are
not a complete catalogue of movement, but instead a curated, many
times inauthentic collection of human activities.314 Complicating the
analysis is the quasi-public nature of the shared photographs, as well
as any privacy filters that might apply.315 Scanning a single photograph in a third-party image database would not raise concerns,316 but
the open question is whether thousands of photos mapped to location,
activity, date, and time might be different.
There is no clear answer to whether police could obtain private
images from third-party providers without a warrant. Carpenter certainly suggests that acquisition of third-party records (that retain an
expectation of privacy) raises Fourth Amendment privacy issues.317
Many social media third-party images may fall into that category,318
but some might not,319 and one might imagine the Supreme Court requiring a warrant similar to that in Carpenter in order to acquire some
forms of private or quasi-private digital content from the photographs

improving your romantic life. . . . The average smart phone user has installed
33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Twenty-Four Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 9, Riley, 573 U.S. 373 (No. 13-132)).
314. Your Instagram friends are not always in beautiful places taking perfect photos. See Elspbeth Harris & Aurore C. Bardey, Do Instagram Profiles Accurately Portray
Personality? An Investigation into Idealized Online Self-Presentation, FRONTIERS PSYCH.,
Apr. 2019, at 9, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6491845/pdf/fpsyg
-10-00871.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV47-HURU] (“Many [participants in a study]
thought that ‘Instagram portrays what they (account holders) want their personality to
be seen as,’ and that ‘the best stuff is published, so there is always a false face in that
respect, you know it does not show life as it is . . . .’”).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“When a social media user disseminates his postings and information to the public,
they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. . . . However, postings using more
secure privacy settings reflect the user’s intent to preserve information as private and
may be constitutionally protected.” (citation omitted)).
316. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
317. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (“There is a world of
difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in [other cases
concerning business records] and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. . . . [M]echanically applying the third-party
doctrine to this case . . . fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on
the revealing nature of CSLI.”).
318. See supra notes 283–87 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 252.
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themselves (e.g., photo metadata).320 But the current state of Fourth
Amendment law does not resolve the question.
4. Non-Law Enforcement Purposes
The foregoing analysis all presupposes a law enforcement purpose, either in the form of surveillance or investigation. But facial
recognition technology may also be used for non-law enforcement
purposes in a host of situations requiring proof of identity. In these
non-law enforcement situations, like international border crossings321 or entry into secure buildings,322 the Fourth Amendment analysis is quite different because the purpose of the use is not focused on
traditional policing.
The Supreme Court has had an inconsistent relationship with
purpose when it comes to Fourth Amendment questions.323 On one
hand, the Court tries to avoid any subjective considerations of purpose
that could entangle the Court in sorting through the decisions of individual officers.324 In Whren, Justice Scalia stated that the officer’s purpose (good or bad) was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis.325 At the same time, purpose does matter when it comes to
programmatic decisions. In Edmond, the Court held that because the
primary purpose of a warrantless checkpoint was for ordinary law

320. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
321. See Paul S. Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sovereignty, and
the Fourth Amendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1985) (“In exceptional circumstances, however, the government’s interest may be strong enough to eliminate the
warrant and probable cause requirements. The Supreme Court has held that border
searches constitute such an exceptional circumstance . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
322. See Mozur, supra note 65 (“At a building complex in Xiangyang, a facial-recognition system . . . let[s] residents quickly through security gates . . . .”).
323. See Nirej Sekhon, Purpose, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment, 107 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 65, 66–69 (2017) (discussing inconsistencies in the Court’s jurisprudence on “purpose” under the Fourth Amendment).
324. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009) (“The pertinent analysis
of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an ‘inquiry into the subjective awareness
of arresting officers.’” (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Herring, 555 U.S. 135
(No. 07-513))). But see Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks:
The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 776 (2010) (“But it is difficult to reconcile that comment [in Herring] with the Court’s acknowledgment just two sentences later that an officer’s
‘knowledge’ is relevant in assessing good faith—as well as in evaluating probable
cause.” (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 145)).
325. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved.”).
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enforcement work, the checkpoint was unconstitutional.326 Meanwhile, the Court has distinguished other warrantless checkpoint stops
where the purpose was not routine, untargeted law enforcement.327
And, in the community caretaker cases like Brigham City v. Stuart, the
Court stated that when the primary purpose of responding officers is
to offer aid, and not investigate crimes, ordinary Fourth Amendment
limitations do not apply.328 Similar exceptions exist when police are
not acting as investigators but instead under a valid “special needs”
exception.329 Finally, the Court’s new exclusionary rule jurisprudence
also seems to muddy the water around purpose. In Herring, Chief Justice Roberts required courts to evaluate objective culpability by looking at whether the officer acted in a “deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent” manner.330 As Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent, evaluating deliberateness or culpability necessarily raises issues of subjective purpose and intent.331
Facial recognition for non-law enforcement tasks runs right into
the purpose issue. If police wish to use face surveillance for public
safety monitoring (e.g., at protests, events, special secure places), they
could argue that their purpose was not for ordinary law
326. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance ‘the general
interest in crime control’ . . . . We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
659 n.18 (1979))).
327. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (“The relevant public concern was grave. . . . No one denies the police’s need to obtain more information at that
time. And the stop’s objective was to help find the perpetrator of a specific and known
crime, not of unknown crimes of a general sort.”).
328. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Accordingly, law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” (citing
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978))).
329. See Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 133, 155
(2017) (“A ‘special needs’ search is (in theory) a type of government surveillance
which is undertaken for a non-law enforcement purpose. Such purposes [upheld] have
included ensuring the safety of railway passengers, maintaining a positive learning environment in schools, or securing the country’s borders.” (footnotes omitted)).
330. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009); see Kinports, supra note
325, at 776 (“[T]he very notion of culpability seems to be a subjective one, and in fact
the Court drew a distinction in Herring between a ‘negligen[t] or innocent mistake’ and
one that is ‘deliberate’ or ‘knowing[],’ a distinction phrased explicitly in subjective
terms.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 145)).
331. Herring, 555 U.S. at 157 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is not clear how the
Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of
the exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the police.”).
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enforcement.332 Similarly, if police wished to use face tracking to locate a lost child, they could argue for an emergency exception333 or
that there was an “opt-in” choice (almost like consent) to put the
child’s face in the matching system.334 Thus, purpose could create a
workaround for police who wish to use facial recognition technologies, although—as in Edmond—the courts will have to examine the
primary purpose of the systems.335
While purpose is a decidedly imperfect way to distinguish facial
recognition uses, it might provide a way out of the Fourth Amendment
problems discussed earlier. If explicitly used for non-investigatory
purposes with clear ex ante guidelines and rules, in emergency situations, or in particular locations, one might imagine that the Supreme
Court could view the problem with a different lens. The clearest examples to come will be the use of face verification in established points
of entry, like international borders,336 although one can imagine how
this use could expand to other areas of transport,337 employment,338
332. See Simmons, supra note 329, at 155 (“In practice, the line between a search
pursuant to a ‘law enforcement purpose’ and a search pursuant to a ‘non-law enforcement purpose’ can become blurred.”).
333. See, e.g., Kendall v. Olsen, 727 F. App’x 970, 973 (10th Cir.) (holding that a
missing child justified a warrantless search on exigency grounds); United States v.
Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that exigency justified the warrantless GPS tracking of a suspect to locate a kidnapped minor).
334. But, as might be obvious, in order to find the child you would need to scan
everyone else in the target area, see supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text, possibly running into the same broad versus particular distinction as in Carpenter. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“Critically, because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—
not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—
this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”). Scholars have also critiqued
the idea that any type of valid consent to facial recognition exists. See generally Evan
Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV.
101 (2020).
335. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (“Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately indistinguishable
from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
336. See Rosenzweig, supra note 321, at 1121 (“The Supreme Court has held that
border searches constitute such an exceptional circumstance [not requiring probable
cause].”).
337. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Why Airport Facial Recognition Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019, 3:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/06/10/your-face-is-now-your-boarding-pass-thats-problem
[https://perma.cc/8DFY-C3XA] (reporting increased used of facial recognition technology at airports).
338. See S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3101(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2013) (requiring the Department
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stadiums,339 and public schools.340 In these cases, the Fourth Amendment will not offer any check on the development of the technology.
D. CONCLUSION: FACIAL RECOGNITION AND A CONTINUUM OF SYSTEMIC
SEARCHES
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence offers only limited
help in acting as a privacy bulwark against expanding networks of facial recognition. The Supreme Court’s current emphasis on systems of
surveillance certainly maps on to some types of face surveillance and
face tracking but leaves other uses completely unprotected. Face surveillance and face tracking networks likely require a probable cause
warrant,341 but more limited types of face identification using databases of stored mugshots or DMV photographs might not.342 A continuum exists between permitting some types of police surveillance and
creating “a too permeating police surveillance,”343 but drawing the
bright line is simply a constitutional guessing game. While the futureproofing principles do offer valuable guideposts for Fourth Amendment analysis along the continuum, gaps in the law remain. It is these
gaps that necessitate the legislative framework suggested in Part IV.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM
OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
Criticism directed at facial recognition technology is not just
about privacy but also the legitimacy of police tools and strategies.344
of Homeland Security to “develop and maintain a photo tool that enables employers to
match the photo on a covered identity document . . . to a photo maintained by a U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services database”).
339. See Parmy Olson, Facial Recognition’s Next Big Play: The Sports Stadium, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognitions
-next-big-play-the-sports-stadium-11596290400 [https://perma.cc/A7LV-DVWZ]
(reporting that “the New York Mets and the Los Angeles Football Club, are testing facial-recognition technology in stadiums”).
340. See Tom Simonite & Gregory Barber, The Delicate Ethics of Using Facial Recognition in Schools, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/
delicate-ethics-facial-recognition-schools [https://perma.cc/733Q-YCS9] (reporting
on schools installing facial recognition systems to “prevent major incidents such as
shootings” and “to enforce school rules or simply as a convenient way to monitor students”).
341. See supra Parts II.C.1, 3.
342. See supra Part II.C.2.
343. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 281, 595 (1948)).
344. See Geoffrey Fowler, Black Lives Matter Could Change Facial Recognition Forever—if Big Tech Doesn’t Stand in the Way, WASH. POST (June 12, 2020, 10:13 AM),
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Police legitimacy is at the core of modern Fourth Amendment debates.345 Increased attention on stop-and-frisk policies and police use
of force has caused a reexamination of structural problems of police
bias, fairness, transparency, and mistakes.346 National conversations
about structural racism and policing as a mechanism of social control
have exploded since George Floyd was killed by a Minneapolis police
officer.347 The same issues spill over to the introduction of new surveillance technologies like facial recognition.348 After all, even if the
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/12/facial-recognition-ban
[https://perma.cc/26VB-YDVM] (“Ramping up [facial recognition technology] use . . .
opens a slippery slope to a world of supercharged policing that’s likely to disproportionately impact people of color through misidentification or just more surveillance of
minority communities.”).
345. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 252 (2008)
(reporting the results of a study and regression analysis indicating that “public evaluations of the justice of police decision making and the justice of the manner that the
police treat members of the public both shaped police legitimacy” to a statistically significant degree). Applying those findings to Fourth Amendment issues, one scholar
suggested that:
[p]olice/citizen encounters involving searches and seizures are just the kind
of personal experiences that, according to Fagan and Tyler, shape public
views of police legitimacy and, with it, the prevalence of law-abiding behavior
by the public and its willingness to help police. Everyone wants public safety
and less crime; the vitality of our cities and towns depends on it.
David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 164 (2009).
346. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Amid Calls to ‘Defund,’ How to Rethink Policing, WALL
ST. J. (June 13, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-calls-to-defund
-how-to-rethink-policing-11592020861 [https://perma.cc/SW9L-QZ4K]; Barry
Friedman, Disaggregating the Police Function, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020–21).
347. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd
-abolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/DBQ6-REDB]; Annie Lowrey, Defund
the Police, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/06/defund-police/612682 [https://perma.cc/24CK-NE4U]; Jon Schuppe, What
Would It Mean to ‘Defund the Police’? These Cities Offer Ideas, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2020,
9:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-would-it-mean-defund
-police-these-cities-offer-ideas-n1229266 [https://perma.cc/VM4D-2WMC]; Alex S.
Vitale, The Only Solution Is to Defund the Police, NATION (May 31, 2020), https://
www.thenation.com/article/activism/defund-police-protest [https://web.archive
.org/web/20200607032550/https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/defund
-police-protest].
348. As a direct result of the protests arising from the police killing of George Floyd,
some large technology companies have paused their development or deployment of
facial recognition systems for police. See Brian Fung, Microsoft Says It Won’t Sell Facial
Recognition Technology to US Police Departments, CNN BUS. (June 11, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/tech/microsoft-facial-recognition-police/index.html
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Fourth Amendment “search” issues could be resolved, facial recognition technology also raises difficult questions about error rates, racial
bias, transparency, and fairness that need to be answered.349
The open question is whether the Fourth Amendment offers any
answers to these core police legitimacy issues. If facial recognition becomes a preferred policing tool, does the Fourth Amendment offer any
constitutional protection? Somewhat troublingly, the Fourth Amendment has little to say about these core police legitimacy issues. In fact,
a deep dive into current Fourth Amendment doctrine shows that the
Fourth Amendment largely fails to regulate policing around those subjects.
This Part briefly discusses four core “ethical AI” issues: (1) error,
(2) bias, (3) transparency, and (4) fairness, asking first why these issues are concerns for facial recognition technology, and then what if
anything the Fourth Amendment has to say about them. The conclusion, like the conclusion around privacy, is that the Fourth Amendment is an imperfect and unsatisfactory protection against expanding
facial recognition technology, again suggesting that prohibition or legislation is needed to counteract these systemic weaknesses.

[https://perma.cc/DZF7-CUHE]; Nick Statt, Amazon Bans Police from Using Its Facial
Recognition Technology for the Next Year, VERGE (June 10, 2020, 5:37 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/6/10/21287101/amazon-rekognition-facial-recognition
-police-ban-one-year-ai-racial-bias [https://web.archive.org/web/20200610221350
if_/https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/10/21287101/amazon-rekognition-facial
-recognition-police-ban-one-year-ai-racial-bias]; Bobby Allyn, IBM Abandons Facial
Recognition Products, Condemns Racially Biased Surveillance, NPR (June 9, 2020, 8:04
PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/873298837/ibm-abandons-facial
-recognition-products-condemns-racially-biased-surveillance [https://perma.cc/
2TR7-7CP7].
349. See Tawana Petty, Defending Black Lives Means Banning Facial Recognition,
WIRED (July 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/defending-blacklives-means-banning-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/7EHA-N8S9]; Devich-Cyril,
supra note 5; see also Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016,
5:55 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of
-martin-luther-king-says-about-modern-spying.html [https://perma.cc/SH8R-EH6B];
Dorothy Roberts & Jeffrey Vagle, Opinion, Racial Surveillance Has a Long History, HILL
(Jan. 4, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/264710-racial-surveillance
-has-a-long-history [https://perma.cc/Q32V-MBFB]. See generally ALEX S. VITALE, THE
END OF POLICING (2017).
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A. ETHICAL AI AND CONCERNS ABOUT ERROR, BIAS, FAIRNESS, AND
TRANSPARENCY
In the computer science and data analytics fields, ethical use of
artificial intelligence is now a topic of serious conversation.350 Hard
questions about error, bias, fairness, and transparency are increasingly part of the ongoing conversation about how to build “better” facial recognition technologies.351 This is all for the good, because correcting the naïve assumption that big data policing systems will not
replicate human bias is a necessary first step.352 The common thread
of these critiques is that the perceived objectivity arising from computer code is both false and dangerous, and computer models can be
as biased as any other human enterprise.353 Further, without
350. See, e.g., ACM FAccT, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH. CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTA& TRANSPARENCY, https://facctconference.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/
5WLQ-DS86] (“Although these [algorithmic] systems may bring myriad benefits, they
also contain inherent risks, such as codifying and entrenching biases; reducing accountability, and hindering due process; they also increase the information asymmetry
between individuals whose data feed into these systems and big players capable of
inferring potentially relevant information. ACM FAccT is an interdisciplinary conference dedicated to bringing together a diverse community of scholars from computer
science, law, social sciences, and humanities to investigate and tackle issues in this
emerging area.”); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 683–84 (2016) (“Because data mining relies on training data as
ground truth, when those inputs are themselves skewed by bias or inattention, the resulting system will produce results that are at best unreliable and at worst discriminatory.”).
351. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 350; see also Irina Ivanova, Why Face-Recognition
Technology Has a Bias Problem, CBS NEWS (June 12, 2020, 7:57 AM) https://www
.cbsnews.com/news/facial-recognition-systems-racism-protests-police-bias [https://
perma.cc/Q7ZU-4R33].
352. See SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018) (discussing how search engine algorithms perpetuate bias by
producing stereotypical, offensive, and stigmatizing results); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY 37 (2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (discussing how bias
that is written into algorithms has far-reaching, negative consequences); cf. FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 18 (2015) (“Corporations depend on automated judgments that may be wrong, biased, or destructive. The black boxes of reputation, search,
and finance endanger all of us. Faulty data, invalid assumptions, and defective models
can’t be corrected when they are hidden.”). Leading the movement have been scholars
and public intellectuals who have called out the dangers of trusting the technology as
unbiased, or accurate, or accountable. Joy Buolamwini, How I’m Fighting Bias in Algorithms, TED (Nov. 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/joy_buolamwini_how_i_m
_fighting_bias_in_algorithms [https://perma.cc/32RE-CAYQ].
353. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing how data ranking creates stigmatization in AI scoring systems); cf. RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY:
BILITY
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oversight, artificial intelligence systems could similarly reify existing
structural bias or exacerbate inequalities, all the while claiming to be
data-driven, neutral, and objective.354 In the specific context of facial
recognition technology, the questions become even more pointed.355
First, face surveillance does not always work as intended. Real
concerns have been demonstrated about the accuracy of face surveillance matches.356 Early testing of facial recognition has had a poor
track record for error. Face surveillance tests in public spaces have
bordered on embarrassing, with error rates that dwarf success.357 But,
even in more controlled environments there have been errors resulting in false matches—in one notable story, twenty-eight members of
Congress were falsely matched with arrestee mugshots using commercially available face identification software.358 Even the National
ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE 112–13 (2019) (discussing misguided use of
electronic surveillance by private companies in the movement for decarceration); Paul
Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 340
(2012), https://www.pennlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/161-U-Pa
-L-Rev-Online-339.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3FS-B9M8] (“But some Big Data projects
will also lead to bad outcomes, like invasion of privacy and hard-to-detect invidious
discrimination.”).
354. See Selbst, supra note 1, at 115–16 (arguing that the use of AI systems in policing enhances racial disparities through discrimination in data mining); Pratyusha
Kalluri, Don’t Ask If Artificial Intelligence Is Good or Fair, Ask How It Shifts Power, NATURE (July 7, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02003-2
[https://perma.cc/N9MY-M8G9] (“These [AI] systems sometimes mitigate harm, but
are controlled by powerful institutions with their own agendas. At best, they are unreliable; at worst, they masquerade as ‘ethics-washing’ technologies that still perpetuate
inequality.”); cf. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94 (2014) (“Personal
harms emerge from the inappropriate inclusion and predictive analysis of an individual’s personal data without their knowledge or express consent.”).
355. Devich-Cyril, supra note 5 (arguing that facial recognition technology is an inaccurate tool employed in discriminatory contexts and propagates disparities for communities of color); ERIK LEARNED-MILLER, VICENTE ORDÓÑEZ, JAMIE MORGENSTERN & JOY
BUOLAMWINI, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE WILD: A CALL FOR A FEDERAL OFFICE
3–4 (2020), https://global-uploads.webflow.com/5e027ca188c99e3515b404b7/5ed
1145952bc185203f3d009_FRTsFederalOfficeMay2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGG
-ML6V].
356. Garvie & Moy, supra note 58; BUOLAMWINI ET AL., supra note 16, at 14–16 (discussing how small differences in inputs can create dramatic accuracy issues in facial
recognition technology).
357. Charlotte Jee, London Police’s Face Recognition System Gets It Wrong 81% of
the Time, MIT TECH. REV. (July 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/
07/04/134296/london-polices-face-recognition-system-gets-it-wrong-81-of-the
-time [https://perma.cc/X4J6-TL3V].
358. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
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Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) found significant errors
in facial recognition vendor tests,359 especially in attempting to identify women of color.360 The problems involve both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, including the way in which photos are captured and the
complexities of facial features and human movement.361 This error/accuracy problem, however, could be short-lived as improvements in big data pattern matching will allow companies to improve
their error/accuracy rates year by year.362
Error for facial recognition has real consequences, as a match can
lead to investigations, arrests, and prosecution. The danger of false
positive hits leads to false arrests,363 and the consequence for such a
false match means a coercive and potentially dangerous encounter
with police.364 In the context of face surveillance, with tens of
privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely
-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/9JS3-6TRM].
359. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
INTERNAL REP. 8280, FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 2–3 (2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VEW-SD7F]; see also Sophie Bushwick, How NIST Tested Facial
Recognition Algorithms for Racial Bias, SCI. AM. (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/how-nist-tested-facial-recognition-algorithms-for
-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/9JFT-GV22] (“NIST’s tests revealed that many of these
algorithms were 10 to 100 times more likely to inaccurately identify a photograph of
a black or East Asian face, compared with a white one. In searching a database to find
a given face, most of them picked incorrect images among black women at significantly
higher rates than they did among other demographics.”).
360. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 359, at 63; see also Drew Harwell, Federal Study
Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial-Recognition Systems, Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial-bias-many-facial-recognition
-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use [https://perma.cc/8967-B8VM].
361. Joshi & Gupta, supra note 20, at 59 (recognizing intrapersonal problems such
as “age, facial expression and facial details/equipment used (facial hair, glasses, cosmetics, veil, etc.)” and extrinsic issues such as “illumination, pose, scale and imaging
parameters (e.g., resolution, focus, imaging, noise, etc.)” as causing a myriad of challenges in algorithmic recognition techniques).
362. Tom Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally,
WIRED (July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms
-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally [https://perma.cc/H8KP-AGPC] (“NIST said
last year that the best algorithms got 25 times better at finding a person in a large database between 2010 and 2018 . . . .”).
363. Hill, supra note 68; Torres, supra note 76; Kris Holt, Facial Recognition Linked
to a Second Wrongful Arrest by Detroit Police, ENGADGET (July 10, 2020), https://
www.engadget.com/facial-recognition-false-match-wrongful-arrest-224053761.html
[https://perma.cc/KS46-YWGW].
364. Williams, supra note 82; cf. Jeremy C. Fox, Brown University Student Mistakenly
Identified as Sri Lanka Bombing Suspect, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 28, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://
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thousands of faces being scanned every day, the reality of inaccurate
matching technology will create significant practical problems.365 In
the field, it may be hard for an individual officer to override the suspicion of the algorithm, leading to some erroneous stops and some
missed investigations.366 While police would be wise to never solely
rely on the technology, the ease of use and the perceived technical precision might overcome common sense human judgment.
Second, there are issues of bias and the structural inequities that
infect the data being used in the facial recognition models.367 Bias is
partly due to the fact that the facial recognition systems were initially
designed on homogeneous populations of white men and thus do a

www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/04/28/brown-student-mistaken-identified-sri
-lanka-bombings-suspect/0hP2YwyYi4qrCEdxKZCpZM/story.html [https://perma
.cc/RZK4-WVXD] (describing the emotional distress of receiving death threats and
calls for death of mistaken identity victim).
365. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Detroit Police Chief Cops to 96-Percent Facial Recognition Error Rate, ARS TECHNICA (June 30, 2020, 11:12 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2020/06/detroit-police-chief-admits-facial-recognition-is-wrong-96-of
-the-time [https://perma.cc/DX2G-986E]; Tim Cushing, Detroit Police Chief Says Facial
Recognition Software Involved in Bogus Arrest Is Wrong ‘96 Percent of the Time,’
TECHDIRT (July 2, 2020, 3:30 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200629/
17423944814/detroit-police-chief-says-facial-recognition-software-involved-bogus
-arrest-is-wrong-96-percent-time.shtml [https://perma.cc/9FC8-H2QU]; see also
Joy Buolamwini, Artificial Intelligence Has a Problem with Gender and Racial Bias.
Here’s How to Solve It, TIME (Feb. 7, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://time.com/5520558/
artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias [https://perma.cc/9USJ-K94C] (“[F]ailed machine learning systems . . . amplify, rather than rectify, sexist hiring practices, racist
criminal justice procedures, predatory advertising, and the spread of false information.”); Garvie & Frankle, supra note 15 (“[N]ot only are African Americans more
likely to be misidentified by a facial-recognition system, they’re also more likely to be
enrolled in those systems and be subject to their processing.”).
366. See, e.g., supra note 363 (identifying examples of misidentification by police
using facial recognition technology).
367. BENJAMIN, supra note 353, at 109 (“The power of the New Jim Code is that it
allows racist habits and logics to enter through the backdoor of tech design, in which
the humans who create the algorithms are hidden from view.”); Buolamwini, supra
note 352 (discussing how algorithmic bias amplifies discrimination); Sahil Chinoy,
Opinion, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html
[https://perma.cc/DP34-4MWR] (“[N]ew applications of facial recognition—not just
in academic research, but also in commercial products that try to guess emotions from
facial expressions—echo the same biological essentialism behind physiognomy.”); Joy
Boulamwini, Opinion, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technology-bias
.html [https://perma.cc/UV8U-YV93] (“A.I. systems are shaped by the priorities and
prejudices—conscious and unconscious—of the people who design them . . . .”).
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poor job of identifying faces of other races,368 especially black
women,369 and non-conforming individuals.370 The systemic bias in
the datasets371 is coupled with incomplete, incorrect, and fragmented
data,372 which leads to a system that discriminates against anyone but
white men and almost completely erases transgender, non-conforming, or non-binary individuals.373 As the bias tracks along race and
368. Buolamwini, supra note 365 (“[O]ne government dataset of faces collected for
testing . . . contained 75% men and 80% lighter-skinned individuals and less than 5%
women of color . . . .”); Tom Simonite, Photo Algorithms ID White Men Fine—Black
Women, Not So Much, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/
photo-algorithms-id-white-men-fineblack-women-not-so-much [https://perma.cc/
M5CM-JNXR] (“All the companies’ [facial recognition] services had particular trouble
recognizing that photos of women with darker skin tones were in fact women.”); Simonite, supra note 362 (“The easiest place to gather huge collections of faces is from
the web, where content skews white, male, and western.”).
369. Joy Buolamwini, When AI Fails on Oprah, Serena Williams, and Michelle Obama,
It’s Time to Face the Truth, MEDIUM (July 4, 2018), https://medium.com/@Joy
.Buolamwini/when-ai-fails-on-oprah-serena-williams-and-michelle-obama-its-time
-to-face-truth-bf7c2c8a4119 [https://perma.cc/AQC8-PQES] (“Error rates were as
high as 35% for darker-skinned women . . . .”); Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender
Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81
PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 11 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/
buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2XX-GSB3] (“The most improvement is needed on darker females specifically.”).
370. Cf. Cynthia M. Cook, John J. Howard, Yevgeniy B. Sirotin, Jerry L. Tipton & Arun
R. Vemury, Demographic Effects in Facial Recognition and Their Dependence on Image
Acquisition: An Evaluation of Eleven Commercial Systems, INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS
TRANSACTIONS ON BIOMETRICS, BEHAV. & IDENTITY SCI. (Feb. 2019), https://ieeexplore
.ieee.org/document/8636231 [https://perma.cc/5HB5-HAT2] (“Our analyses show
that demographic factors influenced both the speed and accuracy of all eleven commercial biometric systems evaluated.”).
371. MICHELE MERLER, NALINI RATHA, ROGERIO FERIS & JOHN R. SMITH, IBM RSCH., DIVERSITY IN FACES 4 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.10436.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z5BU-XXP9] (“Face recognition systems that are trained within only a narrow context
of a specific data set will inevitably acquire bias that skews learning towards the specific characteristics of the dataset.”).
372. See Garvie & Moy, supra note 58 (describing many unreliable methods for
gathering photos for police facial recognition searches).
373. Facial Recognition Technology: Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties: Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 116th Cong. 15 (2019) (statement of Joy
Buolamwini, Founder, Algorithmic Justice League) (“[W]hen evaluating error rates for
the facial analysis task of binary-gender classification (which does not account for gender nonconforming people, nonbinary people, agender people, and/or transgender
people), our 2018 Gender Shades audit showed women with skin types associated
with blackness had error rates as high as 47%. In the same study for men with skintypes perceived as white, error rates were no more than .08% in aggregate.”); Ali
Alkhatib et al., On Recent Research Auditing Commercial Facial Analysis Technology, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2019), https://medium.com/@bu64dcjrytwitb8/on-recent-research
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gender lines, mistakes could also follow those patterns.374 In some
cases, it will mean that people with darker skin will be missed by the
system, but in others, the matches will be less accurate.375
Third, there are issues of fairness in application and whether a
facial recognition system is fair to use across a diverse population. In
computer science there are complex debates about the first principles
of fairness.376 For example, one could think of “fairness” as non-discrimination (based on a particular characteristic), or “fairness” as
choosing equally among groups, or “fairness” as preferring false positives to false negatives, or “fairness” as random selection, or a host of
other definitions, all of which can shape how a machine learning
model is developed.377 All of these differing definitions of fairness offer some measure of a fair process, but they result in decidedly different outcomes if coded into a facial recognition model.378 In a computer
design situation, the model’s outcome can be directly impacted by the
type of fairness deemed optimal.379 In the real world, this design might
lead to unfair application.
Finally, there are issues of transparency, as “black box” technologies require overcoming complaints of proprietary trade secrets and

-auditing-commercial-facial-analysis-technology-19148bda1832 [https://perma.cc/
W7SJ-38P2] (“[C]urrent gender classification methods use only a ‘male’ and ‘female’
binary—non-binary genders are not represented in these systems.”).
374. Cf. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 369 (discussing current disparities
among racial and gender groups in facial recognition AI systems).
375. See Garvie & Frankle, supra note 15 (“[E]ven if the features on which an algorithm focuses are race-neutral, a training set of images that contains disproportionate
numbers of one race will bias the algorithm’s accuracy rates in that direction.”).
376. Ziyuan Zhong, A Tutorial on Fairness in Machine Learning, MEDIUM (Oct. 21,
2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/a-tutorial-on-fairness-in-machine-learning
-3ff8ba1040cb [https://perma.cc/HL42-9ZEJ] (“[D]efinitions, however, are too abstract for the purpose of computation. As a result, there is no consensus on the mathematical formulations of fairness.”).
377. See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, danah boyd, Sorelle A. Friedler, Suresh Venkatasubramanian & Janet Vertesi, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems,
CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 59 (2019), https://dl.acm.org/doi/
pdf/10.1145/3287560.3287598 [https://perma.cc/V79B-WULJ]; Richard Berk, Hoda
Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth, Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk
Assessments: The State of the Art, SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
12–15), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf [https://perma.cc/W86U-9DP7].
378. See Selbst et al., supra note 377, at 59 (“[T]hese [fairness] concepts render
technical interventions ineffective, inaccurate, and sometimes dangerously misguided
when they enter the societal context that surrounds decision-making systems.”).
379. See id.
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a lack of accountability.380 The artificial intelligence and machine
learning community has long confronted issues of transparency, secrecy, accountability, inscrutability, interpretability, and explainability.381 The same is obviously true with the machine learning systems
fueling facial recognition technology. As machines get more sophisticated and as artificial intelligence and machine learning companies
enter the policing space, it may be difficult to obtain any measure of
transparency among the complex models and competing proprietary
interests.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ERROR, BIAS, TRANSPARENCY, AND
FAIRNESS
In the face of such questions about facial recognition technology,
one might hope that the Constitution, in the form of the Fourth
Amendment’s limits on policing, might provide a substantial counterweight. Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment has little to say about
the matter, offering almost no response to the problems of error, bias,
fairness, or transparency in policing more generally, and facial recognition in particular.
This Section addresses how the Supreme Court has ignored issues of error, bias, fairness, and transparency in traditional Fourth
Amendment cases. Thus, if offered as a design guide to computer engineers interested in designing a constitutionally compliant facial
recognition system, the Fourth Amendment would be decidedly unhelpful.
1. Error and Policing
Error is part of policing. The Supreme Court has crafted Fourth
Amendment rules to forgive error when seizing individuals, arresting
individuals, and when considering the suppression of evidence for
380. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20 (2017), https://www.nyulawreview
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NYULawReviewOnline-92-Joh_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AX4Z-TGGR] (“[A]ggressive assertions of secrecy about proprietary information may mean that the press, the courts, and the public have no access to the technology shaping substantive decisions about who should be subjected to police attention.”); Brent Mittelstadt, Chris Russell & Sandra Wachter, Explaining Explanations in
AI, CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 279, 279 (2019) (“What distinguishes machine learning is its use of arbitrary black-box functions to make decisions.
These black-box functions may be extremely complex and have an internal state composed of millions of interdependent values.”).
381. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2018).
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merely negligent errors.382 The only time the Supreme Court appears
to punish police error is if it is intentional, reckless, grossly negligent,
systemic, or recurring—a high bar to clear.383 This Section examines
the extent of error allowed in Fourth Amendment doctrine to show
how limited the Fourth Amendment would be as a guide to regulating
error in facial recognition design.
a. Error and Reasonable Suspicion
The legal standard of “reasonable suspicion,”384 which constrains
police from stopping or seizing an individual suspected of criminal activity, is a clear acknowledgment that police will err in their judgments
on the streets.385 The rule stated in Terry v. Ohio and controlling in
thousands of cases is: “[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.”386 In subsequent cases, the Court has
acknowledged that reasonable suspicion can involve completely
382. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring
or systemic negligence.”); see also Kit Kinports, Illegal Predicate Searches and Tainted
Warrants After Heien and Strieff, 92 TUL. L. REV. 837, 880 (2018) (“The definitions of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion already give the police room to make reasonable errors in applying those standards to the facts of a particular case.”).
383. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (“When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the
deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But
when the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct
is lawful, . . . or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the ‘deterrence rationale loses much of its force’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
384. The rule comes from Terry v. Ohio, a case which involved Officer McFadden,
an experienced police officer, watching the unusual behavior of John Terry and two
associates outside a store in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1968). McFadden believed the men were “casing” the store in preparation for a robbery, so he approached, stopped, and frisked them, and found an illegal handgun on
John Terry. Id. In justifying McFadden’s stop of Terry on less than probable cause, the
Supreme Court credited McFadden’s interpretation that the behaviors of the men were
suspicious. Id. at 33.
385. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not
to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of
government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s
protection.’”); see also id. at 61 (“[I]f officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect
mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect’s description, neither the seizure
nor an accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful.”).
386. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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innocent conduct,387 can be based on less than perfectly reliable information, and should be evaluated under a “totality of circumstances”
test.388 It can also be wrong. Suspicion does not equal certainty.
The Supreme Court has never quantified just how mistaken an
officer can be or how low the threshold for error should be set.389 In
fact, courts have been emphatic in refusing to quantify the certainty of
reasonable suspicion.390 Commentators and judges, however, have
not been so reticent and have opined on the rough parameters of what
percentage likelihood would look like for reasonable suspicion. Generally, the estimated range runs between a 20% to 30% level of “certainty,”391 although one survey of judges had a broader range of 10%
to 50%.392 Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch but less than
probable cause, and no matter what “number” is chosen within this
accepted range, the threshold to reach reasonable suspicion has a
huge margin of error (again taking the average—somewhere between
70% to 80% of police suspicion can be mistaken and yet be constitutional).393

387. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”).
388. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than
that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”).
389. See Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential
of Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 964.
390. Id. (“[C]ourts have been unwilling to explicitly quantify the percentage chance
for ‘reasonable suspicion’. . . .”).
391. Stephen E. Henderson, A Rose by Any Other Name: Regulating Law Enforcement Bulk Metadata Collection, 94 TEX. L. REV. 28, 39 (2016) (positing that “reasonable
suspicion is something akin to being 30% confident”); see also Christopher Slobogin,
Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1083 (1998) (determining reasonable suspicion “to be something
like a 20% to 30% chance of success”).
392. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J.
1143, 1156–57 (2012) (“When 164 judges were asked to quantify how much evidence
they felt was required to sustain a reasonable suspicion, their estimates ranged from
50% at the high end to 10% at the low end.”); see also Simmons, supra note 390, at
1005 (“[J]udges appear to have widely divergent views as to this question, with survey
results varying widely but averaging at 30.8% for reasonable suspicion and 44.5% for
probable cause.”).
393. Given the 20% to 30% chance of success cited by Slobogin, it can be surmised
that 70% to 80% would then be unsuccessful products of reasonable suspicion. Slobogin, supra note 391.
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For a facial recognition system, this uncertainty means that the
error rate for a match could be significant (and yet constitutional).394
Both false positives and false negatives may occur, and within the existing percentages many individuals could be incorrectly stopped
based on erroneous matches.395 If mapped to the reasonable suspicion
standard, a facial recognition system could be more wrong than right
and still be constitutional (or at least not violative of the Fourth
Amendment).
b. Error and Probable Cause
Probable cause that a person’s face matches the face of a person
with an open felony warrant could be sufficient to arrest them on the
spot. Probable cause is the legal standard that constrains police from
arresting or searching individuals.396 The standard originates from
the text of the Fourth Amendment, but despite this provenance, its
meaning has never been established in any single definition.397 The
Supreme Court has articulated several formulations over the years,
but has generally agreed that probable cause should be “defined in
terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense’”398 or when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”399 The Court has
394. The human equivalent of this process would be an officer erroneously believing the person who just walked past him has an open warrant based on a misidentification of the person.
395. The variables that can be factored into the matching system (creating reasonable suspicion of a match) are wide open. See Garvie & Moy, supra note 58. The “totality
of circumstances” does not exclude many factors, leaving design parameters open.
396. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 9 (2020) (“Under the Fourth Amendment, the standard
for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing
an offense; this standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary
accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and the state’s duty to control
crime.”). See generally Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L.J.
1276, 1280 (2020) (discussing how pluralism in the meaning of probable cause creates
no clear guidance in judicial interpretation of the standard).
397. Crespo, supra note 396, at 1279 (“[T]wo centuries after the Supreme Court
first applied the phrase [probable cause], scholars continue to describe it as ‘elusive,’
‘hopelessly indeterminate,’ and ‘shrouded in mystery.’”).
398. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
399. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of
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gone on to emphasize that “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning
on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”400 Because the standard is meant to be used in the real world, the Supreme
Court has emphasized its “practical, common-sense” application401
and specifically refused to offer any quantification.402 Generally, the
objective test is whether a “man of reasonable caution” or “reasonably
prudent person” would judge that a crime had been committed.403
Reasoned probability, not certainty, is the requirement, meaning that
mistakes are baked into the standard.404
Scholars, judges, and law enforcement agents examining probable cause in practice have attempted to quantify this probability with
some general consensus.405 As Professor Ric Simmons has written,
“Most commentators also agree that probable cause is something
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”).
400. Id. at 232; see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (“In
dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.”); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV.
913, 915 (2009) (“[T]he probable-cause determination is explicitly and exclusively a
statement about the probability of a particular outcome—namely, the odds of recovering evidence from a particular location.”).
401. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (“[W]e think it suffices for the practical, common-sense
judgment called for in making a probable-cause determination.”).
402. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard
is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”).
403. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (“‘Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances . . . warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that” an offense has been or is being committed,’ and that evidence
bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched.” (citation omitted));
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2013) (“The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts . . . viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal
contraband or evidence of a crime.”).
404. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
405. Simmons, supra note 389, at 987–88 (“Forty-five years ago, one law professor
surveyed 166 federal judges to ask them to quantify the concept of probable cause, and
the results ranged from ten percent to ninety percent.” (citing C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982))); id. at 988 n.165 (“The vast majority of the judges
were between the 30% and 60% range—16% answered 30%, 27% answered 40%,
31% answered 50%, and 15% answered 60%—still indicating a wide range of disagreements.”). But see Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards
in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (2017) (arguing against
quantification and for an explainable context for suspicion).
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close to but just less than 50%, while scattered evidence from prosecutors and law enforcement point to numbers between 40% and
51%.”406 The quantum of evidence is certainly greater than reasonable suspicion.407 A variation along a spectrum around 40% to 51%
provides a general sense of the certainty required for an arrest or full
search. Similar to reasonable suspicion, police have no obligation to
consider exculpatory or innocent conduct,408 can base their decisions
on inferences,409 and their judgment can be mistaken.410
The consequences of a 50% error rate for a facial recognition
matching system are quite serious. An automated match (correct or
not) will mean the identified suspect could be handcuffed, searched,
and forcibly detained. The person may be incarcerated pending resolution of the warrant allegation. Absent unusual circumstances, police
officers will have little discretion on whether to arrest an individual
matched by the computer system. In fact, four fairly recent Supreme
406. Simmons, supra note 389, at 1005; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right
Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 338–39 (2004) (using an imprecise range of 40–49%); Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 347, 356 (2011) (noting that practitioners and commentators estimate probable
cause to be “in the 40-45 percent range”); Henderson, supra note 391, at 38–39 (“Some
think probable cause requires a preponderance of the evidence, whereas I think it a
slightly less, albeit inarticulable, measure.”); Slobogin, supra note 391 (reporting probable cause at about 50%); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 641, 680 (2005) (reporting anecdotal account of a prosecutor stating probable
cause is about 40%); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 783 (2003) (reporting anecdotal account of FBI
agent stating probable cause is 51%).
407. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“We have held that probable
cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ . . .
and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than
that for probable cause . . . .”).
408. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Once probable cause is
established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional
evidence which may exculpate the accused.”).
409. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (“In reviewing the propriety
of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific
certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists.”); Richardson,
supra note 392, at 1155 (“[C]ourts consistently fail to determine whether the inferences drawn by the officer conducting the stop are actually entitled to any weight.”).
410. Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus
Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 (2010) (“‘[P]robable cause’ necessarily contemplates that official action may be undertaken in situations under which
there is some probability that the action will prove to have been ‘correct’ (it will accomplish the objective for which it was initiated), and some probability that the action
will prove to have been ‘incorrect’ (it will cause harm that, ex post, was not justified).”).
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Court cases have involved errors in arrest warrants.411 And, again under a totality of circumstances, many different inputs can be used to
make the match.
c.

Negligent Error
The doctrines of reasonable suspicion and probable cause forgive
error at high rates. But even those percentages underestimate the permissible amount of Fourth Amendment error tolerated in policing.
Adding to the calculus is the fact that the Supreme Court has both narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule to obtain a remedy in the
criminal justice system412 and raised the bar for qualified immunity
for Fourth Amendment violations in the civil legal system.413 By restricting both civil and criminal remedies for police mistakes, the consequence for errors drops.
For purposes of suppression, the Supreme Court now forgives police error that was not intentional, reckless, grossly negligent, or the
product of systemic or recurring problems.414 In other words, merely
negligent error will not result in the suppression of evidence.
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has signaled that
mere negligent error—a misjudgment or mistake—will not be sufficient to warrant use of the exclusionary rule.415 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Herring v. United States:416
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in
our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence.417

411. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012); Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
412. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 684 (2011) (noting when the Court first
began to apply the exclusionary rule to police misconduct covered by the Fourth
Amendment).
413. Id. at 671–77 (analyzing the evolution of the impact the Court’s decisions have
on the exclusionary rule and qualified immunity doctrines).
414. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 639 (2014) (detailing cases regarding a “culpability-centered exclusionary rule”).
415. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229
(2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
416. Herring, 555 U.S. at 136.
417. Id. at 144.
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In practical effect, this means that the negligent error of a police officer
or police employee will not result in suppression.418
For purposes of a facial recognition pattern matching technologies, Herring solidifies the reality that negligent errors in application
will not undermine the constitutionality of the system.419 Only intentional or reckless or systemic instances of error will warrant an exclusionary rule remedy.420 While rights and remedies are certainly different, this forgiving of error allows a greater freedom for mistakes. If
merely negligent, an error in a facial recognition match will have no
consequence for police investigation.421
418. The Court held that “the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated
from the arrest.” Id. at 137. Four relatively recent Supreme Court cases involved arrests based on police errors. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318
(2012); Herring, 555 U.S. 135; Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008); Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). The Court also held that a mistaken arrest based on a facially valid warrant is not itself a Fourth Amendment violation, and that police have no
duty “to investigate independently” claims of mistaken identity. Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144–46 (1979). See generally Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human
Users, 100 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting that the use of artificial intelligence
by police is not regulated by tort law, and discussing the need to adapt oversight of
emerging technologies to ensure negligence law works as intended).
419. Interestingly Herring itself was a case about data error, specifically, how a
mistake in a computer database did not justify suppression because there was no evidence of systemic or recurring problems. Herring, 555 U.S. at 135–36. Herring was arrested because a database search erroneously stated that he had an open felony arrest
warrant. Id. at 137. However, the database was not updated, and by the time the investigating agent learned of the mistake, drugs and a gun were recovered on Herring’s
person. Id. at 138. In refusing to exclude the evidence, the Court suggested that merely
negligent data errors would not be the subject of constitutional remedy. Id. at 146. This
general acceptance of police error and data error in the criminal justice system has
been well cataloged in prior work. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 542 (2016) (“[R]esearch has long documented significant quality problems with criminal justice databases . . . .”); id. at 543
(“[T]he prevailing zeitgeist of governments [includes] . . . a blasé acceptance of data
error and its negative consequences for individuals.”); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at
155–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic information raise grave concerns for individual liberty. ‘The offense
to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street
simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer data
base’ is evocative of the use of general warrants that so outraged the authors of our
Bill of Rights.” (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
420. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue
Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561, 591–94 (2019) (describing why even systemic instances of
error do not always warrant Fourth Amendment suppression).
421. Similarly, civil remedies ordinarily effectuated by lawsuits against police officers have also been limited by an expanded qualified immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, Criminal Culpability, Civil Liability, and Police Created Danger: Why
and How the Fourth Amendment Provides Very Limited Protection from Police Use of
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2. Bias
Implicit and explicit biases exist in all human endeavors, but systemic racial bias has been revealed in policing practices at a discomforting level.422 Yet, intentional or unintentional racial bias does not
factor into the Fourth Amendment calculus (although it may raise
equal protection or due process concerns).423 The Fourth Amendment
regulates police actions, but it does so within the social, economic, and
racial realities of modern America. Those realities are not comforting
to advocates of racial equity because they reveal a policing structure
that has repeatedly demonstrated racial bias toward communities of
color.424 In hundreds of investigations, lawsuits, media stories, and
Deadly Force, 28 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 241, 246–61 (2018) (describing the Supreme
Court’s civil immunity jurisprudence). Civil lawsuits claiming that a police officer made
an error in applying the Fourth Amendment regularly lose in court and have been restricted by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. Id. Moreover, the layers of legal rules
scaffolding the qualified immunity doctrine and § 1983 doctrine make individual civil
rights cases rare to bring and even rarer to win. See, e.g., Andrew Chung, Lawrence
Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo Gomez, For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS: REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus
[https://perma.cc/8D8Q-7D6P] (scrutinizing the impact of Supreme Court decisions
on police immunity for excessive use of force suits). Most false stop or arrests cases do
not get litigated. Id.
422. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The
Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1458–66 (2016) (analyzing multiple long term studies on the impact of racial bias on policing practices); Meares, supra
note 108, at 162 (characterizing stop-and-frisk as a policing program); Richardson, supra note 240, at 1170 (discussing the impact of implicit bias on shoot/don’t shoot decisions); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2061–63 (2011) (discussing the impact of implicit racial bias on the development of police hunches).
423. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We of course agree with
petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment.”).
424. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2071 (2017) (“A large body of historical research has documented
the entanglement of police in the long-running national project of racial control.”); M.
Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 515, 527
(“The specific system of power used to enforce the economic and social relationship
between low-income Black communities in the United States and the larger White
community in general, and corporate interests in particular, is the domestic colony. In
the context of the domestic colony, the police are responsible for maintaining the coercive exploitative and oppressive relationship by serving as an occupying force in
low-income Black communities.”). See generally VITALE, supra note 349 (making the
case for police reform to stop systemic racial bias); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING
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personal anecdotes the reality of racial bias in policing has been made
plain.425 Especially in urban areas with higher crime rates, the problems of explicit and implicit bias and structural racism persist.426
Despite this reality, the Supreme Court has refused to allow the
Fourth Amendment to be a vehicle to address racial bias in individual
cases.427 In Whren,428 the Court held in response to a claim of a racially
biased pretextual traffic stop: “[T]he constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”429 This understanding that
racial bias is largely irrelevant to policing decisions has essentially
foreclosed Fourth Amendment claims based on racial

BLACK MEN 59–61 (2017) (describing the power the Supreme Court gave officers to
legally stop vehicles and the use by police in racial profiling practice).
425. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority
Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 66–69 (2014) (stating stop-and-frisk is a continuation of racial subordination that began with slavery); R. Richard Banks, Beyond
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003) (making the
argument to abandon efforts to eliminate racial profiling and instead focus on the consequences); BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES 24, 52–53 (Charles J. Ogletree et al. eds., 1995) (describing how
abuse of stop-and-frisk is perpetuated by the reluctance of minority communities to
report police abuse); see also C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2–3 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT], https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7NS-9CSB] (discussing
how police practices that promote “productivity” over community relations lead to a
negative relationship between police and minority neighborhoods in Ferguson, Missouri); C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 24 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/crt/
file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/U4CT-49ZN] (describing how “zero tolerance” enforcement strategies lead to systemic and widespread stop, search, and arrests that violate the Fourth Amendment).
426. Cedric Merlin Powell, The Structural Dimensions of Race: Lock Ups, Systemic
Chokeholds, and Binary Disruptions, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 7, 8 (2018) (stating that
disproportionately high rates of incarceration for African Americans and Latinos
makes the criminal justice system a leading source of racial inequality); Scott Holmes,
Resisting Arrest and Racism—the Crime of “Disrespect,” 85 UMKC L. REV. 625, 637–38
(2017) (discussing structural racism in the context of implicit and explicit racial bias
and how it is presented within policing).
427. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial
Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
882, 884 (2015) (stating that Whren legitimized racial profiling by denying that a police officer’s intentions when making a stop have any bearing on Fourth Amendment
analysis).
428. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
429. Id. at 813.
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discrimination.430 While race, alone, would not constitute an appropriate justification for a stop, search, or arrest the Court will likewise
not declare a stop unconstitutional because it is racially motivated.431
In the pattern matching context, this would mean that a system programmed to encourage pretextual race-based stops would not necessarily run into Fourth Amendment problems.
In addition, proxies for racial bias about certain groups or in certain areas would be permissible to include in the matching model. The
Supreme Court has allowed proxies for race, poverty, and nationality
to impact reasonable suspicion and probable cause in a series of
Fourth Amendment cases.432 “[H]igh crime areas,”433 “drug courier

430. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[An
officer’s] justification must provide specific reasons why the officer suspected you
were breaking the law, . . . but it may factor in your ethnicity, . . . where you live, . . .
what you were wearing, . . . and how you behaved . . . . The officer does not even need
to know which law you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible
infraction—even one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.” (citations omitted)).
431. Simmons, supra note 389, at 971 (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has little to say about whether race can be used as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Courts are unanimous in holding that race alone can never be
the basis for a stop or a search, for the obvious reason that a person’s race alone can
never create probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.”); see, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (“Mexican ancestry . . . alone . . . does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they
are aliens.”); State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“No rational inference may be drawn from the race of [a person] . . . that he may be engaged
in criminal activities.”).
432. Simmons, supra note 389, at 976–77; see also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives
from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276–80 (2009) (describing the impact of New York
City’s zero tolerance policing strategy).
433. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Simmons, supra note 389, at
976 (“No doubt in many instances, higher-crime neighborhoods will tend to be inner
city neighborhoods with higher proportions of certain minority groups (or at least this
will be the perspective of many police officers and judges). And this formal use of proxies for race under the current system is likely only the tip of the iceberg. The unconscious (or conscious) racial biases of police officers and magistrates permeate every
aspect of the front end of the criminal justice system.”).
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profile[s],”434 incongruity,435 and immigration-related stops436 all rely
on proxies for individuals who have historically been targeted by police.437 The result has been that inputs that stand in for race can be
used to justify a stop or arrest (at least in the human policing context).438
In the facial recognition pattern matching context, such proxy inputs might also be allowed. So, while a machine would not code for
race, it might code for hairstyle, or facial composition, which in turn
might stand in to represent (accurately or inaccurately) a particular
race. Depending on what information was collected, some matching
might include geographic areas (where the photograph is taken)
which also could easily substitute as a neighborhood proxy for race or
ethnicity,439 or the system could be programmed for tattoo recognition as a proxy for gang involvement (and thus criminality).440 At least
from a Fourth Amendment perspective, there is nothing stopping facial recognition designers from creating and relying on these proxies
to do the work that race might do in the algorithm. If a correlation for
434. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1299 (1990) (“In the drug courier profile cases,
the Court accorded police officials broad discretionary powers that do not implicate
the fourth amendment. Mendenhall and Royer demonstrated that questioning citizens
does not trigger fourth amendment scrutiny.” (first citing United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980); and then citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983))).
435. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J.
214, 226 (1983) (“Police manuals often instruct officers to become familiar with their
beat and question persons who do not ‘belong.’”).
436. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880.
437. See generally David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 307
(2001) (describing arguments used to defend racially disparate police practices).
438. Richardson, supra note 422, at 2080 (“Some courts currently allow officers to
rely on race and proxies for race (such as consideration of high-crime neighborhoods)
to justify Terry seizures.”); Rudovsky, supra note 437, at 304.
439. Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the
Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99,
138 (1999) (“Using the character of the neighborhood as a factor in the determination
of reasonable suspicion results in the consideration by proxy of the impermissible factors of race and poverty. Even if the factor is not consciously used in this fashion, using
this criterion will have a disproportionate impact on such communities.”).
440. See generally Aaron Mackey, Dave Maass & Soraya Okuda, 5 Ways Law Enforcement Will Use Tattoo Recognition Technology, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2,
2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/5-ways-law-enforcement-will-use
-tattoo-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/4SQH-RGQB] (discussing tattoo
recognition technology tested by the FBI and National Institute of Standards and Technology and relating it to similar technologies already used or being contracted for use
by various police departments).
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suspicion can be found, the Fourth Amendment would not preclude its
use. This is a problem since, as discussed, early tests of facial recognition identification systems have been shown to be discriminatory toward African Americans,441 and especially darker skinned women.442
3. Fairness
Fairness presents an equally complex principle for policing. On
one hand, “fairness” defined as equality under the law and equal application of the law remains an aspirational goal for police. Police are
supposed to enforce the law the same regardless of race, class, age,
gender, or neighborhood.443 In actual practice, this has not been the
case, as differences in race, class, gender, and place have impacted
every facet of the policing process.444 As a matter of procedural

441. See Garvie & Frankle, supra note 15.
442. Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial
-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/47EG-Q6XH].
443. Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence
of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J.F. 525, 539 (2014) (“[Experience of fairness is determined by] considering both the fairness of decisionmaking and the fairness of treatment.”); Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jeffrey B. Snipes & Anne E. Supina, Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RSCH. CRIM. & DELINQ. 269,
277 (1996) (studying compliance in police interactions and finding procedural fairness increases compliance with police).
444. See Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to Be Black in the Criminal Justice
System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://slate.com/news_and_politics/crime/
2015/08/racial-disparities-in-the-criminal-justice-system-eight-charts-illustrating
-how-its-stacked-against-blacks.html [https://perma.cc/Z49Q-PHMM] (using charts
to demonstrate how blacks are discriminated against at nearly every level of the criminal justice system); Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity,’
USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2014, 2:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207 [https://perma.cc/
H4RQ-Z5L7] (discussing various factors that result in blacks being arrested at the highest rates of all racial groups). See generally Tate Ryan-Mosely & Jennifer Strong, The
Activist Dismantling Racist Police Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020), https://
www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002709/the-activist-dismantling-racist
-police-algorithms [https://perma.cc/3TQQ-DD92] (describing a grassroots effort in
L.A. to dismantle police artificial intelligence programs that perpetuate racism).
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fairness,445 procedural justice,446 or just common experience, police
treat different people differently.447 And sadly, from a Fourth Amendment perspective, “fairness” defined as equal treatment of people,
groups, and places has never been constitutionally required.448
In fact, explicit adoption of profiling, high crime areas, border
searches, and a litany of poverty focused exceptions to the warrant
requirement all speak to an unequal and unfair doctrine.449 In addition, police tactics have not been the same for all communities and all
people. Differences in terms of the impact of stop-and-frisk tactics,450
use of force, and surveillance all undermine a claim of a fair (i.e., uniform and equal) application of the Fourth Amendment. Some
445. Joshua J. Reynolds, Victoria Estrada-Reynolds & Narina Nunez, Development
and Validation of the Attitudes Towards Police Legitimacy Scale, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
119, 120 (2018) (“Procedural fairness, which concerns the fairness of how the outcomes are reached, is based on the quality of decision-making (e.g., opportunities for
error correction) and the quality of treatment (e.g., respect, dignity, and courtesy).”
(citing Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103 (2013))).
446. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 345, at 264–65; see also Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 651, 657–66
(2009) (describing police practices that can promote legitimacy and procedural justice).
447. Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 992 (2017) (“When
communities of color fear the police, believe they will receive unfair treatment, and
question their legitimacy, the natural result is that they also attempt to avoid contact
with the police. In many minority communities, these efforts go so far as to avoid even
reporting crimes, from a fear that police officers will treat them as suspects rather than
witnesses or victims—a concept foreign to most white people.”); see id. (“A recent Chicago survey revealed that only 6% of African-Americans in the city believed that Chicago police officers treated everyone fairly.”); see also Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 229–31 (2012) (commenting
that order-maintenance and subsequently attendant Terry stop policing priorities impact police legitimacy); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 946, 952 (2002) (describing how microaggressions generated by policing activity that targets black people has negative social effects).
448. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55
FLA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2003) (finding unfairness in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions that adversely affect less affluent and privileged groups).
449. Id. (“Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on the extent to which
one can afford accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns,
heavy curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors and walls.”).
450. Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk
as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2412 (2017) (“In particular,
SQF [Stop, Question, Frisk] tends to be concentrated upon minority—i.e., AfricanAmerican and Hispanic—neighborhoods. In New York, the district court in Floyd found
that the racial composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor of the density of
stops than its lagged crime rate.”).
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communities bear the brunt of police tactics with no relief provided
by the Fourth Amendment.451 Focused simply on how the Fourth
Amendment guides equal treatment in the real world, one might argue
that it has no impact, or worse, reifies an unequal and unfair society
that is riven by differences in race, class, gender, and neighborhood.452
For purposes of building a facial recognition matching system,
the same tension between ideals and application arises. The ideal of
fairness, meaning applying the same decision-making rules to similar
problems, is present.453 AI systems are good at procedural fairness
rules.454 But systemic and structural inequities in society (the inputs)
results in a system that will not be fair in fact or be perceived as fair
(the outputs).455 For example, if the list of people with felony warrants
was created in a way that replicates societal bias in policing priorities,
then a matching system will replicate the societal bias. And, independent of the technology, the Fourth Amendment says nothing about the
underlying reality and source of data.456 An AI system built around
principles of Fourth Amendment fairness probably need not be very
fair as long as it represents the unfair world around it.457
Beyond unequal treatment, the Fourth Amendment also has little
to say about unequal or disparate effects of policing. Policing resources historically are not equally distributed across society.458 Police respond to crime patterns, strategic assessments, and political
pressure, and those influences do not result in an equal distribution of
451. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City
Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102
J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007) (“In the period for which we had data, the NYPD’s
records indicate that they were stopping blacks and Hispanics more often than whites,
in comparison to both the populations of these groups and the best estimates of the
rate of crimes committed by each group.”).
452. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2010).
453. See supra Part II.C.
454. Machines, after all, follow the process designed by the computer engineers.
455. See Ryan-Mosely, supra note 444.
456. See supra Part II.
457. See supra Part II.C.4.
458. Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private
Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 149 (2017) (“Policing is widely viewed as redistributive;
the communities that provide the lion’s share of the tax revenue that funds public policing efforts are typically not where the majority of policing takes place. Or, to provide
a more nuanced view, those communities may receive a different mix of policing services than poorer communities; more community policing and problem-oriented policing, for example, and less enforcement oriented or zero-tolerance policing.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2006) (discussing
the problem of under-policing certain poor areas).
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police resources across a community.459 Some neighborhoods are
over-policed and some under-policed, and in both police have been
criticized as being unfair.460 Distributive fairness has never been realized or really a priority.461 The Fourth Amendment neither mandates
equal policing resources nor freedom from policing attention.462
For a facial recognition system, any unfairness in effect will not
be a Fourth Amendment concern. Complaints, then, that facial recognition matching systems do not work equally well on different races
or genders because they are trained on datasets without sufficient diversity will not merit Fourth Amendment attention. Complaints about
the placement of surveillance cameras in particular neighborhoods
will not be heard. Complaints about the disproportionate number of
people of color with felony arrest warrants which might skew the
matching capabilities of the algorithm will not be heard. In short, fairness considerations, while important in principle, are not required as
a Fourth Amendment matter.
4. Transparency
Police decision-making is decidedly not transparent.463 At an officer level, one cannot see into the human brain to understand why an
officer acted the way they did. Further, well-documented cognitive
shortcomings, implicit biases, and other limitations of the human

459. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1109 (2017) (manipulating police response factors to improve predictive policing).
460. See John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the
-statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict [https://perma.cc/FT7P-QZTZ]
(analyzing the S.D.N.Y. court’s interpretation of statistical data for New York City’s
stop-and-frisk program, finding it unconstitutional for indirectly racially profiling minorities).
461. Reynolds et al., supra note 445, at 120 (“Distributive fairness is described as
perceptions that people receive fair decisions (e.g., to arrest or not) and that the outcomes are distributed fairly (e.g., minorities or poor individuals are not disproportionally arrested).” (citing Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of
Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103 (2013))).
462. Cf. Stoughton, supra note 458 and accompanying text (demonstrating the differences in police resources and attention across diverse groups).
463. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2000) (“Hidden police abuses are at least as virulent as prosecutorial misconduct, with occasional
revelations of uniformed lawlessness indicating the existence of a secret code of policing on the streets.”); see also id. at 1156 (“Undemocratic opaqueness in law enforcement policy and practice . . . is never harmless.”).

2021]

FACIAL RECOGNITION

1189

mind prevent an accurate understanding.464 Police officers, like everyone else, see a distorted world without noticing the distortions.465
While there are some ex post mechanisms for recording the observations of officers (e.g., police reports, testimony, recordings of body
camera footage), these types of formal memorialization are limited in
scope and value.466
As mentioned, the Supreme Court has stated that subjective reasoning of police officers is largely irrelevant for Fourth Amendment
purposes.467 In rejecting consideration of an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping or arresting a suspect, the Court has signaled that
it is fine leaving the actual decision-making process unexamined.468
The goal, instead, is to look for objective justifications for a stop, not
actual reasons.469 And, while objective rules must be established for
police, these rules do not have to control the actual decisions of police.
Police officers are allowed to arrest based on a reasonable mistake of
fact470 or a reasonable mistake of law,471 as long as there are some objective justifications for their actions.472
Beyond individual human decisions, the larger context of policing
is equally opaque. As a profession, policing traditionally has not been
very transparent about subjects like training, experiences, or tactics.473 More than occasionally, police have been affirmatively
464. See Megan Quattlebaum, Let’s Get Real: Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, and
the Reasonable Police Officer, 14 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1, 10 (2018).
465. See id. at 10–13.
466. But see Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 182
(2017) (using recorded data to understand police patterns).
467. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Our cases have repeatedly
rejected a subjective approach, asking only whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006))); Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
468. See King, 563 U.S. at 464 (reasoning that “[l]egal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective,” and allow for fairer law enforcement than do subjective
examinations).
469. See id.
470. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990).
471. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 62 (2014).
472. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that
an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to
the existence of probable cause.”).
473. See Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV.
1119, 1129 (2013) (“In practice, police chiefs and other local government actors often
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secretive.474 At both operational and institutional levels, local governments have avoided various transparency initiatives and have occasionally fought them.475 When technology is added to the formula, the
push for secrecy grows even stronger, as claims of proprietary systems and tactical advantage cause police to defend non-transparent
strategies.476 The result has been that the reasons for police decisions,
training standards, and protocols remain under-examined, if not completely opaque.477 What officers are taught about the Fourth Amendment, how they are instructed to enforce the law consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, and how new technologies intersect with the
Fourth Amendment are all quite unclear.
A facial recognition system built to such Fourth Amendment
standards can be a true “black box” and still be constitutional under
this thinking. The Fourth Amendment neither requires police to be
transparent nor asks for the true underlying reason for the stop, as
long as there is an objective justification.478 So, for example, a facial
recognition-matching model might set forth explicit rules of how a
match should occur, but if the model is actually finding another hidden
correlation to make the match, this underlying correlation could not
limit rather than promote information availability. Cities and police departments
sometimes actively inhibit the collection of information about police by, for example,
requiring secrecy when they settle civil suits for police misconduct or discouraging
citizens from filing complaints about officer conduct.”).
474. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 533 (2004) (“[E]fforts by outside agencies to collect and analyze
information in a potentially adversarial framework, such as a § 14141 lawsuit, may
lead police officers to be defensive and uncooperative.”).
475. See Harmon, supra note 473, at 1133 (“[S]tates not only do little to encourage
police departments to produce information about policing that does exist, they also
often restrict public access to it through privacy laws and exemptions from open records statutes.”).
476. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms,
26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 293 (2017) (“An algorithm can also be a black box in
another sense; the companies that create them often refuse to divulge information
about them. From their developers’ perspective, revealing how an algorithm works
risks exposing valuable trade secret information to competitors.”); Ric Simmons, Big
Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1067, 1087 (2018) (“Unfortunately, big data algorithms are notoriously opaque
and incomprehensible, sometimes even to those who are applying them. Two of the
largest providers of predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system are corporations who claim that the inner workings of their software are trade secrets.”); NYPD
Predictive Policing Document, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 12, 2019), https://www
.brennancenter.org/analysis/nypd-predictive-policing-documents [https://perma
.cc/5WUH-QTR9].
477. See Harmon, supra note 475 and accompanying text.
478. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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be challenged. All that has mattered to the Court has been that there
was an objective justification; the actual reason does not matter. The
result would be that an objectively reasonable but mistaken facial
recognition algorithm might survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny because courts would not want to look under the hood of the model.
C. CONCLUSION ON ERROR, BIAS, TRANSPARENCY, AND FAIRNESS IN FACIAL
RECOGNITION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Like the privacy problem, the Fourth Amendment offers little
comfort to some of the longstanding challenges to police legitimacy.
The question is why, and what can be done about it.
Examining the Fourth Amendment through the lens of facial
recognition technology reveals two related insights helpful for future
Fourth Amendment analysis. First, much of the Supreme Court’s expansion of police power can be traced to deference to human decisionmaking, and when decision-making is made at a programmatic or administrative level, such deference wanes. Digital may be different, but
“programmatic” may also be different for the Fourth Amendment
(ratcheting up constitutional scrutiny). Second, while the Supreme
Court seems to forgive isolated errors or pretextual biases of individual officers, the Court does not forgive recurring errors or systemically biased decisions.
These two insights are not necessarily new, as scholars like
Daphna Renan, Tracey Meares, and Christopher Slobogin have all
made the argument that the Fourth Amendment should be thought of
in a systemic light.479 The insights do, however, offer a way forward to
theorize how the Supreme Court might address new systems of surveillance like facial recognition. The common theme (like with privacy) is that the more programmatically designed and systematized a
policing practice becomes, the higher level of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny it should receive from the Court. As facial recognition technology is literally a construct of programmatic engineering and computer design, it would receive higher Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
1. Human v. Programmatic Error/Bias
One reason why the Supreme Court seems to forgive police error
and bias turns on the fact that for most of the Court’s history, Fourth
Amendment cases were decidedly human, with police officers on the
479. Renan, supra note 108, at 1041–42 (“While our Fourth Amendment framework is transactional, then, surveillance is increasingly programmatic.”); Slobogin, supra note 108, at 97; Meares, supra note 108, at 162.
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front lines of quick discretionary decisions. Police, as ordinary people,
get things wrong.480 As the Court recognized in Heien v. North Carolina, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials,
giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”481 The Supreme Court has forgiven mistakes of fact482 and
mistakes of law.483 Within this “human” forgiveness, the Supreme
Court emphasizes the quickness required for immediate decisions, the
complexity of human behavior and observations, and the one-off nature of decision-making.484 In addition, the Court forgives error because Fourth Amendment law can be technical and hard to interpret.485
Yet, this human deference falls away when programmatic (and
thus systemic) Fourth Amendment violations can be shown. Generally, when police administrators organize formalized, broad investigatory measures for ordinary policing purposes, the response of the Supreme Court is critical.486 Dragnet sweeps, roadblocks, and other
types of broad-based suspicionless searches for law enforcement
480. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes
must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions
of probability.”).
481. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S.
at 176).
482. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 61 (“We have recognized that searches and seizures
based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.” (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
183–86 (1990))); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971).
483. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 61 (“But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and
such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. . . .
There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why
this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of
fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.”).
484. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (“[T]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989))); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (“Inadvertent errors of judgment that do not work any grave injustice will inevitably occur
under the pressure of police work.”).
485. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 83 (2011) (“A
prime justification for forgiving police mistakes of law lies in the enormous number
and often-technical nature of low-level offenses that commonly serve as bases to stop
and arrest individuals. The expectation that the law is ‘definite and knowable’ is no
more tenable for police today than it is for the lay public.”).
486. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 33 (2000).
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purposes are not favored.487 The reason in part is because police administrators have the ability to craft constitutionally respectful rules
before implementing the plans.488 Absent special needs or special circumstances, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow systems
of general suspicionless searches for ordinary law enforcement purposes.489 The more planned the practice is, the less deferential the
Court appears.490 In the case of a designed system of facial recognition
technology, any deference would seem to drop away to a fully programmatic (i.e., computer-programmed) system.
2. Isolated v. Recurring Error/Bias
As stated, another reason for the Supreme Court’s failure to address human error and bias arises from how Fourth Amendment cases
come before the courts. Suppression hearings involve individualized
cases with particular facts involving particular officers.491 Fourth
Amendment rights are decided in one-off settings where systemic or
structural error is not presented.492 The result is that in criminal cases,
systemic constitutional violations are not litigated and thus not seen
by courts. This practice hides systemic error and allows for a less holistic understanding of police misconduct.
Yet those systemic errors exist. Through investigations and litigation, clear evidence of systemic police error, misconduct, and
Fourth Amendment violations have been found in cities like

487. See id. at 37 (illustrating how searches are considered unreasonable without
individualized suspicion).
488. See Logan, supra note 485, at 101 (explaining how police enjoy the power and
opportunities to enact more laws to seize and prosecute).
489. See FRIEDMAN, supra 224, at 143–84 (explaining the difference between cause
based and suspicionless searches).
490. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (“In looking to the
programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence in order to determine
the relevant primary purpose.”).
491. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 419, at 579 (explaining that suits against
individual officers remain the main avenue for victims of wrongful search or seizure).
492. But see Ferguson, supra note 420, at 591 (discussing the promise of litigating
systemic or recurring error through the use of new data-driven technologies).
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Chicago,493 Baltimore,494 Philadelphia,495 New York City,496 and most
famously Ferguson, Missouri.497 The Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division has opened sixty-nine investigations and entered into
forty reform agreements.498 Since 2012, the DOJ Civil Rights Division
has “opened 11 new pattern-or-practice investigations and negotiated
19 new reform agreements.”499
In recent cases, the Justices have acknowledged that recurring
problems would impact Fourth Amendment decisions, including the
suppression of evidence. For example, Herring turned on the lack of
recurring errors in the arrest warrant database.500 Similarly, in Utah

493. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 23 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925
846/download [https://perma.cc/U8W6-6C9G].
494. DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 425.
495. See Plaintiffs’ First Report to Court and Master on Stop and Frisk Practices at
7, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.law
.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/contract-economic-organization/files/
Bailey%20First%20Report_final%20version.docx [https://perma.cc/T4HB-XQR7];
id. at 8 (“In sum, over the first six months of 2011, based on the 1426 75-48a forms
reviewed by counsel (a larger number were reviewed by law students with similar
findings), 713 pedestrian stops were made with reasonable suspicion and 713 were
made without reasonable suspicion. Of 355 frisks, 165 were with reasonable suspicion
and 190 without reasonable suspicion.”).
496. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
City acted with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks.”); id. at 660 (“The NYPD’s
practice of making stops that lack individualized reasonable suspicion has been so pervasive and persistent as to become not only a part of the NYPD’s standard operating
procedure, but a fact of daily life in some New York City neighborhoods.”); Ligon v. City
of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 492–510 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that nine independent police stops illustrated misconduct); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp.
2d 405, 412–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (illustrating seven instances of NYPD misconduct); see
also Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in
Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 69 (2015) (illustrating how the settlement of the Daniels case “mandated procedures for NYPD officers to record the rationale for stops” due to deficiency in the program).
497. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 425.
498. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994–PRESENT 3 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/
922421/download [https://perma.cc/QC3S-A792]; see also id. at 15 (“Of 69 total investigations since Section 14141’s enactment, the Division has closed 26 investigations
without making a formal finding of a pattern or practice.”).
499. Id. at 1.
500. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (“In a case where systemic
errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable
warrant system.”).
THE
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v. Strieff, both the majority and dissent recognized that proof of systemic violations would have impacted the analysis.501
In fact, the flipside of Herring’s limits on negligent error is that
intentional or reckless error and/or systemic or recurring error may
yet be remedied as a Fourth Amendment violation.502 One would hope
that intentionally choosing an 80% error rate in a facial recognition
system (following reasonable suspicion rules) qualifies as recklessly
promoting error. And, because Herring talks about remedies and not
rights, it might be an even stronger case to say that a system built
around 80% error violates Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, civil
rights investigations, civil rights lawsuits, and empirical studies that
demonstrate systemic or recurring error could be the basis of finding
Fourth Amendment violations.503 A facial recognition program that
systematically or regularly makes matching errors could be the subject of constitutional challenge (or a civil rights lawsuit).
If thought of as a system of policing rules, any design choice that
results in reckless errors will be constitutionally suspect. While human police error can be common and forgiving, designed structural
police error might not be treated the same way.
3. A Fourth Amendment Framework for Surveillance Systems
A silver lining thus might emerge from this analysis that offers a
way forward for regulating systems of surveillance. Surveillance technologies like facial recognition are by design non-human, programmatically engineered, and meant to offer recurring and systemic information to police. Someone must ex ante sit down and program the
choices made to provide information. These technologies, thus, should
sit in a different space compared to traditional human policing decisions.

501. Strieff v. Utah, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (“Moreover, there is no indication
that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. To the
contrary, all the evidence suggests that the stop was an isolated instance of negligence
that occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected drug house.”).
502. Herring, 555 U.S. at 146 (“We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by
the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct
at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.”).
503. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 425, at 3–4; DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 269; Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
City acted with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks.”); Fagan & Geller, supra note
496, at 69 (providing empirical data to demonstrate violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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If seen in this light, courts may not afford these technologies the
deference traditionally given to human police decisions. If an issue of
error rate, bias, or fairness can be identified in the design stage, this
systems problem should result in a colorable Fourth Amendment
challenge that should not be dismissed by the courts.
If, as I have argued, digital systems are different, then the cases
focused on the harms of systemic or recurring error, bias, or unfairness should open the door for a different legal analysis. A litigant
should be able to bring a case showing the design flaw as a Fourth
Amendment problem and escape the traditional arguments about low
standards of suspicion, the irrelevance of error, or pretext.
For example, if the face identification system routinely fails to
identify women of color in comparison to white males, a suspect who
was stopped based on a face identification match should be able to
challenge the stop on Fourth Amendment grounds without being limited by Whren’s suggestion that bias is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment.504 Or, if the error rate were revealed, the suspect should
be able to challenge the stop based on the high error rate without being precluded by the rather forgiving reasonable suspicion standard.505 While the Fourth Amendment has not traditionally worked this
way, the move to systems of pre-programmed decision-making creates a new opportunity for a new legal analysis. In this way, the Fourth
Amendment argument could build on insights of ethical AI critics who
have demanded access to the decisions and data underlying AI systems to show its limitations.
The symmetry of this systems analysis around privacy and legitimacy reinforces my claim that the Supreme Court might treat systems
of mass surveillance differently than traditional policing when it
comes to the Fourth Amendment. In both analyses, the fact that there
are programmed systemic choices being made ex ante changes things.
In both analyses, the fact that technology restructures police power
changes things. And, in both analyses, the potential scope and scale of
the societal change changes things. But, as it might be clear, such a theory that digital systems—like facial recognition—are different for
Fourth Amendment purposes would need to be adopted by the courts.
This would take time, and there is no guarantee that the Supreme
Court would see the systems of surveillance the same way. More practically, facial recognition technology needs to be regulated now. If the

504. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
505. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1990).
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Fourth Amendment largely fails to offer protections, a legislative fix is
necessary.
The next Part addresses how legislation could be drafted to fill
the gaps of Fourth Amendment protection in terms of privacy, error,
bias, transparency, and fairness.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION
This last Part details the principles that should undergird any legislation around facial recognition. The Constitution provides the floor
on which legislative bodies can scaffold further protections to protect
privacy and enhance legitimacy. The first Section examines the legal
standards that should cover the different use cases for facial recognition technology with an eye toward those uses that threaten Fourth
Amendment expectations of privacy. The second Section examines the
necessary accountability protections that will address issues of bias,
fairness, transparency, and error.
A. FACIAL RECOGNITION & PRIVACY: LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES
Following the analysis detailed in Part II, legislation should remedy the concerns raised by the different potential police uses (surveillance, identification, tracking, and verification). Proposed legislation
should mirror existing Fourth Amendment principles and also fill any
gaps from the acknowledged failures of the Fourth Amendment.
Central to the regulation of facial recognition are three questions:
(1) should any facial recognition uses be banned outright;506 (2) if not
banned, what level of legal justification (probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, etc.) should be required to use facial recognition matches;
and (3) above the constitutional floor, what, if any, additional protections should be required as a better way to protect privacy and ensure
legitimacy? The following discussion attempts to interweave the technologies and legal analysis discussed in Parts I and II to set out principles helpful for legislative action.
1. Ban Generalized Face Surveillance
Face surveillance should be banned for all ordinary law enforcement purposes. Whether stored, real-time, or through third-party image searches, building a system with the potential to arbitrarily scan
506. See Alfred Ng, Lawmakers Propose Indefinite Nationwide Ban on Police Use of
Facial Recognition, CNET (June 25, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/lawmakers
-propose-indefinite-nationwide-ban-on-police-use-of-facial-recognition [https://
perma.cc/TUE3-JE93].
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and identify individuals without individualized suspicion and to discover personal information about their location, interests, or activities
should simply be banned by law.507
The justification for such a ban derives in large part from the
Fourth Amendment principles discussed earlier. This type of suspicionless, warrantless, mass surveillance system runs straight into
Fourth Amendment concerns508 and—depending on the scope and
scale—likely would be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. The combination of digital capacity, mass collection, retrospective searching, long-term aggregation, and tracking, all without any individualized or particularized suspicion, should trigger significant, if
not fatal, Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
But the constitutional concerns extend beyond the fact that suspicionless mass surveillance runs afoul of Fourth Amendment principles. In addition, First Amendment principles are threatened.509 In
fact, underlying the Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment reasoning about privacy in public is a realization that surveillance chills
First Amendment protected activity.510 Free expression, association,
petitioning for redress, and political dissent all will be negatively impacted by face surveillance systems.511 Police have already shown a
willingness to use surveillance technologies to monitor dissenting
voices,512 and face surveillance will only strengthen that power. In
507. Separate rules can be designed for non-law enforcement purposes including
public safety emergencies.
508. See supra Part III.C.3.
509. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked
World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 747
(2008) (“The potential chilling effect due to relational surveillance poses serious risks
not only to individual privacy, but to the First Amendment rights to freedom of association and assembly.”); Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21,
28–29 (2013) (discussing Fourth Amendment searches in which the police accesses
recordings in public that they would otherwise not be able to see or hear). Public surveillance in violation of the Fourth Amendment can have a chilling effect on the First
Amendment.
510. See Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment To Do the Work of the First?,
127 YALE L.J.F. 444, 445 (2017).
511. See Kelly & Lerman, supra note 69; Boyd, supra note 69.
512. See George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter
Since Ferguson, INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 1:50 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/
07/24/documents-show-department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives
-matter-since-ferguson [https://perma.cc/LTZ2-V3LR]; Darwin BondGraham, Counter-Terrorism Officials Helped Track Black Lives Matter Protestors, E. BAY EXPRESS (Apr.
15, 2015), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/counter-terrorism-officials
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addition, individual choices to live free from government observation
and participate in certain social and recreational activities, religious
practices, or community groups will be curbed without a way to maintain some level of public obscurity.513 By eroding what Woodrow
Hartzog and Evan Selinger term the “practical obscurity” of public activity,514 face surveillance raises significant First and Fourth Amendment concerns and provides ample reason to ban its use.515 In sum,
generalized face surveillance should be banned under federal law,
with the only exceptions being for emergency or non-law enforcement
uses. Some cities have already enacted local bans.516
2. Require a Probable Cause Warrant for Face Identification
Police currently use face identification without any explicit legislative oversight or constitutional check. As detailed in Part II, while a
warrant requirement may not be constitutionally required under today’s doctrine, legislatures would be wise to future-proof their legislation with a heightened standard. Face identification should be regulated by a probable cause warrant requirement because of the
potential for abuse and the important due process and transparency
considerations around the use of new surveillance technologies.
The main reason for this warrant requirement involves the same
“digital is different” fears articulated by the Supreme Court, namely

-helped-track-black-lives-matter-protesters/Content?oid=4247605 [https://perma
.cc/4AGG-HKVP].
513. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Why You Can No Longer Get Lost in the
Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/
data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/9QQ2-9N4J].
514. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way To Think About
Your Data Than ‘Privacy,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than
-privacy/267283 [https://perma.cc/FA9K-B2TQ].
515. See Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96
N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2018); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by
Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 388 (2013).
516. See, e.g., Caroline Haskins, Oakland Becomes Third U.S. City To Ban Facial
Recognition, VICE (July 17, 2019, 6:41 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
zmpaex/oakland-becomes-third-us-city-to-banfacial-recognition-xz [https://perma
.cc/N3X3-S9F7]; Jon Schuppe, San Francisco’s Facial Recognition Ban Is Just the Beginning of a National Battle over the Technology, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/san-francisco-s-facial-recognition-ban-just-beginning-national-battle
-n1007186 [https://perma.cc/M7XY-XLU2] (May 22, 2019, 2:09 PM); Rachel Metz,
California Lawmakers Ban Facial-Recognition Software from Police Body Cams, CNN
BUS. (Sept. 13, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/tech/california
-body-cam-facial-recognition-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/NHF8-PHGQ].
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that the quantitatively and qualitatively different capabilities of digital
matching require caution and greater court oversight.517
The argument here is two-fold: first, because of the growing scale
and aggregation of digital images and the ease of automating face
identification, a heightened legal standard and additional legal process should be legislatively required. Second, this probable cause
standard will be relatively straightforward to operationalize in the
face identification context. Finally, because of the potential abuse and
overuse, the technology should be limited to serious felony crimes.
First, the scale of digital images available to police is simply too
great to allow unregulated face identification scans.518 Whereas today
a police officer might just match a target’s face to a local jail database,
the ability tomorrow to search any other database of images needs to
be regulated. Even the FBI’s own image database has grown to now
include access to a network of more than 400 million images.519 The
simple fact is that any government-controlled database can be expanded to include any number of images bought, scraped from the
web, or developed organically.520
In addition, the ease brought on by automation makes these
searches something different in kind than traditional photo matches.
It would be a mistake to mechanically equate past human search practices with the quantitatively and qualitatively different capabilities of
AI-powered pattern matching systems. Just because police officers
once could match a target image with a paper mugshot book does not
mean that the same officers should be able to run that image against
400 million images (or billions of Internet images) without any cause.
Too many innocent people are caught in that web521 and the capacity
to search these millions of innocent faces is simply too powerful without regulation.522
517. See Petrescu, supra note 19.
518. See supra Part I.B.
519. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-267, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY:
FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY (2016), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/677098.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9XK-8S93].
520. See supra Part I.B.
521. Kaveh Waddell, Half of American Adults Are in Police Facial-Recognition Databases, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/10/half-of-american-adults-are-in-police-facial-recognition-databases/504560
[https://perma.cc/8U5T-QVWJ].
522. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Amazon Needs To Stop Providing Facial
Recognition Tech for the Government, MEDIUM (June 21, 2018), https://medium.com/
s/story/amazon-needs-to-stop-providing-facial-recognition-tech-for-the
-government-795741a016a6 [https://perma.cc/BYX2-5Y7N].
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Importantly, the requirement of probable cause will prevent warrantless face identification from becoming an automated and continuous process. If police need no cause or justification to run a search of
an image against their growing image datasets, they could also automate this process.523 The result would be that every photograph in police possession or every photo taken through police-worn body cameras could be uploaded to see if a face identification match occurs
(with all the images permanently stored for future searches).524 A
probable cause warrant requirement, while not mandated by the current Fourth Amendment doctrine, allows for a balance of interests
that would limit the use to particular crimes and particular cases. Interposing a judge in the process will also provide an additional check
to minimize human error or a rush to target an individual.525
Second, the requirement of a probable cause threshold will not
be burdensome to meet in the context of face identification. In many
serious felony cases police have both probable cause a crime has occurred and a suspect’s photo.526 They wish to run the image in a particular database because they have no other leads. They have a defined
purpose, a defined image dataset, and probable cause to believe that
the face they are searching for will be in the dataset. Police have solved
crimes long before the ability to do dragnet-like face searches and
likely should be encouraged to not overly rely on the technology. If all
of these things are true, they would meet the requirements of a probable cause warrant to be signed by a judge.527
As an added benefit, the warrant process will generate a written
record allowing for a measure of transparency, accountability, and
avoidance of abuse.528 Probable cause warrants are not simply about
justifying an intrusion into personal privacy but also about documenting the use after the fact.529 Written records will reveal the scale,
523. See supra Part II.C.3.
524. See supra Part II.C.3.a.
525. See Williams, supra note 82.
526. See supra Part I.B.2.
527. Such a process has been proposed for other new digital technologies. See Natalie Ram, Christi J. Guerrini & Amy L. McGuire, Genealogy Databases and the Future of
Criminal Investigation, 360 SCIENCE 1078 (2018) (discussing a Wiretap Act-like requirement for genetic databases); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE 255–57 (2017) (proposing a Wiretap Act-like process for tracking technologies); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 497 (2012)
(discussing a Wiretap Act-like process for biometrics).
528. See, e.g., Wiretap Report 2017, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.uscourts
.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2017 [https://perma.cc/2TJ4-G5HN].
529. See, e.g., id.
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scope, and efficacy of the programs and also allow regular auditing
and accountability.530 Stories have already begun to emerge about the
consequences of an unregulated system of face identification used to
target low-level crimes and immigration enforcement.531 Finally, the
warrant process will provide a record to study if any alterations were
made to the searched photos or any deviations made in the process of
obtaining a match and also create a formal record suitable to be provided to prosecutors and defense counsel consistent with due process
protections including potential Brady material.532
3. Ban or Require a Probable Cause-Plus Standard (akin to the
Wiretap Act) for Face Tracking
Face tracking presents the most difficult legislative decision. The
danger, of course, is that face tracking is just face surveillance with a
particularized purpose.533 The technological process and surveillance
power is the same, but the purpose is to find a particular person at a
location, not generalized monitoring.
If police are given the power to search stored video footage and
real-time video monitors for their human target, a grave privacy
threat exists.534 Systems of surveillance will exist and be difficult to
deconstruct or limit.535 Such a capability could be misused by government authorities and, once built, could even be allowed by a change in
legislation. It is for this reason that many advocates have pushed for a
ban on all types of face tracking that use the face surveillance capabilities of the video camera systems.536 Trusting police to use a judicial
530. See, e.g., id.
531. E.g., Drew Harwell, Police Have Used Celebrity Look-Alikes, Distorted Images To
Boost Facial-Recognition Results, Research Finds, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/16/police-have-used-celebrity
-lookalikes-distorted-images-boost-facial-recognition-results-research-finds
[https://perma.cc/JUQ9-LNDF].
532. See Ben Conarck, Florida Courts Could Decide How Police Use Facial Recognition Tech, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/
Florida-Courts-Could-Decide-How-Police-Use-Facial-Recognition-Tech.html [https://
perma.cc/G7UN-R3EW]; Mak, supra note 252.
533. See supra Part I.B.
534. See supra Part II.
535. See supra Part II.B.7.
536. See, e.g., Petty, supra note 349; Devich-Cyril, supra note 5; Evan Selinger &
Woodrow Hartzog, What Happens When Employers Can Read Your Facial Expressions?,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/facial
-recognition-ban.html [https://perma.cc/ZHE7-GB9X]; Luke Stark, Facial Recognition
Is the Plutonium of AI, XRDS: CROSSROADS, Apr. 2019, at 50, 52–55, https://xrds.acm
.org/article.cfm?aid=3313129 [https://perma.cc/65PQ-CFX6]; Evan Greer, Don’t
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process or trusting that the legislative limits will not change is not a
risk advocates are willing to take. The arguments for this type of ban
of all forms of face surveillance (generalized and particularized) are
compelling and should be taken seriously.
Legislators should respect this legitimate fear and ban both face
surveillance (generalized) and face tracking (targeted) using stored
footage and real-time cameras. This would leave police with the capabilities to search through still photograph datasets (e.g., mugshots,
DMV records) with a warrant but not turn a network of surveillance
cameras into a tracking system. A probable cause requirement could
still be required for those mugshot/DMV photo searches, but it would
be limited to the current practice of just searching through datasets of
stored face images (not city-wide video surveillance streams). Having
thought about the issue carefully, were I given the choice, I would vote
to ban face tracking because of a lack of structural checks to prevent
misuse against marginalized communities and dissenting voices. The
history of policing shows little reason to have faith that the systems of
surveillance would not be abused.537
If, however, legislatures wished to allow carefully regulated police face tracking capabilities, legislation could authorize use of face
tracking for limited crimes and only with a heightened legal process.
One option would be to allow face tracking only on a probable causeplus standard for the most serious violent crimes, requiring an assertion of probable cause in a sworn affidavit, plus declarations that care
was taken to minimize unintended collection of other face images, that
no other investigative tools were possible, and that proper steps have
been taken to document and memorialize the collection.538 This standard (akin to a Wiretap Act warrant) would apply to all face tracking,
including stored surveillance scans, real-time scans, and third-party
image scans.539 As will be discussed below, while a significant risk to
liberty, this proposal fills the gaps of Fourth Amendment protection,
offers significantly more protection than the constitutional floor, and
responds to the different ways digital surveillance technologies will
expand in scope and scale over time.
Regulate Facial Recognition. Ban It., BUZZFEED NEWS (July 18, 2019), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/evangreer/dont-regulate-facialrecognition-ban-it
[https://perma.cc/WEQ7-J7WS]; Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/
s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://
perma.cc/Q992-YHKE].
537. See Vitale, supra note 347.
538. GRAY, supra note 527.
539. Id.
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The analogy here to the Wiretap Act is admittedly imperfect but
offers a working model for legislation.540 Designed to address another
form of valuable but personally revealing information, the Wiretap Act
provides law enforcement access to personal communications on a
showing of probable cause in addition to a few other requirements.541
The Wiretap Act is built around several limitations. First, it is limited to specific enumerated crimes, most of which are serious felonies.542 Second, the Act itself has four requirements: (1) probable
cause that a crime has been committed, (2) a minimization requirement to avoid unnecessary collection, (3) a declaration that other
means of investigation have been exhausted, and (4) a particularized
statement about the length of time and type of communication
sought.543 Notably, this process has been used without significant
complaint for decades by investigators and the courts in the context
of communications evidence.544
In the facial recognition context, a parallel process should be relatively easy to implement because all that would be required is a
showing of probable cause that a serious felony violent crime had
been committed, a declaration that the face tracking search was
540. The suggestion is also not new. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:
Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 14 (2004) (describing
the history of the Wiretap Act and how it can be adapted to new technologies); see also
Donohue, supra note 527; Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy,
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1280 (2004).
541. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 reads, in relevant part:
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication under this chapter shall specify—
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or
the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications,
and of the person authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including
a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
542. Id. § 2518.
543. Id.
544. See Wiretap Reports, U.S. CTS. (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics
-reports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports [https://perma.cc/8VAG-ANJE] (reporting information provided by federal and state officials on applications for wiretaps).

2021]

FACIAL RECOGNITION

1205

necessary because there were no other ways to obtain an identification, a statement about how other images of innocent people would be
minimized (e.g., images deleted), and the reason why police thought
the target’s image would be in the particular dataset. Like the Wiretap
Act, this process could be formalized and standardized (but also limited to only certain more serious types of crime—maybe even limited
to violent crime). The limitation for only serious crimes would bar the
use of facial recognition to investigate property-based or quality of life
crimes and non-violent incidents.
For some forms of targeted face tracking (e.g., stored footage
scans, third-party images scans with metadata), this type of probable
cause-plus standard is not only an important check on police power
but likely constitutionally necessary to survive a Fourth Amendment
challenge. If the Supreme Court is going to require a probable cause
warrant for systems of surveillance like cell-site data that can reveal
location, patterns, interests, and identity, some forms of facial recognition matching should be regulated by an appropriately high constitutional standard (probable cause or probable cause-plus). To be
clear, the dangers of face tracking outweigh the advantages and, especially at this early stage of development, the technology filled with error, marred by bias, and embedded in structural problems of police
power should be banned along with face surveillance.
4. Limit Face Verification to International Border Crossings
Government face verification may actually be the hardest technology to regulate as it has the potential to be the most ubiquitous.
From Apple iPhone log-ins to the tests of face verification on the international border, the ability to substitute face verification for the myriad security checkpoints encountered as we travel, enter government
buildings, conduct financial transactions, or enter other secure spaces
will be quite tempting.545
As this Article largely focuses on domestic law enforcement use
of facial recognition, the regulation of face verification is slightly misaligned, but the technology exposes related dangers. For example, in
jurisdictions that have “stop and identify” statutes on the books which
allow police to ask for identification after they have made a stop based
on reasonable suspicion,546 one could imagine that face verification
could be used to confirm identity. In addition, as the dissenting
545. See Joshi & Gupta, supra note 19, at 58 (describing uses such as “electoral registration, banking, electronic commerce, identifying newborn babies, establishing national IDs, passports, driving licenses, employee IDs and so on”).
546. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 182 (2004).
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Justices acknowledged in Utah v. Strieff, police have been known to use
warrant checks as a pretext to stop individuals.547 With face verification, this warrant-check justification could lead to the use or abuse of
facial recognition technology in pedestrian stops or car stops. Similarly, narcotics interdiction stops on busses and trains have become a
routine practice.548 The request to see identification and match it to a
bus or train ticket could also now include a face verification match.
Finally, one could imagine a facial recognition system in a police station to confirm identity in a routine booking situation.549
While none of these uses is all that different from what a human
police officer can do, it also muddies the line between face identification and face verification. Police could simply assert they are doing
face verification during a traffic stop when in truth they are attempting a warrantless face identification process. It is for this reason that
legislation should also address the potential abuse of face verification.
Face verification should be banned from ordinary domestic law enforcement. If there is a need to make a face match, then police can use
the face identification procedures of a probable cause warrant. If not,
they should not have routine warrantless access to the technology.
The only exception might be on the international border where
the interests of the government are the strongest,550 the Fourth
Amendment has little purchase,551 and individuals are already presenting themselves with government issued identification to prove
547. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
States and Federal Government maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding
warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses. . . . The county in
this case has had a ‘backlog’ of such warrants. . . . Justice Department investigations
across the country have illustrated how these astounding numbers of warrants can be
used by police to stop people without cause.”); see also id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In other words, the department’s standard detention procedures—stop, ask for
identification, run a check—are partly designed to find outstanding warrants. And find
them they will, given the staggering number of such warrants on the books.”).
548. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002).
549. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449 (2013).
550. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Consistently, therefore, with Congress’s power to protect the Nation by stopping and examining persons entering this country, the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness
is qualitatively different at the international border than in the interior. Routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant and first-class mail may be opened
without a warrant on less than probable cause.”).
551. Rosenzweig, supra note 321, at 1119 (“The fourth amendment’s restrictions
on searches do not apply at the nation’s borders. Law enforcement agents may search
any individual entering the country even without a warrant or a showing of probable
cause.”).
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identity. As currently designed, the face verification systems on the
border conduct a binary match of the passport photograph on file and
a digital photo of the person presenting herself.552 After the match, the
digital image is destroyed.553 While entry and exit records are maintained, the face image taken is not.554 Such a limited use could be allowed through carefully crafted legislation that would allow face verification in situations at international borders.
5. Require Accountability Around Error, Bias, Fairness, and
Transparency
Legislation can also address the Fourth Amendment’s inability to
confront the legitimacy questions around how well facial recognition
works or how it will be used. Legislation can be drafted to strengthen
the weaknesses around accuracy, bias, fairness, and transparency.
To address issues of error rates, legislation can require testing,
auditing, and third-party certification requirements and forbid use if
the technology does not pass the test.555 For example, as a precondition to utilizing any form of facial recognition, police (or the technology companies) could be required to reveal results from testing about
error rates. Such auditing should occur in product development and
be conducted by independent researchers.556 Similarly, after adoption, auditing measures to continue to test the technology could be required.557 The auditing could focus on accuracy and error rates and
also how the technology was used in actual practice. Such audits will
both offer a measure of practical accountability to prevent misuse and
ensure that the technology is improving in accuracy and precision and
not harming particular communities.558
552. See supra notes 42–43.
553. See supra notes 42–43.
554. See supra notes 42–43.
555. See Learned-Miller et al., supra note 355 (promoting an FDA-like regulation
structure to minimize harmful errors).
556. See, e.g., Ali Alkhatib et al., supra note 373; Inioluwa Deborah Raji & Joy Buolamwini, Actionable Auditing: Investigating the Impact of Publicly Naming Biased Performance Results of Commercial AI Products, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 AAAI/ACM
CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 429 (2019).
557. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 519 (discussing the need for
auditing); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, DOJ AND FBI HAVE
TAKEN SOME ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO GAO RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY, BUT ADDITIONAL WORK REMAINS (2019) (statement of Gretta L. Goodwin, Director of Homeland Security & Justice for the U.S. Government Accountability Office before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
700/699489.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLT5-8A72].
558. See Raji & Buolamwini, supra note 556.
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To address concerns about bias, certification and auditing could
include testing to track how facial recognition is used on people of different races, ethnicities, genders, ages, or other demographic characteristics. Of particular importance, the training data and on-going data
being fed into the system should be revealed. One way to avoid past
instances of biased data systems is to pay close attention to the types
of data going into the system to train the system and include individuals from all races, genders, and orientations in the creation of the
technologies.559 Systems that cannot show through audits that the
technology avoids bias should not be adopted. Systems that have not
incorporated and consulted with impacted communities should not be
authorized.
In addition, legislation could require public reporting about how
facial recognition technologies are deployed. Surveillance tools automatically raise discrimination concerns, so if past is prologue, the use
of the technology will impact poor communities and communities of
color more than other groups.560 The history of policing in America
supports an acute awareness that technology has been weaponized as
a mechanism of social control.561 There is little reason to think that the
development of face surveillance technology will be different than
past uses of surveillance technology. Early adopters have targeted
poor urban areas and communities of color.562 The choices of where
the cameras are placed, which datasets are used, how they are used,
and who is targeted must be publicly reported in order to avoid implicit or explicit discriminatory uses and unregulated systems of police surveillance power.
Fairness is a hard concept to legislate because the initial fairness
choices will all be baked into the design.563 The choices about how to
deploy the technology are also harder to legislate, as they will be local
choices and based around police necessity. But some forms of fairness
can be legislated such as giving fair notice about the use of the technology before deployment and reporting on any inequities in use. In
addition, enforcement provisions to ensure fairness can be included
in legislation. Civil remedies, administrative remedies, and damages
559. See generally supra Part I.A.
560. See Bedoya, supra note 349; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 349.
561. See Vitale, supra note 347; PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 59–
61 (2017); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury and Police Violence Against Black Men,
in POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 209, 209–33 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017).
562. Garvie & Moy, supra note 58.
563. See supra Part I.A.
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can all be included as a mechanism to check abuses. The costs for failing to comply with legislative requirements must be significant
enough to encourage adoption of best practices in terms of privacy,
civil liberties, and civil rights.
Most importantly in terms of fairness, legislatures should ensure
that due process protections are protected for criminal defendants.564
Facial recognition produces matches that vary in accuracy and certainty thresholds. Some matches might be considered 99% accurate
and some 27%, and the parties should know the difference. If the system returns 20 matches for a probe photograph in ranked order of
certainty, the other photographs should be preserved as possible impeachment evidence. The images may be exculpatory, impeach a witness, undermine the government’s investigation of the case, or reveal
an error in the software matching system itself. In the interest of fairness, these other photos and underlying system data need to be preserved and, if appropriate, turned over as Brady material.565 This preplea and pretrial disclosure would include all search queries used,
near matches not used in the photo array, documentation of the process, underlying validation and testing results, and information about
any alterations or changes made to the photographs.
Finally, transparency concerns can be built in akin to the Wiretap
Act which includes an annual public report of the types of warrants
requested and issued.566 A public report of how facial recognition was
used, in what types of cases, by whom, and the results can be required
by statute.567 In combination with the auditing provision that recertifies and protects against error and bias, these types of reporting requirements can generate a measure of public trust.
These ideas help ground a legislative framework that would be
able to respond to the failures of the Fourth Amendment and take seriously the privacy and legitimacy concerns of the technology that
might undermine it.

564. See Jack Karp, Facial Recognition Software Sparks Transparency Battle,
LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1215786/facial
-recognition-software-sparks-transparency-battle [https://perma.cc/7DVC-GSXK];
Jason Tashea, As Facial Recognition Software Becomes More Ubiquitous, Some Governments Slam on the Brakes, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/
web/article/facial-recog-bans [https://perma.cc/A7PQ-GM29]; Mak, supra note 252.
565. Mak, supra note 252; Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018).
566. The Wiretap Act audits are all publicly available on a government website. See
Wiretap Reports, supra note 544.
567. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Surveillance technologies like facial recognition can monitor
movements, transactions, families, and watch the religious and democratic habits of its populace, raising serious liberty concerns.568 Even
when not directed by police officers, omnipresent digital surveillance
undermines human privacy and threatens personal liberty.569
The harms associated with this type of surveillance are political,
personal, and corporal. Constant public surveillance chills associational freedom, inhibits expression, and undermines the freedom to
protest or petition for redress.570 The ability to carve out a private life
independent of government watchers is fundamental to modern
American life.571 Finally, the harm can be quite physical, as surveillance can lead to police contact and control. The social control powers
of surveillance do not always remain virtual but can have real world
impacts, especially with those individuals with less political power
and in already over-policed communities.572
Because of these dangers, facial recognition must be regulated by
legislative action.573 As discussed throughout this Article, the Fourth
Amendment largely fails to protect core issues of privacy and ignores
fundamental problems of error, bias, opacity, and unfairness. The
framework set forth in this Article offers a compromise that acknowledges that not all facial recognition technology is the same, but that all
such surveillance requires oversight and accountability. Legislative
action is required to ensure that the liberty interests threatened by
facial recognition remain secure.

568. See supra Part II.
569. See id.
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571. See Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 334.
572. See supra Part III.
573. Barry Friedman & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Opinion, Here’s a Way Forward
on Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
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